O preconceito e a intolerância com as religiões de matriz africana foram construídos no contexto da colonização e atualizam-se cotidianamente por meio da colonialidade. O artigo objetiva analisar o que professores negros têm feito para superar essa realidade. Para tanto, foram realizadas entrevistas semiestruturadas com professores negros, militantes da causa negra, que atuam em escolas públicas. A análise mostrou que esses professores desenvolvem várias estratégias com vistas à desconstrução do preconceito e da intolerância.

Gilles Deleuze se apropria do conceito nietzschiano de dívida, ou, em alemão, Schuld, em sua dupla dimensão de promessa e culpa, para criar uma filosofia da potência, da pluralidade e dos agenciamentos. Aqui, não apenas o universo conceitual deleuziano é marcado pela demanda de emancipação da dívida, com noções como rizoma, desterritorialização ou corpo sem órgãos: a própria irreverência dessa filosofia investe na descontinuidade e no devir.

This book claims that Aristotle followed an aspect theory of predication.

One of the core doctrines of Mozi 墨子 is his teaching on jian'ai 兼愛, and this is discussed primarily in the three chapters bearing this term in their title.1 The term "jian'ai" and its theme also appear scattered throughout the Mozi, such as in chapters like "Standards and Rules" and the "Intention of Tian." Jian'ai has been translated into English as "Universal Love," "Inclusive Care," "Impartial Care," and other similar phrases. As these various translations suggest, there is not yet a (...) prevailing consensus on the exact meaning of jian'ai.2Despite his renowned clarity and simplicity and his skill at argumentation, those who try to pin down Mozi's teaching on jian'ai soon encounter difficulties. I think there are... (shrink)

The primary aim of this paper is to defend the Lockean View—the view that a belief is epistemically justified iff it is highly probable—against a new family of objections. According to these objections, broadly speaking, the Lockean View ought to be abandoned because it is incompatible with, or difficult to square with, our judgments surrounding certain legal cases. I distinguish and explore three different versions of these objections—The Conviction Argument, the Argument from Assertion and Practical Reasoning, and the Comparative Probabilities (...) Argument—but argue that none of them are successful. I also present some very general reasons for being pessimistic about the overall strategy of using legal considerations to evaluate epistemic theories; as we will see, there are good reasons to think that many of the considerations relevant to legal theorizing are ultimately irrelevant to epistemic theorizing. (shrink)

The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. (...) Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on (...) Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat. (shrink)

This essay intends to criticize Hans-Georg Gadamer’s conception of language on the basis of which he justifies the proposition that learning is only possible through conversation. Although he understands as language non-verbal forms of communication such as gestures, physiognomic expressions, looks, Gadamer conceives language as word. However, I believe, and no one would deny it, language needs to be understood and, above all, learned. So here is the motivating problem of this essay: if language has to be understood as word, (...) how is it possible to learn it before mastering the word during childhood? To answer this problem, first, I clarify what I understand as philosophical conception of education. Then I demonstrate, in a broad examination of Gadamer’s essays written over five decades, the absence of a pre-predicative conception of language. Finally, I outline a pre-predicative conception of language by which I intend to show how it is possible to learn language before mastering the word. (shrink)

In ordinary discourse we often attribute beliefs not just to individuals but also to groups. But can groups really have genuine beliefs? This paper considers but ultimately rejects one of the main arguments in support of the claim that groups can be genuine believers – the Argument From Interpretationism – and concludes that we have good reasons to be sceptical about the existence of group beliefs. According to the Argument From Interpretationism, roughly speaking, groups qualify as genuine believers because we (...) can interpret their behaviour in much the same way that we can interpret the behaviour of individuals. While this argument may seem initially attractive, I argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful. In particular, I argue that the argument is unsuccessful even if one is generally sympathetic towards interpretationism. The reason for this, as we will see, is that a number of problems arise when we try to apply the interpretationist strategy – originally formulated with individual subjects in mind – to plural subjects or groups. In showing why the Argument From Interpretationism fails, the paper also brings into focus some more general constraints on the scope and applicability of interpretationism. (shrink)

This paper aims to construct a comprehensive theory of royal succession of Mencius. Basically, there are three distinct modes of royal succession described in the Mencius: abdication, hereditary succession, and revolution. Abdication involves the voluntary transfer of power by the incumbent ruler to a virtuous minister. Hereditary succession entails the transmission of power to the son of the incumbent ruler. Revolution marks the foundation of a new dynasty by deposing the incumbent ruler. What are their exact relationships? In contrast to (...) hereditary succession, which represents “rule by heredity,” abdication and revolution are often categorized together as “rule by virtue,” which became the backbone of the Confucian virtue politics. However, Mencius' writings, especially 5A5 and 5A6, suggest his clear intention to establish a coherent, or at least, compatible relationship between abdication and hereditary succession. This paper analyzes Mencius' discussions on royal succession to elucidate how he perceived the connection between abdication and hereditary succession, and to explore why he considered revolution as a separate category. In this study, I refer to the former as the “entrenched‐trust model” and distinguish the latter as “anticipated‐trust model.” The final section of the paper compares the three modes of royal succession in terms of the nature of the people's trust, the susceptibility of the people's approval, and the candidate's disinterest in power. (shrink)

