Research on bias in peer review examines scholarly communication and funding processes to assess the epistemic and social legitimacy of the mechanisms by which knowledge communities vet and self-regulate their work. Despite vocal concerns, a closer look at the empirical and methodological limitations of research on bias raises questions about the existence and extent of many hypothesized forms of bias. In addition, the notion of bias is predicated on an implicit ideal that, once articulated, raises questions about the normative implications (...) of research on bias in peer review. This review provides a brief description of the function, history, and scope of peer review; articulates and critiques the conception of bias unifying research on bias in peer review; characterizes and examines the empirical, methodological, and normative claims of bias in peer review research; and assesses possible alternatives to the status quo. We close by identifying ways to expand conceptions and studies of bias to countenance the complexity of social interactions among actors involved directly and indirectly in peer review. (shrink)

The issue of directed donation of organs from deceased donors for transplantation has recently risen to the fore, given greater significance by the relatively stagnant rate of deceased donor donation in the UK. Although its status and legitimacy is explicitly recognized across the USA, elsewhere a more cautious, if not entirely negative, stance has been taken. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Human Tissue Act 2004, and in Scotland the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, are both silent in this (...) regard. Although so-called conditional donation, donation to (or perhaps withheld from) a specific class, has been outlawed as a product of guidance issued by the Secretary of State for Health issued in the wake of the controversial incident occurring in the North of England in 1998, its intended application to ‘directed’ donation is less certain. Directed and conditional donations challenge the traditional construct of altruistic donation and impartial (equitable) allocation in a very immediate and striking fashion. They implicitly raise important questions as to whether the body or parts of the body are capable of being owned, and by whom. This paper attempts to explore the notion of donor ownership of body parts and its implications for both directed and conditional donation. (shrink)

Is the possession of taste relevant to the practice of moral and political judgement? For Mary Wollstonecraft and many of her contemporaries, the formation of taste was increasingly significant for both ethics and politics. In fact, some of the key contributors to the debate, which I have termed the ‘politics of taste’, believed that fostering existing standards of taste promised a palliative to modern democratic ills that they diagnosed. Wollstonecraft is an immanent critic of such positions. Although she shares some (...) of Edmund Burke’s and David Hume’s assumptions, she proposes dramatic revision of the extant model of refined taste driven by the spread of rational education. In this way, she attempts to rescue ‘true taste’ from its sentimental context – one permeated by false assumptions about femininity and class. For Wollstonecraft, ‘true taste’ must be the product of refined understanding. Only then can it be deemed a support rather than a hindrance to the practice of moral and political judgement. Although recent Wollstonecraft scholarship has emphasised the depth of her engagement with Scottish Enlightenment thought, using Hume as a primary interlocutor with Wollstonecraft, especially on the question of taste, is yet unprecedented. This approach, Wollstonecraft’s immanent critique of taste, yields arguments about taste that are especially complex and philosophically interesting, both in her time and ours. (shrink)

This article defines the Nietzsche's philosophy as a Versuch (test, attempt, trial) and not as a set of articulated theses in a fixed manner. The Nietzsche's readers work is itself constrained to approach the texts of this thinker in a groping way: if at first the reading seems impossible to comprehend, the second part of the contribution resembles that a methodical reading can be considered, reading that, however, intends to fully absorb the difficulties posed through the Nietzsche's thought. The Nietzschean (...) Versuch leads, therefore, to build a Versuch reader in a way that, more broadly, invites us to consider the work of Nietzsche as a problem ("als Problem"). (shrink)

