Abstract
We have been left with a big challenge, to articulate
consciousness and also to prove it in an artificial agent
against a biological standard. After introducing Boltuc’s
h-consciousness in the last paper, we briefly reviewed
some salient neurology in order to sketch less of a standard
than a series of targets for artificial consciousness, “most-consciousness” and “myth-consciousness.”
With these targets on the horizon, we began reviewing the research
program pursued by Jun Tani and colleagues in the isolation
of the formal dynamics essential to either. In this paper,
we describe in detail Tani’s research program, in order to
make the clearest case for artificial consciousness in these
systems. In the next paper, the third in the series, we will
return to Boltuc’s naturalistic non-reductionism in light of
the neurorobotics models introduced (alongside some
others), and evaluate them more completely.