This essay examines the Ru 儒 notion of ming 命, usually translated into English as “fate,” with an emphasis on the thought of two prominent Ru thinkers, Zhu Xi 朱熹 of Song 宋 China and Jeong Yagyong 丁若鏞 of Joseon 朝鮮 Korea. Although they were faithful followers of the tradition of Kongzi 孔子and Mengzi 孟子, they held very different views on ming. Zhu Xi saw the realm of fate as determined by contingent movements of psychophysical force, whereas Jeong Yagyong believed (...) it to be utterly contingent upon the unfathomable deity, Shangdi 上帝. These differences have important consequences for their conceptions of the good human life as well as the development of their respective cultivation programs. In conclusion, I argue that their differences are directly related to their different stances on the goal of Ru study. Zhu Xi, in confrontation with Buddhism, tried to put all people on the road to becoming a sage, while Jeong Yagyong aimed at the actual attainment of sagehood even if only some people could do so. (shrink)

This essay examines the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods in conceptions of the good human life through an exploration of the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Both Confucius and Mencius lived in quite similar worlds, but their conceptualizations of the world differed from each another. This difference led them to hold different views on the role of virtue and the status of non-moral goods. On the one hand, Confucius highlighted the self-sufficiency of virtue, but he acknowledged (...) and appreciated the intrinsic and instrumental value of non-moral goods. On the other hand, while Mencius underscored the role of virtue as the best means to the best ends, he tried to depreciate the value of non-moral goods. As a consequence, even though their conceptions of the good life were essentially predicated on virtue, they parted company concerning the status of non-moral goods in human life. (shrink)

Mozi’s 墨子 doctrine of impartial care has been interpreted predominantly through the lens of Mengzi 孟子, that is, as “love without distinctions” versus “love with distinctions.” However, I think Mengzi saw only half of the picture, as his focus was exclusively on the difference between Confucianism and Mohism in regard to the scope, intensity, and sequence of love. In this essay, I argue that Mozi’s impartial care is also characteristically different in kind from the Confucian notion of humaneness. My analysis (...) and comparison of their usage of the word ai 愛 shows that Mozi’s ai is material-oriented care, while the Confucian ai is emotion-oriented care. I further argue that Mozi had this particular understanding of care largely because he held a quite negative view of human emotions. For him, human emotions are unreliable and harmful for the practice of care. (shrink)

Scholars of classical philosophy have long disputed whether Aristotle was a dialectical thinker. Most agree that Aristotle contrasts dialectical reasoning with demonstrative reasoning, where the former reasons from generally accepted opinions and the latter reasons from the true and primary. Starting with a grasp on truth, demonstration never relinquishes it. Starting with opinion, how could dialectical reasoning ever reach truth, much less the truth about first principles? Is dialectic then an exercise that reiterates the prejudices of one's times and at (...) best allows one to persuade others by appealing to these prejudices, or is it the royal road to first principles and philosophical wisdom? In From Puzzles to Principles? May Sim gathers experts to argue both these positions and offer a variety of interpretive possibilities. The contributors' thoughtful reflections on the nature and limits of dialectic should play a crucial role in Aristotelian scholarship. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne significant feature of Jeong Yakyong’s丁若鏞 thought is his deconstruction of Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 moral universe based on li 理 and qi 氣. For Zhu Xi, the world in its entirety was a moral place, but Jeong Yakyong distinguished nonmoral domains from the moral domain. One question that follows in pursuing a comparison of their philosophies on this topic is what each thinker meant by ‘moral’ and, in particular, whether they meant the same thing. In this paper, I delve deeper (...) into this topic by comparing their respective perspectives on whether nonhuman animals are moral. Interestingly, they held exactly opposite views: Zhu Xi believed that certain actions on the part of nonhuman animals manifest moral values, whereas Jeong Yakyong claimed that none of the actions of nonhuman animals has moral value. In comparing their views, I introduce Mark Rowlands’ distinction between ‘moral subjects’ and ‘moral agents.’. (shrink)

Livro-texto de introdução à lógica, com (mais do que) pitadas de filosofia da lógica, produzido como uma versão revista e ampliada do livro Forallx: Calgary. Trata-se da versão de 13 de outubro de 2022. Comentários, críticas, correções e sugestões são muito bem-vindos.