Living-donor kidney transplantation is the “gold standard” treatment for many individuals with end-stage renal failure. Superior outcomes for the graft and the transplant recipient have prompted the implementation of new strategies promoting living-donor kidney transplantation, and the number of such transplants has increased considerably over recent years. Living donors are undoubtedly exposed to risk. In his editorial “underestimating the risk in living kidney donation”, Walter Glannon suggests that more data on long-term outcomes for living donors are needed to determine whether (...) this risk is permissible and the extent to which physicians and transplant surgeons should promote living-donor kidney transplantation.1 In this paper I argue that it is not clear that medical professionals have underestimated this risk, nor is it clear that more data on long-term outcomes are needed in order to determine whether it is permissible for individual autonomous agents to expose themselves to this or, indeed, any risk. The global shortage of organs available for transplantation ultimately means that every year thousands of individuals who value their life die needlessly. This is an unacceptable loss of human life. Saving life is one of the most wonderful things an individual can do for another. Promoting any strategy that will assist in saving life and preventing human suffering within acceptable moral limits is legitimate. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

Wilkinson’s discussion of the individual and family consent to organ and tissue donation is to be welcomed because it draws attention to the “incoherent hybrid” of the current position.1 I wish to highlight some areas of his discussion and propose that, in a situation of posthumous organ and tissue donation, the cadaver has no individual rights and family rights should under no circumstances automatically outweigh the potential transplant recipients’ right to a life-saving treatment.Transplant immunobiology and clinical transplantation is a revolutionary (...) area of medicine and has saved thousands of lives. In the UK, between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005, organs from 752 people who died were used to save or dramatically improve many people’s lives through 2242 transplants.2 In the US, 23 506 transplants were performed between January and October 2005 from 12 084 donors.3 Information from available databases shows that demand for organs, cells and tissues has outstripped the supply. As of 18 January 2006, 6553 people are still waiting for transplants in the UK and there are 90 636 waiting list transplant candidates in the US.2,3 As of 01 January 2006, there are 15 977 people active on the Eurotransplant waiting list.4 It is likely that non-compulsory posthumous donation of organs has resulted in the loss of many thousands, possibly many …. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage rassemble les textes des interventions prononcées lors du colloque Cornelius Castoriadis. Réinventer l'autonomie qui s'est déroulé aux universités de Paris-VIII et de Cergy-Pontoise en mars 2007.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 51-80 [Access article in PDF] Kant's Politics of Enlightenment Ciaran Cronin THE ENDURING RESONANCE OF Kant's brief essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (henceforth "WE") can be traced in large part to the connection it makes between two ideas central to the self-understanding of European modernity. The first is the idea of autonomy implicit in its famous (...) definition of enlightenment: "Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority.Minority is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another... Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment." 1 Kant's rallying cry to independence of thought resonates with the view that individual autonomy is a central component of modern self-identity. The second is the defense of freedom in the public use of reason: "For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters." 2 With this emphatic endorsement of freedom of expression as a precondition of enlightenment, Kant appears to situate the project of enlightenment squarely in the tradition of liberal political thought. [End Page 51]Yet the interpretation of the essay as a defense of a liberal model of freedom of expression proves to be problematic on a closer reading. Even Kant's famous definition of enlightenment is not without its puzzling aspects. He employs the legal term "minority" (Unmündigkeit, often translated as "immaturity"), the condition of a child or dependent who has not reached the legal age of adulthood, to describe the condition of human beings before they have achieved enlightenment; but as some of his contemporaries remarked, the idea of a minority that is "self-incurred" makes no legal sense. That their puzzlement was not just a matter of injudicious terminology is shown by Kant's apparent indecision over whether the failure of individuals to make independent use of their reason is due to lack of courage on their part 3 or whether it is because they have been prevented from doing so by constraining social authorities. 4 Even more perplexing is Kant's idiosyncratic distinction between the private and public uses of reason: "by the public use of one's own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted." 5 What is perplexing in this is not so much the restriction of the public use of reason to scholars addressing a public of readers as the characterization of the use of one's reason in exercising a civil or public office as "private." Moreover, liberal sensibilities cannot fail to be ruffled by the authoritarian cast of some of Kant's remarks. Most troubling is the observation that only a ruler who "hasa well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee public peace" can tolerate complete freedom of public expression and that a lesser degree of civil freedom (bürgerliche Freiheit) is conducive to the fullest expansion of "a people's freedom of spirit" (or intellectual freedom, Freiheit des Geistes). 6 This would seem to lend ammunition to those who argue that Kant ultimately embraces a conservative politicalposition in contradiction to the radical implications of his own critical philosophy. 7 [End Page 52]But an examination of the historical context of the essay reveals that it is neither a clear expression of a liberal nor of a conservative position as these are conventionally understood, or so I will argue. The perplexing features of the essay become intelligible when it is seen as part of a larger project of reconciling the ideal requirements of a republican constitution with the political reality of Prussian absolutism in response to contemporary debates concerning... (shrink)

