(i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any change, C, among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C. (ii) If God knows the occurrence of C, then X. (iii) not-X. It is clear that the set of propositions (i)—(iii) is inconsistent. This is the general form of two problems—which I call the ‘problem of change in knowledge’ (PCK) and the ‘problem of change in essence’ (PCE)—for Avicenna concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. No work in the secondary literature has discussed exactly what (...) PCK and PCE are. In this paper, I will clarify exactly what they are. (shrink)

God is omniscient; therefore, He knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red.’ If God knows that ‘the flower in my hand is red,’ then He knows it perceptually. God does not know anything perceptually. It is clear that the set of propositions – form an inconsistent triad. This is one of four problems with which Avicenna was engaged concerning God's knowledge of particulars, which I call the problem of perceptual knowledge. In order to solve PPK and three other (...) problems, Avicenna has developed a theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. Secondary literature around Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has mostly directed its attention to give an account of Avicenna’s positive theory rather than the problems which that theory was designed to solve. But this paper will not do the same thing as this secondary literature. In contrast, in this paper, I will concentrate on the characterization of one of the problems, i.e., PPK, because of which Avicenna has presented his positive theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. In short, this paper aims to show why Avicenna deems explaining God’s knowledge of, say, the redness of a flower, via his accepted theory of perception as problematic. In this regard, I will extract three versions of PPK based on Avicenna's philosophy and through it will shed some light on Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. (shrink)

It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his theory concerning God’s knowledge of particulars is that one of them, which I call the Neglected Interpretation, appeals to some metaphysical entities as the proxies of concrete particular objects, which are distinct from God’s essence, to explain God’s knowledge of particulars, while the other type does not. The views of post-Avicennian thinkers like (...) Suhrawardī and Ṭūsī of Avicenna’s account are classifiable under the Neglected Interpretation, as shown by their objections to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. This type of interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars has been neglected in the secondary English literature on the issue. In this paper, I will present a reconstructed version of this type of interpretation of the Avicennian theory of divine knowledge. (shrink)

It seems Avicenna’s passages regarding God’s knowledge of particulars are susceptible of being given two different types of interpretation. The main difference between these two accounts of his the...