Teaching ethics in public health programmes is not routine everywhere – at least not in most schools of public health in the European region. Yet empirical evidence shows that schools of public health are more and more interested in the integration of ethics in their curricula, since public health professionals often have to face difficult ethical decisions.

In recent work, Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau (2020) develop a new social version of moral intuitionism that promises to explain why our moral intuitions are trustworthy. In this paper, we raise several worries for their account and present some general challenges for the broader class of views we call Social Moral Intuitionism. We close by reflecting on Bengson, Cuneo, and Shafer‐Landau's comparison between what they call the “perceptual practice” and the “moral intuition practice”, which we take to raise some difficult (...) normative and meta‐normative questions for theorists of all stripes. (shrink)

While developing his theory of world 3, Popper rejects two claims made by Plato: first, that the inhabitants of world 3, ideas, are a source of ultimate explanation, a divine revelation of truth, and second, that these ideas are unchanging. I will rehabilitate the second claim. Man does not construct world 3 by creating his theories, nor is it a source of ultimate truth. Instead, world 3 is discovered by man, and it destroys some of his theories: destructive Platonism. I (...) discuss the impact of the modified position on the Grundlagenstreit in mathematics, taking into account Gillies’s constructive Aristotelianism. I then turn to the philosophy of computers and discuss how destructive Platonism relates to computers and the Internet. In particular, I criticize Popper’s claim that computers are nothing but elaborate pens as too pessimistic and incautious, and the fashionable “singularity” theory as too optimistic and at the same time too fatalistic. In my closing remarks, as an antidote against both views, I provide a more modest and reasonable speculation about the ultimate goal and meaning of life. (shrink)

This paper puts forward a novel pluralist theory of epistemic justification that brings together two competing views in the literature—probabilistic and non-probabilistic accounts of justification. The first part of the paper motivates the new theory by arguing that neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts alone are wholly satisfactory. The second part puts forward what I call the Functional Theory of Justification. The key merit of the new theory is that it combines the most attractive features of both probabilistic and non-probabilistic accounts (...) of justification while avoiding their most serious shortcomings. The paper also provides a blueprint for future pluralist projects in epistemology. (shrink)

The likelihood principle of Bayesian statistics implies that information about the stopping rule used to collect evidence does not enter into the statistical analysis. This consequence confers an apparent advantage on Bayesian statistics over frequentist statistics. In the present paper, I argue that information about the stopping rule is nevertheless of value for an assessment of the reliability of the experiment, which is a pre-experimental measure of how well a contemplated procedure is expected to discriminate between hypotheses. I show that, (...) when reliability assessments enter into inquiries, some stopping rules prescribing optional stopping are unacceptable to both Bayesians and frequentists. (shrink)

I give an analysis of the logical structure of statements describing duties in social roles. Role terms like ‘doctor’ should not be treated as simple predicates, as natural kind terms, like ‘human being’, are. When role terms are treated as simple predicates, fallacies may result. Rather, treat role terms (M) as complex predicates with a simple subject, a person (S), as a base; ‘S qua M’, and then analyze their reduplicative structure. I illustrate and support this analysis by considering sophisms, (...) traditionally known as committing the fallacy of secundum quid et simpliciter, about conflicts of duties in different roles. I end with some remarks about personal integrity. (shrink)

Medieval theologians discussed the logical structure of reduplicative propositions in the midst of their discussions of the Incarnation and the Trinity. Aquinas has the usual medieval analyzes of reduplicative propositions: the specificative and the strictly reduplicative. But neither analysis resolves successfully the problems of the consistency of the statements about God while avoiding making the Trinity or the Incarnation a merely accidental feature of Him. However, Scotus introduces another analysis: abstractive. I shall conclude that Scotus’s view of reduplication, one, if (...) not invented by him, as least stressed and developed by him, offers a better solution of the consistency of the Incarnation and the Trinity than that of Aquinas. (shrink)

As Sungmoon Kim points out, contemporary Confucian studies has been disproportionately focused on the ethical side of the tradition. In this regard, Kim’s book, Theorizing Confucian Virtue Politics: The Political Philosophy of Mencius and Xunzi, makes an enormous contribution to the field of Confucian political thought. What makes his project even more valuable is that he goes beyond the textual analysis of political concepts and ideas in classical Confucian writings and builds them into a coherent and systematic political theory.In what (...) follows, I will examine Kim’s reconstruction of the Confucian political theories of Mencius and Xunzi. However, rather than taking issue with whether his reconstructions are true... (shrink)

Like Plato, Aristotle uses dialectic to interpret and analyze ordinary discourse as well as to ascend to the first principles of philosophy and science. At the same time he says that it is intellect ( noûs ) that apprehends the first principle. With al-Fārābī and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), dialectic becomes relegated to dealing with ordinary language. For them demonstration in an ideal language from principles apprehended by the intellect suffices for the philosopher.