In Republic II Glaucon assigns to Socrates the task of praising justice for itself. What it means to praise justice for itself is unclear. A new interpretation is offered on the basis of an analysis of Glaucon's division of goods. A distinction is developed between criterial benefits, those valuable consequences of a thing which provide a standard for evaluating a thing as a good instance of its type, and fringe benefits, valuable consequences which do not provide such a standard. Socrates (...) is expected to praise justice by describing the benefits it constitutes as a valuable activity of soul. He may also use the criterial benefits of justice but not its fringe benefits. This account of Socrates' task is superior to those interpretations which rule out all use of valuable consequences in praising justice and to those interpretations which fail to preserve the distinction between the second and third classes of goods. (shrink)

This book explores a variety of teleology present in Plato's Republic, in which actions are carried out for the sake of an end that is not the intended goal. Payne draws on examples from Republic to demonstrate that performing some actions can help produce unintended results, which qualify as ends or purposes of human action.

In Archytas of Tarentum, Carl Huffman reconstructs Archytas’ theory of definition by linking definitions to the mathematical study of ratios and proportions. This paper considers whether and how Archytas used definitions and whether he possessed a theory of definition. Our evidence does not support the claim that Archytas has a theory of definition, and his approach to the science of harmonics suggests that he relied on analogies and proportions in the practice of inquiry. We understand sounds and other entities by (...) placing them in a network of relations governed by mathematical proportions. Although he does not seem to have formulated definitions of sound, Archytas pursued inquiry into motion and rest by formulating definitions in such a way that they fit into a larger network of causal explanations. (shrink)

Emerson's Representative Men reveals his awareness of the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and his admiration for figures of great genius. These trends of thought, which led Emerson's contemporaries Carlyle and Nietzsche to reject democracy, are combined in Emerson with support for democracy. To understand and justify Emerson's combination of fear of the tyranny of the majority, admiration for genius, and support for democracy, it is helpful to examine his portrait of Socrates in Representative Men. Emerson's Socrates is (...) a figure of genius who, by his ironic profession of ignorance and demonstration of moral truths, is capable of freeing the citizen of a democracy from the tyranny of the majority. (shrink)

Emerson's Representative Men reveals his awareness of the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and his admiration for figures of great genius. These trends of thought, which led Emerson's contemporaries Carlyle and Nietzsche to reject democracy, are combined in Emerson with support for democracy. To understand and justify Emerson's combination of fear of the tyranny of the majority, admiration for genius, and support for democracy, it is helpful to examine his portrait of Socrates in Representative Men. Emerson's Socrates is (...) a figure of genius who, by his ironic profession of ignorance and demonstration of moral truths, is capable of freeing the citizen of a democracy from the tyranny of the majority. (shrink)

Socrates in the Lysis discusses philia and the conditions under which two or more people can be said to engage in this relationship. Many commentators take Socrates to be attempting to discover how human beings enter into the relationship of friendship, a relationship characterized by reciprocal affection, altruistic concern and personal intimacy. Other readers of the Lysis see in the dialogue’s investigation of philia a discussion of desire and attraction at the most general level. On this view, philia is one (...) species of the general human desire for good. The present paper develops a third reading of philia. Philia is a type of partnership or fellowship where affection and intimacy are not central features of the relationship. The fellowship involves at least one party who possesses wisdom while other members of the fellowship seek to benefit from wisdom. Thus philia is a characteristically human response to the need for wisdom. The members of such a fellowship share a common desire for a good which gives purpose to their association, and because of their common desire to benefit from this good the members can be described as fellows or partners in the pursuit of this good. (shrink)

Plato’s Symposium offers an enticing range of topics for the critical-guide treatment of philosophical classics now in vogue. The current volume contains thirteen essays of consistently high quality devoted to such issues as the nature of erotic desire and its orientation toward the forms, the ethical question of how best to live in the pursuit of wisdom, Plato’s engagement with poetry, and his use of dramatic interaction between speakers to advance his philosophical agenda.An admirable feature of the volume is the (...) close attention that is paid to all parts of the Symposium. Many discussions of the dialogue focus exclusively on Socrates’s speech, but Destrée and Giannopoulou have taken care to avoid this narrowly... (shrink)

: Socrates in the Apology takes an adventurous approach to belief. Although he lacks knowledge, he holds strong beliefs about virtue and the human good. These beliefs count as wisdom only if they are supported by the ability to explain why they are true, and Socrates lacks this ability. To understand why Socrates holds these beliefs, Gorgias 481c–482c is examined. He claims there always to say the same thing and to agree with himself. His beliefs allow him to maintain a (...) stable core of harmonious beliefs. This provides some evidence of the truth of his beliefs and forms one aspect of his human wisdom. (shrink)