This chapter takes a closer look at the doctrine of common notions and universal consent developed by Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–51) in his Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature, a work based on lectures delivered at Cambridge in 1645–46, but only published posthumously in 1652. I study Culverwell’s doctrine of common notions and universal consent from the perspective of his critical discussion of two contemporary works, namely Descartes’s Discours de la méthode (1637) and Robert Greville’s The Nature of (...) Truth (1640). I argue that, contrary to Wallis who was indeed an Aristotelian who rejected innate ideas entirely, Culverwell adopted a characteristically stoic position, according to which common notions do not directly derive from sense experience, but are innate dispositions common to all which become present to the mind only under the impact of the senses. (shrink)

This note establishes a new identification result for additive random utility discrete choice models. A decision-maker associates a random utility Uj+mj\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$U_{j}+m_{j}$$\end{document} to each alternative in a finite set j∈1,…,J\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$j\in \left\{ 1,\ldots,J\right\} $$\end{document}, where U=U1,…,UJ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {U}=\left\{ U_{1},\ldots,U_{J}\right\} $$\end{document} is unobserved by the researcher and random with an unknown joint distribution, while the perturbation m=m1,…,mJ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} (...) \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {m}=\left $$\end{document} is observed. The decision-maker chooses the alternative that yields the maximum random utility, which leads to a choice probability system m→Pr1|m,…,PrJ|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf { m\rightarrow }\left,\ldots,\Pr \left \right) $$\end{document}. Previous research has shown that the choice probability system is identified from the observation of the relationship m→Pr1|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$ \mathbf {m}\rightarrow \Pr \left $$\end{document}. We show that the complete choice probability system is identified from observation of a relationship m→∑j=1sPrj|m\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\mathbf {m}\rightarrow \sum _{j=1}^{s}\Pr \left $$\end{document}, for any sshrink)

While the field of semiotics has been active since it was started by Peirce, it appears like the last decade has been especially productive with a number of important new concepts being developed within the biosemiotics community. The novel concept of the Semiotic scaffold by Hoffmeyer is an important addition that offers insight into the hardware requirements for bio-semiosis. As any type of semiosis must be dependent upon Semiotic scaffolds, I recently argued that the process of semiosis has to be (...) divided into two separate processes of sign establishment and sign interpretation, and that misalignment between the two processes result in faulty sign interpretation and over-signification. Such faulty signs were forbidden in the sign classification system of Peirce, so I defined them as forbidden signs. Here I present an analysis of the forbidden sign categories with examples from Occult semiotics. I also show that biological semiosis offers examples of forbidden signs, where the faulty interpretation of signs may lead to decimation of whole evolutionary lines of organisms. A new concept of Evolutionary memory which is applicable to both human and biological semiosis is explained as the combination of two processes; one leading to diversity generation within semiotic scaffolds followed by a second process of decimation of faulty signs during selection in specific learning environments. The analysis suggests that forbidden signs are always used as early stages in the iterative sign establishment process during semiosis. (shrink)

This volume collects contributions from leading scholars of early modern philosophy from a wide variety of philosophical and geographic backgrounds. The distinguished contributors offer very different, competing approaches to the history of philosophy.

The paper shows the standard definition of time at a distance to be beset with ambiguities that may be solved by making a fresh start taking its point of departure in the idea of a cosmic time as proposed by the British tradition of relativistic cosmology.

The paper shows the standard definition of time at a distance to be beset with ambiguities that may be solved by making a fresh start taking its point of departure in the idea of a cosmic time as proposed by the British tradition of relativistic cosmology.

This paper discusses Baruch de Spinoza’s cosmological argument for the existence of God (CA) as it can be found in ’Ethics’, I, proposition 11, demonstration 3. The aim of the article is to provide a reconstruction of the argument by developing the underlying metaphysical framework governing it. It is partly motivated by Michael Della Rocca’s attempt to account of fundamental principles of Spinoza’s philosophy. According to him, all dependence relations in Spinoza can be reduced to conceptual ones. I argue to (...) the contrary that Spinoza’s theories of causation and power are more fundamental than his theory of concepts. I discuss the CA as a point of departure for arguing this, and for suggesting what I consider to be a more faithful approach to Spinoza’s metaphysics as a whole. (shrink)

