This article analyzes the four main criticisms against commercial manipulative advertising : the virtue ethics criticism, the utilitarian criticism, the autonomist criticism, and the Kantian criticism. After demonstrating the weaknesses of the virtue ethics criticism, the utilitarian criticism, and the autonomist criticism, I reconstruct the latter using Kant’s conception of autonomy. In doing so, I simultaneously expand the Kantian criticism: irrational advertising not only entails treating humanity merely as means, but it also threatens moral autonomy by encouraging heteronomy and sometimes (...) even a rebellion against the moral law. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to defend Kant’s idea of the highest good as part of his ethics, particularly in relation to the alleged problem of impossibility, according to which it would be impossible to promote it, due to the obscurity of moral intentions and of the relative nature of happiness. As a preliminary step, a singular definition of the highest good is unfolded, one that sees the highest good as a moral world where virtue will be rewarded with (...) happiness, which is a duty and an object of hope, individually and collectively. Regarding the defense itself, a distinction is made between fallible and infallible duties, and a soft interpretation of the “ought implies can” principle (as developed by Stern) is used. The article also points out what is yet required for an overarching defense of the highest good, namely, a response to the other problems at stake, which are here labeled as those of heteronomy (the highest good undermines the principle of autonomy, since it as an object includes happiness), deduction (the highest good is not contained and does not follow from the moral law), and irrelevance (the highest good is irrelevant for ethics). (shrink)

Como introducción interpretativa a la “segunda etapa” de la teoría moral de F. Miró Quesada (1918), se analizan sus tres últimos trabajos éticos para ver cómo intenta refi-nar la deontología kantiana, superar sus aparentes límites –materialismo encubierto, formalismo vacío y dualismo absurdo–, y repensar la moral como una moneda de dos caras: simetría y no arbitrariedad. Se presta especial atención a la simetría como condición suficiente para la ética.

The goal of this article is to introduce, interpret, and defend the originality of the «first half» of the rational foundation of ethics of Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias (Lima 1918-2019). To do so, we will focus on his three first ethical works —«El Intelectual, el Occidente y la Política» (1965), «Sobre el Derecho Justo» (1976) y «Ser Humano Naturaleza, Historia» (1987)—, leaving his later works aside for a complementary work. We will show how Miró Quesada tries to refine Immanuel Kant’s (...) moral philosophy, overcoming its possible main flaw —here called disguised materialism— and rethinking the supreme moral principle, which he calls non-arbitrariness. We will also evaluate both his thesis that the principle of non-arbitrariness is the necessary condition of ethics and his invitation to renounce looking for its sufficient condition. On the way, we will highlight the originality of Miró Quesada’s proposal. Finally, we will advance the central thesis of his later ethical works and posit brief questions that his moral theory needs to answer. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to think the moral law in Francisco Miró Quesada's version: What is its source? What does it orders? And why is it important for ethics? The paper answers this question while contrasting Miró Quesada's position with that of Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant.

El presente artículo tiene tres objetivos: a. compilar las críticas planteadas en contra del sumo bien kantiano ; b. elaborar una revisión crítica de las respectivas defensas; y c. desarrollar una nueva defensa, con énfasis en el problema de derivación. Respecto al primero punto, el artículo muestra que son al menos cinco los problemas que amenazan la doctrina: heteronomía, derivación, imposibilidad, irrelevancia y dualismo. Respecto al segundo, el artículo revela que las múltiples defensas elaboradas en nombre del sumo bien son (...) fuente, a su vez, de otros problemas, como los de incompletitud, ilusión, injusticia, deslealtad y escisión. Respecto al tercer y principal punto, y empezando por la derivación, el artículo propone ver al sumo bien como el objeto construido de la ley moral. Resuelto el problema de derivación, el artículo ofrece breves respuestas a los otros problemas en juego. El artículo también traduce por primera vez, del inglés al español, fragmentos de importantes publicaciones sobre el sumo bien. (shrink)

What is a conflict of interest? What is morally problematic about one? Beginning with the definition, this paper organizes the core literature and creates two continuums—one devoted to the more specific definition of ‘interest,’ and the other to that of ‘duty’. Each continuum places the authors according to the narrowness or broadness of their positions, which facilitates the understanding of the debate as well as what is at stake when defining conflicts of interest. The paper then develops a moral analysis (...) that leads to the sought-for definition and to an explanation of why we should treat conflicts of interest carefully. While doing so, the paper discloses the criterion to judge whether a definition is right and presents the duties that makes conflicts of interest special as ‘tertiary’ duties of morality. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es introducir, interpretar y defender la originalidad de la «primera mitad» de la fundamentación racional de la ética de Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias. Para ello, nos enfocaremos en sus tres primeros trabajos éticos —«El Intelectual, el Occidente y la Política», «Sobre el Derecho Justo» y «Ser Humano Naturaleza, Historia» — dejando sus escritos posteriores para un trabajo complementario. Mostraremos cómo Miró Quesada intenta refinar la filosofía moral de Immanuel Kant, superando su posible mayor defecto —aquí (...) llamado materialismo encubierto— y repensando el principio moral supremo, al que llama no arbitrariedad. Evaluaremos también su tesis de que el principio de no arbitrariedad es la condición necesaria de la ética y su invitación a renunciar a buscar su condición suficiente. En el camino, resaltaremos la originalidad de la propuesta de Miró Quesada. Finalmente, adelantaremos la tesis central de sus textos éticos posteriores y plantearemos breves preguntas que su teoría moral requiere responder. (shrink)

In the 1960s Lewis White Beck criticized Kant’s highest good as a moral concept. In 1963 John Silber responded. Thus, the “Beck-Silber controversy.” This paper explores such controversy in the Spanish literature. It begins identifying four criticisms: the problems of heteronomy, derivation, impossibility, and irrelevance. It then identifies a new problem rescued from the Spanish literature: dualism. After categorizing, following Matthew Caswell, the Spanish defenses into revisionists, secularizers, and maximalists, this paper assesses these defenses. The paper also translates sections of (...) such literature into English and leaves us closer to a complete defense of the highest good by salvaging what it can of the Spanish literature’s unique points. (shrink)