Moral Knowledge and the Acquisition of Virtue in Aristotle's "Nicomachean" and "Eudemian Ethics"

Review of Metaphysics 54 (3):553 - 583 (2001)
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Abstract

IN BOTH THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS AND THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Aristotle says that the aim of ethical inquiry is a practical one; we want to know what virtue is so that we may become good ourselves and thereby do well and be happy. By classifying ethical inquiry as a practical endeavor, Aristotle is rejecting a view that he attributes to Socrates according to which ethics is a kind of theoretical science. In theoretical sciences, such as geometry or astronomy, the knowledge of a particular subject matter is sought as an end in itself, and the possession of such knowledge is sufficient to make one a geometer or an astronomer. In rejecting this model Aristotle argues that the knowledge of virtue is sought not solely for itself but in order to inform praxis and in order that we become virtuous and good, not by knowing what the virtues are but by cultivating them in practice.

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Alex John London
Carnegie Mellon University

Citations of this work

Empeiria and Good Habits in Aristotle’s Ethics.Marta Jimenez - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (3):363-389.
The independence of practical ethics.Alex John London - 2001 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 22 (2):87-105.

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