Abstract: A current debate in semantics and pragmatics is whether all contextual effects on truth-conditional content can be traced to logical form, or 'unarticulated constituents' can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment. In this paper, I defend the latter position. The main objection to this view is that free enrichment appears to overgenerate, not predicting where context cannot affect truth conditions, so that a systematic account is unlikely (Stanley, 2002a). I first examine the semantic alternative proposed by (...) Stanley and others, which assumes extensive hidden structure acting as a linguistic trigger for pragmatic processes, so that all truth-conditional effects of context turn out to be instances of saturation. I show that there are cases of optional pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed that cannot plausibly be accounted for in this way, and that advocates of this approach will therefore also have to appeal to free enrichment. The final section starts to address the question of how free enrichment is constrained: I argue that it involves only local development or adjustment of parts of logical form, any global developments being excluded by the requirement for the proposition expressed to provide an inferential warrant for the intended implications of the utterance. (shrink)

It is argued that genuinely subsentential phrases, such as a discourse-initial utterance of “From France” to indicate the provenance of an item, provide evidence for the reality of the pragmatic process of free enrichment. I consider recent attempts to treat such discourse-initial fragments as linguistic ellipsis of some kind while accommodating the difference between these cases and accepted types of ellipsis such as sluicing and gapping. I claim that the mechanisms they posit to save an ellipsis story have no role (...) in an account of performance. An argument against the enrichment approach from the indeterminacy of the content of subsentential utterances is discussed, and refuted, and it is shown how this indeterminacy is accommodated in a contextualist pragmatic theory. (shrink)

Increasing genetic knowledge over the last decade has enabled hundreds of genetic variants associated with inherited cardiac conditions to be identified, many of which cause increased risk of sudden cardiac death. While individually these conditions are rare, taken together they impose a significant burden. The severity of these conditions—the possibility that they might cause sudden unheralded death of a teenager or young adult—juxtaposed with uncertainty about the pathology linked with many of the genetic variants is significant in terms of professional (...) practice because, increasingly, clinicians have been encouraged to cascade out genetic testing from the proband or consultand to other family members who may be at risk of developing the same condition. This process often involves sharing human tissue samples, DNA or personal information. This paper reviews the legal and regulatory frameworks which may apply when tissue and DNA samples are collected, used and retained, both for the purpose of diagnosis and for benefiting other family members, when a suspected or definitive diagnosis of an inherited cardiovascular condition is made. Sometimes the interests of family members may conflict, and it may be difficult for practitioners to reconcile the interests of one family member with another, particularly if the balance of benefits and harms from testing is unclear. The paper then examines some of the ethical tensions which may arise in practice and concludes that all involved should be conversant with the legal and ethical frameworks that apply. (shrink)