The study analyzes the philosophy of artificial consciousness presented in the first season of TV series 'Westworld' and as a result of the analysis shows the collision of two opposite philosophical views on consciousness and the possibility of creation of artificial consciousness from the standpoint of two characters of TV series - Arnold Weber and Robert Ford. Arnold Weber proceeds from two philosophical assumptions: consciousness really exists and human consciousness can be a prototype for modeling consciousness in an artificial intelligence (...) bearer. And he has to choose: either to pick out one of the already existing conceptions of consciousness to implement the emergence of artificial consciousness within artificial intelligence or to invent his own; Arnold Weber chooses the Julian Jaynes' conception of consciousness as a basis for artificial consciousness what means that artificial consciousness must have the following features: 1) artificial consciousness has to be the result of the breakdown of the bicameral mind, the state of mind in which cognitive functions are divided into two part, a 'speaking' part and 'hearing' part, until the breakdown that makes the bicameral mind the unified mind; 2) artificial consciousness has to be a mind-space based on language and characterized by introspection, concentration, suppression, consilience and an analog 'I' narratizing in the mind-space. Robert Ford believes that consciousness does not exist at all and that there are only stories which human beings and artificial beings, modeled in the image and likeness of human beings, tell each other and always the basis of all those stories is suffering. (shrink)

The study outlines the existing and potential philosophical issues of the idea of conscious machines originated from the development of artificial consciousness within the framework of contemporary research of artificial intelligence and cognitive robotics. The outline shows that the idea of conscious machines is concerned with two big philosophical issues. The first philosophical issue is a definition of consciousness, taking into account the selection of a set of objects that can have consciousness, the typology of consciousness, the clarifying of the (...) nature of consciousness' carriers and the relationship between consciousness and its environment and the relationship between consciousness and language, in order to create an artificial consciousness within a machine, making that machine conscious. The second philosophical issue is a clarification whether only artificially created machines can be conscious machines, or cyborgizated human beings also can be considered of conscious machines. These philosophical issues show that there can be two ways to create conscious machines: 1) the creating of artificial consciousness within artificially created machine; and 2) the cyborgization of human being, transforming it into artificially created machine possessed natural consciousness. (shrink)

The study is to show the similarities between J. Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis and epistemic modal logic. According to the J. Fodor's hypothesis there is the language of thought that is the meta-language in which mental representations of attitudes of organism to propositions expressed in object-language are formulated. These attitudes are called "propositional attitudes". In the hypothesis propositional attitudes are thoughts and relations between organism and proposition. Propositional attitudes are of interest for epistemic modal logics. In epistemic logics propositional (...) attitudes are relations considered as modalities, i.e. propositions with modal operators. On certain conditions J. Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis may be considered as a sort of epistemic modal logic, only it would require certain updating as a formal logical system. The similarities between J. Fodor's Language of Thought and epistemic modal logics give two opportunities. First opportunity is to make special version of epistemic modal logic as an instrument of research for cognitive psychology based on J. Fodor's Language of Thought hypothesis. Second opportunity is to accept the idea of J. Fodor's Language of Thought as an innate language and to attain comprehension that epistemic modal logics are not especially constructed formal languages but innate cognitive programs. It might enable to extrapolate the idea of innate languages onto all formal languages including logical languages and to attempt verifying that idea experimentally within cognitive sciences. (shrink)