Essays exploring the prospects for transnational democracy in a world of increasing globalization.

Pascal was a scientist and man of the world who came to be a passionately devout Christian. The fragments of his great defense of Christianity, left unfinished at his death in 1662, survive in the form of the Pensees. This series of brief, dramatic notes on his religious convictions are here translated into English. These thoughts expose Pascal's vision of the world and display powerful reasoning and a profound faith.

Background: Legislation on physician-assisted suicide is being considered in a number of states since the passage of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act in 1994. Opinion assessment surveys have historically assessed particular subsets of physicians.Objective: To determine variables predictive of physicians’ opinions on PAS in a rural state, Vermont, USA.Design: Cross-sectional mailing survey.Participants: 1052 physicians licensed by the state of Vermont.Results: Of the respondents, 38.2% believed PAS should be legalised, 16.0% believed it should be prohibited and 26.0% believed it should (...) not be legislated. 15.7% were undecided. Males were more likely than females to favour legalisation . Physicians who did not care for patients through the end of life were significantly more likely to favour legalisation of PAS than physicians who do care for patients with terminal illness . 30% of the respondents had experienced a request for assistance with suicide.Conclusions: Vermont physicians’ opinions on the legalisation of PAS is sharply polarised. Patient autonomy was a factor strongly associated with opinions in favour of legalisation, whereas the sanctity of the doctor–patient relationship was strongly associated with opinions in favour of not legislating PAS. Those in favour of making PAS illegal overwhelmingly cited moral and ethical beliefs as factors in their opinion. Although opinions on legalisation appear to be based on firmly held beliefs, approximately half of Vermont physicians who responded to the survey agree that there is a need for more education in palliative care and pain management. (shrink)

Afin de clarifier la réalité elle-même, Nietzsche rapporte généalogiquement le « conatus » spinoziste à une volonté de statisme à laquelle il oppose la dynamique expansive de la volonté de puissance. Pourtant, on peut montrer que Nietzsche rejette moins la conservation qu’il ne la réinterprète dans l’ordre d’une grandeur à produire, indissociable du tragique.

Cet article est disponible en texte intégral en format PDF.

In the countries with a strong muslim immigration, the practice and the organization of Islam represent a national and international politica! stake. The Belgian state, which recognizes and supports the most important cults financially, recognized Islam in 1974. But this cult doesn't still obtain this state support and the questions concerning its organization are more complex than ever. Thelegislation is insufficient and its application almost non-existent. The debates on 'integrism' and hijab have confronted us with the problem of the integrating (...) role of Islam. The Belgian political world seems today to fear the influence of foreign countries on immigrants. All these factors throw light on the history and the present state of the Belgian legislation on the organization of the islamic cult, which this article analyses. (shrink)

