Prudential Arguments, Naturalized Epistemology, and the Will to Believe

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1):1 - 37 (1999)
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Abstract

This paper argues that treating James' "The Will to Believe" as a defense of prudential reasoning about belief seriously misrepresents it. Rather than being a precursor to current defenses of prudential arguments, James paper has, if anything, more affinities to certain prominent strains in contemporary naturalized epistemology.

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2009-01-28

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Henry Jackman
York University

Citations of this work

Science, Religion, and “The Will to Believe".Alexander Klein - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):72-117.
Idealism, Pragmatism, and the Will to Believe: Charles Renouvier and William James.Jeremy Dunham - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (4):1-23.
Reorienting Clifford’s evidentialism: returning to social trust.Ian MacDonald - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-22.
William James and the ‘willfulness’ of belief.Alexis Dianda - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):647-662.
The Metaphysics and Logic of Psychology: Peirce's Reading of James's Principles.Mathias Girel - 2003 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 39 (2):163-203.

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