ABSTRACTA paper in two parts, the first is a critique of the commonly held view among both cognitivist and non-cognitivist sport philosophers that conscious mental representation of knowledge that is a necessary condition for skill acquisition. The second is a defense of a necessary causal condition for skill acquisition, a necessary causal condition that is mimetic, physically embodied, and socially embedded. To make my case I rely throughout on a common thought experiment in and beyond the philosophy of sport literature, (...) the seminal work of Kuhn and Quine counter the representational theory of knowledge, and recent argument in the philosophy of sport related to neurophysiology, cognition, and intentionality. Ultimately I conclude that the failure of a necessary representational condition and its replacement by a necessary casual condition in skill acquisition jeopardizes much of what has been said in the philosophy of sport about not just skill acquisition but the more popular topic of high-level skill. It does, because it challenges the assumption that there is some necessary baseline knowledge that which, according to cognitivists, is brought forward in some way into highly skillful performance or, according to non-cognitivists, is somehow left behind or subsumed into a background in highly skillful performance. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, beyond a philosophy of sport, space should be made for a ‘philosophy from sport.’ A philosophy from sport is one that can allow us to see sport as more than instantiating broader social values or possessing an isolated set of unique values. It can, as I believe a philosophy from sport, by paying special attention to the actual practice of sport, bring with it ways of developing, informing, even justifying a set of broader social (...) values. Using as a test case Michael Sandel’s arguments counter markets in What Money Can’t Buy, with a particular focus on his critique of naming rights for stadiums and arenas, I maintain that sport shows how markets can be reformed in order not to suffer the charge that they breed inequality and corruption or indecency. In fact, with sport, I argue it is possible to see exactly how markets can serve equality, decency, and ultimately the pursuit of excellence. Relying, in part, on the work of philosophers of sport from div.. (shrink)

This paper explores metaphilosophy’s role in pragmatism. It does so particularly in relation to pragmatism’s multiplying and competing forms (e.g. classical pragmatism, neo-pragmatism, analytic pragmatism, third-wave pragmatism, new pragmatism, etc.). Focusing on the most comprehensive treatment of metaphilosophy in pragmatism, that of Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse, I argue their attempt to turn pragmatism into a metaphilosophy is problematic. Using a “metaphilosophical minimalism” to address pragmatism’s tendency toward what they label an inward looking and dogmatic “insularity” and “triumphalism” – a (...) tendency that feeds competition among pragmatists – I charge displays that very tendency (it also leads to a regress). I then pivot to outline what I dub “eclectic pragmatism.” This pragmatism embraces the contemporary zeitgeist of the inclusionary, decentered “more.” It does so by abandoning competition over the singular, right form of pragmatism (and indeed philosophy). It embraces the “more,” but not because it is right (which would be an obvious contradiction). Rather, it embraces the “more” because it is “’satisfying.” Simply put, there is a metaphilosophy at work with eclectic pragmatism. It is a “naturalized metaphilosophy” where the “choice” for pragmatism, especially eclectic pragmatism, is seen to stem from psychological and sociological propensities not the necessity of long exalted “reason.”. (shrink)

This paper develops an understanding of the nature of sport fans that helps rebut the charge of nihilism leveled against identity anti-essentialism as represented in the work of Butler, Appiah, and...

This paper develops a position I call “apathetic pragmatism.” Apathetic pragmatism is a form of pragmatism that, through advocating “apathy” about the topic of truth, avoids the troubled identification of utility and truth found in classical and neo pragmatist theories of truth. Initially explored by Stephen Stich, I argue Stich’s case for apathetic pragmatism relies upon a theory of truth that causes vicious circularity. I then pursue a different route to apathetic pragmatism, one that sees apathetic pragmatism as a “paradigm (...) shift” in relation to previous forms of pragmatism. It is a paradigm shift where pragmatism becomes a normative view concerning the questions that are necessary to ask, not an attempt to answer questions assumed necessary. (shrink)