Consideration of social cognition—how an individual’s decision-making is influenced by her/his social environment—is key to understanding the behaviour of socially living nonhuman primates. In this chapter we discuss primate social cognition by focusing on primates’ behavioural responses to the presence and actions of others, how they adjust their behaviour to maximize their own gains, and possibly also the rewards received by a partner. Individuals can observe and replicate the actions of others, or the outcomes of their actions, to accelerate behavioural (...) acquisition of techniques to obtain rewards. Beyond passively observing others, primates can also work with group mates to obtain rewards more easily or to get rewards that would otherwise be unattainable by a single individual. Although not universally seen among primates, one individual may also help another to acquire resources. Prosocial and collaborative interactions may result in an imbalance of benefits received, and certain primate species respond negatively when receiving less than a social partner, a response which may protect individuals against cheating. Such behaviours demonstrate how the interplay between an individual’s desires and those of others can modify behavioural outcomes and the importance of considering cognition from a social perspective in order to understand the decision-making of individuals. However, there is variation both within and between species in their sensitivity to the actions of others and their responses to them. Thus, a comparative framework is needed when studying what is meant by ‘primate social cognition’. (shrink)

AESTHETICS OF “PURE SIGN” ADORNO, MERLEAU-PONTY AND ART AS AN ENDLESS REINVENTION OF REALITY Contemporary painting has often dealt with signs, graffiti, calligraphy, and more precisely with aesthetic objects that take the form and appearance of signs, but which do not belong to any existing alphabet. These are forms that imitate signs but are what we might call “pure signs”, i.e. signifiers without a signified. This form of artistic experimentation has elicited parallel and convergent analyses by Merleau-Ponty and Adorno. These (...) authors show the ways in which this kind of artistic experimentation at once renews reflection on language and reflection on art, through a more fundamental reflection on the cognitive actions that they necessarily share, namely deciphering and interpretation. By asking how signs that have no conventional meaning can still be identified as signs–the “decryption” of which is therefore impossible–we re-actualize a question that goes back to Plato and Augustine. How can we begin to investigate and understand what we do not know yet? How does the decryption and interpretation process arise for one who does not yet know if there is something to understand? This type of artwork actually has a meaning, but not in the traditional sense. Although they are unreadable and untranslatable, such works clarifying the meaning of interpretation for us, they free us from a naive and simplistic conception of the process of understanding. They show us that interpretation is always a process of inventing and producing a new meaning, but never of actually finding a pre-existing meaning. In doing so, these kinds of artwork are inseparable from ontological and political issues. Against a conservative view of our relationship to reality, they make us aware that the sense of reality is never simply given nor definitive, and that our relationship to reality contains much more potential than we commonly believe. (shrink)

On associe habituellement Rousseau à la tradition républicaine, opposée schématiquement à la tradition libérale. Sans remettre en cause globalement cette thèse, il peut être intéressant de déplacer les termes de la problématique, en présentant la critique rousseauiste du libéralisme comme une critique menée de l’intérieur, plutôt que de l’extérieur. On peut en effet, à l’exemple de John Pocock, identifier un tronc commun aux pensées républicaine et libérale ou, à l’exemple de Charles Larmore, voir dans le républicanisme « une formulation plus (...) lucide de la théorie libérale ». Cela se traduit chez Rousseau par une stratégie consistant à se réapproprier les promesses contenues dans les prémisses du libéralisme, pour mieux en dénoncer les conséquences dogmatiques. De fait, on trouve chez Rousseau une défense des droits individuels, un souci de l’indépendance individuelle dans les relations économiques et plus généralement dans les rapports sociaux, une justification jusnaturaliste de la propriété privée, et même des emprunts à l’idée selon laquelle la mise en concurrence permettrait de définir les conditions d’un choix optimal. Cependant l’analyse de certains textes de l’Émile montre que Rousseau vise en définitive à dissiper l’illusion d’une autorégulation optimale des rapports sociaux et économiques : l’opacité et les distorsions des rapports économiques ainsi que l’usage spontanément irrationnel de la liberté individuelle impliquent la nécessité de gouverner la liberté, par l’éducation et par la législation. (shrink)