Summary At the beginning of this century most scholars believed that the document inserted in Dem. 24.20–23 was authentic. It regulated the legislative procedure practiced by the Athenians in the fourth century B.C. which was introduced shortly after the restoration of the democracy in 404/403 B.C. But in his monograph “The Documents in the Attic Orators” (Oxford 2013), 80–102, Mirko Canevaro rejected the document at Dem. 24.20–23 as a late forgery. I responded with the article “The Authenticity of the Law (...) about nomothesia Inserted in Demosthenes Against Timokrates 20–23”, Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies 56 (2016), 438–476. In Klio 100 (1) (2018), “The Authenticity of the Document at Demosth. or. 24.20–3, the Procedures of nomothesia and the so-called ἐπιχɛιροτονία τῶν νόμων”, 70–124, Canevaro contested my arguments and restated his view that the document must be a late forgery. This article is my response to Canevaro’s article. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 1 Seiten: 135-152.

The paper shows the standard definition of time at a distance to be beset with ambiguities that may be solved by making a fresh start taking its point of departure in the idea of a cosmic time as proposed by the British tradition of relativistic cosmology.

Emil Boesen.--Ilia Fibiger.--Mathilde Leiner.--Ernesto Dalgas.

Udgivet i forbindelse med Mogens Pahuus's fratrædelse som professor ved Aalborg Universitet.

Gennem filosofiske refleksioner og litterære analyser af danske og udenlanske forfattere diskuteres sammenhængen mellem begreberne tomhedsfølelse og ondskab.

The theory of the separation of powers between a legislature, an executive and a judiciary is still the foundation of modern representative democracy. It was developed by Montesquieu and came to replace the older theory of the mixed constitution which goes back to Plato, Aristotle and Polybios: there are three types of constitution: monarchy, oligarchy and democracy; when institutions from each of the three types are mixed, an interplay between the institutions emerges that affects all functions of state: legislation, implementation (...) of laws and jurisdiction. Today Montesquieu's separation of powers is riddled with so many exceptions that it is an obstacle rather than a help to understand the structure of modern democracy. The mixed constitution deserves to be revived as a corrective to the prevailing view that Western states are pure democracies and that democracy is rule by the people. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explore the complex and neglected tradition of the early modern common notion. I focus on three thinkers, two of them innatist in some sense, one of them not; all (mostly) products of the English context; all arguably part of the background for Locke’s critique of common notions and innate ideas in the first book of the Essay; and all related to each other in various and complicated ways. They are: Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1582–1648), Kenelm Digby (...) (1603–1665), and Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651). I show how they deployed three different theories of common notions that we can describe, respectively, as gnoseological, rhetorical, and allegorical. (shrink)

A Reply P. Flensted-Jensen/M. H. Hansen: Pseudo-Skylax' Use of the Term Polis M. H. Hansen: City-Ethnics as Evidence for Polis Identity .

In Politikos Plato draws a picture of the true statesman, a picture that has baffled several of the scholars who have analysed the dialogue, because it appears to be very abstract and remote from what we know about the development of the political organization of the poleis in the Archaic and Classical periods. In this article I argue that there is a clear historical background to the person whom Plato calls a statesman, viz., the famous legislators of the Archaic period, (...) in particular Lykourgos, Charondas, Zaleukos and Solon. My argument proceeds in two parts: first a survey of Plato's general description of the statesman and second a sketch of the historical prototype of Plato's statesman. (shrink)

In the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz famously declared that he once had “begun to lean towards” Spinozist necessitarianism. In this article, I argue that this remark refers to his modal philosophy anterior to 1677. Leibniz’s mature refutation of Spinoza’s necessitarianism relies on the notion that pure possibility has some sort of reality in God’s mind, because only this allows for a strong notion of divine choice. But I believe that Leibniz only developed this ontology of possibility after 1677. Before this date, (...) he inclined towards the view that non existing possibilities are mere logical abstractions that God never actually conceives. In order to show this, I analyze a series of early texts written between 1668 and 1676. Next, I consider a series of texts from 1677-1678, where Leibniz developed his ontology of possibility and put it to use against Spinozist necessitarianism for the first time. (shrink)