God is omniscient; therefore, for any two propositions, P1 and P2, God knows both that P1 and P2. If God knows multiple things, then God is not simple. But, God is supposed to be a s...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Long Way to God's Mutability:A Response to Ebrahim AzadeganAmirhossein Zadyousefi (bio)I. IntroductionIn his "On the Incompatibility of God's Knowledge of Particulars and the Doctrine of Divine Immutability: Towards a Reform in Islamic Theology" (2020, 2022) Ebrahim Azadegan tries to make room for what he calls a reform in Islamic theology. Affirming that God's knowledge of particulars is inconsistent with God's immutability, Azadegan puts forward a theory of God's (...) knowledge of particulars, inspired from Sadrā's philosophy, which allows one to (1) explain God's knowledge of particulars and (2) hold that God is mutable. That is, Azadegan, accusing Avicenna of having the dogma of God's immutability, abandons God's immutability in favor of God's knowledge of particulars and thinks that a God who knows particulars but is mutable is more perfect than a God who does not know particulars but is immutable. In the present response, I shall show that Azadegan's project is not as easy as he thinks, and I will criticize it. Let us have a short look at Azadegan's project. II. Azadegan's ProjectAzadegan's 2020 essay consists of three parts. In the following, I will present a brief summary of each. In the first part, Azadegan tries to delineate the main contours of a debate in Islamic intellectual tradition over God's knowledge of particulars—a debate chiefly between Ghazālī and Avicenna—and shows how God's knowledge of particulars is in tension with God's immutability. He summarizes this debate in the following argument:1. God is omniscient. 2. Every omniscient being knows all past, present, and future particular states of the world and of individuals. 3. Particular states of the world and of individuals change.4. Every sort of knowledge will change with the change of its object. 5. [Therefore] God's knowledge of occurrent particulars changes. [End Page 166]6. Knowledge is an intrinsic property of every individual, including God.7. [Therefore] God's intrinsic property regarding His knowledge of particulars changes.8. God's intrinsic properties are His essential properties.9. [Therefore] God's essential properties change. 10. [Therefore] God is not immutable.1Then he states that God's knowledge of particulars, in both Avicenna's and Ghazālī's views, is inconsistent with God's immutability.2 That is, if one holds that God knows particulars (premise 2), according to the argument above, one has to accept that God is not immutable (premise 10). According to Azadegan, Avicenna denies God's knowledge of particulars, that is, premise 2 of the argument above, in order to avoid its conclusion (premise 10). 3 But, Azadegan is well aware that only temporal knowledge of changing particulars entails a change in God's essence. So, he mentions that by introducing knowledge in a universal way Avicenna tries to save premise 2 of the preceding argument while denying its fifth premise. 4But Azadegan thinks that Avicenna's appeal to knowing in a universal way does not help him, and this way of knowing particulars "cannot in the end accommodate God's knowledge of occurrent particulars and the phenomenal states of other minds"5 and "the contents of our senses and particular mental states."6 "God does not" even "know what time it is"7 and "what particular qualitative or phenomenal properties any particular individual has been experiencing when he or she has felt a pain or some other sensation."8 Azadegan states that Avicenna warmly welcomes such a result because Avicenna thinks that God's lack of knowledge of changing particulars partly constitutes God's perfectness.9 But he disagrees with Avicenna and, following Ghazālī, holds that such a God is perfect only in name. Following Ghazālī, Azadegan makes a connection between God's perfectness, God's immutability, and God's knowledge of particulars and holds that a God who knows particulars but is mutable is more perfect than a God who does not know particulars but is immutable.10 He believes that the conception of God introduced by Avicenna (a God who lacks knowledge of changing particulars) does not correspond to the God introduced by... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hylomorphism, Change, and God's Mutability:A Rejoinder to Ebrahim AzadeganAmirhossein Zadyousefi (bio)In "A Long Way to God's Mutability: A Response to Ebrahim Azadegan"1 I tried to challenge what Azadegan says in his "On the Incompatibility of God's Knowledge of Particulars and the Doctrine of Divine Immutability: Towards a Reform in Islamic Theology."2 Then, in his "Necessary Existence, Immutability, and God's Knowledge of Particulars: A Reply to Amirhossein Zadyousefi,"3 Azadegan replies (...) to my response. In my response to Azadegan, I discussed many points, and Azadegan did not deal with all of them in his reply. So, in this short rejoinder, I will deal with what Azadegan has said about some of my criticisms. Before proceeding, I should say that in my response to Azadegan I remained neutral on whether God is mutable or not. All I have done there is to show that Azadegan's path to God's mutability by adopting Sadra's knowledge-by-presence theory is not as easy as it initially seems. Also, I have tried to show that Avicenna does not adopt the dogma of God's immutability. Rather, he has some reasons for adopting this view. I understand that one might challenge Avicenna's reasons for God's immutability. But, as I insisted in my first response to Azadegan, we should be careful not to conflate having a dogma with having a bad reason.In his reply to my response, Azadegan states that "according to Zadyousefi, Avicenna believes in an incompatibility between God's necessary existence and the denial of divine immutability." Then, he presents the following argument that he calls "Argument from God's Necessary Existence to His Immutability": [End Page 196]A1:1. God is a necessary existent.2. A necessary being possesses his attributes necessarily (the principle of 'Necessity of a necessary Being's Attributes').3. If God has a certain knowledge-set, then He has it necessarily.4. A necessary existent exists in all possible worlds and at all times.5. In all possible worlds God has a certain fixed knowledge-set.6. So what God knows at w1 (in a possible world w1 or in time t1 in the actual world) is the same as what God knows at w2 (or t2).7. Therefore, God is immutable."4But I have not argued by virtue of the above argument that according to Avicenna God's being a necessary existent is inconsistent with God's mutability. Instead, I have presented the following argument to show that:A2:Avicenna, following Aristotle, explains change via matter. That is, if something undergoes change or can undergo change, then it is composed of matter and form and hence it is material. Now, since every material being is constituted by a matter-form compound, every material being is dependent on its constituents (matter and form) and therefore is a contingent being. For a contingent being, according to Avicenna, is a being that is dependent on something else. So, every material being would be contingent. Therefore, God's mutability entails God's being material, which in turn entails God's being contingent. So, God's being a necessary existent is incompatible with God's mutability.As we can see, this argument is completely different from A1. I suspect Azadegan's A1 is a misinterpretation of an objection that I raised against him. In his initial paper, following Ghazālī, Azadegan states that, according to Avicenna, God's knowledge of particulars is in tension with God's eternality. In my response, I argued that this is not the case. According to Avicenna, God's knowledge of changing particulars, based on some certain mechanism for knowing the occurrence of a change among particulars (i.e., knowledge of change through indexical propositions), is in tension with God's being a necessary existent. I stated this inconsistency as follows:A3:8. God is omniscient.9. Therefore, for any change C among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C.10. For any knower S, if S knows the occurrence of C, then S's set of knowledge changes (based on indexical propositions). [End Page 197]11. If S's set of knowledge changes... (shrink)

Allegedly, according to Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars, God knows particulars in a universal way or universally. But, it is controversial how we should interpret knowing in a universal way. It seems knowing in a universal way is a black-box in Avicenna’s theological context. However, Peter Adamson in his valuable ‘On Knowledge of Particulars’ has suggested a novel approach to decode this black-box in Avicenna’s theological context. According to Adamson, the key for this black-box is embedded in Avicenna’s (...) epistemological context, i.e., Kitāb al-Burhān. It seems Adamson’s interpretation of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars consists of two main steps. Firstly, on the basis of Kitāb al-Burhān, he tries to show that knowing in a universal way amounts to knowing syllogistically. For example, when, based on the syllogism “(I) all humans are animals, (II) Zayd is a human, and therefore (III) Zayd is an animal” one knows that ‘Zayd is an animal,’ one knows it universally. Secondly, on the basis of the first step, Adamson tries to show how we should interpret Avicenna’s theory. The upshot of Adamson’s interpretation is that God knows only essential features of particulars and not their accidental features. In this paper, I will argue that both steps in Adamson’s account of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars face serious problems. (shrink)

Michael E. Marmura, an outstanding Avicenna scholar, has presented a special interpretation of Avicenna’s view concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. In this paper, which consists of two parts, we will examine his interpretation of Avicenna. In the first part, we briefly present Marmura’s reading of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. According to Marmura’s interpretation of Avicenna, God only knows, individually, particular entities which are the only member of their species. Also, He knows, individually, particular events which are attributed (...) to such particular entities. Arguing that Avicenna’s theory is not able to explain God’s knowledge of ‘all’ particulars, Marmura concludes that Avicenna ‘believed’ that God does not know all particulars individually. In the second part, we will object his interpretation. The most important criticisms are as follows: he has not determined what problems Avicenna’s theory aims to solve; he has not touched two important elements of Avicenna’s theory, i.e., God’s knowledge of particulars by means of their forms, and God’s knowledge of particulars by means of His causal relation with them; and he presents an erroneous interpretation of Avicenna’s use of the eclipse example. (shrink)