L’Émile met en scène deux leçons de choses visant à initier l’élève à la science économique : l’une concernant le fondement du droit de propriété, l’autre concernant l’échange marchand et la division sociale du travail. Ces deux moments éducatifs donnent un précieux éclairage sur la pensée économique de Rousseau, pensée plus complexe et informée qu’on ne le considère communément. Mais c’est également dans les décisions existentielles d’émile que sont abordées philosophiquement les conditions d’un choix rationnel, la maximisation de la satisfaction (...) et les vertus supposées de la concurrence. Par ces différents biais, Rousseau met à l’épreuve et critique les thèses de la science économique, annonciatrices du libéralisme, qui s’ébauchent à son époque.Two practical lessons, in Émile, aim to introduce the pupil to economics. The first one concerns the foundation of the right to property ; the second one concerns trade and the social division of work. Both of these educational moments show Rousseau’s economic thought to be more complex and informed than we often believe. But Émile’s existential decisions are also occasions for philosophical investigations on the conditions of rational choice, the maximization of satisfaction and the supposed benefits of competition between bids. Through these differents issues, Rousseau puts to the test and critically examines the free market principles which are starting to take shape just then. (shrink)

Le perspectivisme nietzschéen se situe-t-il « après la vérité »? Si Nietzsche critique le concept même de vérité, il emploie pourtant très régulièrement cette expression, jusque dans Ecce homo et L’Antéchrist. Prendre acte de cette tension est insuffisant : y a-t-il contradiction ou s’agit-il plutôt de polysémie? Cette étude, qui distingue chemin faisant perspectivisme et relativisme, procède à l’examen des différents sens de « vérité » dans l’œuvre de Nietzsche afin de construire une réponse à ce problème.

Foucault's theory of disciplinary power and Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power are among the most innovative attempts in recent social thought to come to terms with the increasingly elusive character of power in modern society. Both theories are based on cri tiques of subject-centered analyses of power and offer original accounts of modern social institutions. But Foucault's critique of the subject is so radical that it makes it impossible to identify any deter minate social location of the exercise of power (...) or of resistance to its operations. Bourdieu's theory of practice in terms of the symbolically mediated interaction between the habitus and social structure avoids these problems by connecting relations of domination both to identi fiable social agents and to the institutions of the modern state. However, Bourdieu's strategic model of social action remains too narrow to allow for the possibility of autonomous agency and an emancipatory political praxis. The theory of symbolic power must be supplemented by a normative conception of practical reason if its emancipatory potential is to be realized. Key Words: agency • habitus • modernity • power • resistance. (shrink)

It has long been theorized that Heidegger’s idea for Dasein was highly influenced by the Chinese notion of the Dao. This is due to a misinterpretation on behalf of Heideggerian scholars and others of what the Dao represents. In fact, Heidegger, in explicating what he thought to be “the most extreme inversion of φύσης-ουσία [phusis-ousia],” made this equal to “Chinese-like ‘constancy,’” which is the basis of the Dao. Taking what Heidegger interpreted phusis to be (derived from Aristotelian metaphysics and an (...) assumption of pre-Socratic thought) as a process of unconcealment from continuing re-concealment which signals a kind of “truth” of being [phusis], that which calls for constant presence is inauthentic Dasein, rather than authentic Dasein. In other words, Heidegger’s idea of what inauthentic Dasein calls for could be explained within Aristotle’s system as equal to aiming to replace phusis with the know-how of τέχνη [techne]. The Dao, as rightfully understood and utilized by the master craftsman and the Sage, is accessible, constant, and knowable. This could not be in more opposition to Heidegger’s notion of phusis. (shrink)

Cette étude considére le § 301 du Gai Savoir, à partir du § 98 même ouvrage. Dans le sillage de la «nouvelle justice» brièvement présentée dans le § 289, ce § 301 remaine en profondeur l'opposition traditionelle entre l'actif et le contemplatif; suivre pas à pas ect aphorisme permet ainsi de constituer «l'homme juste» en problime qui est cet «homme juste»? Brutus? Shakespeare? Le «poète»? Et donc: comment appréhender la «nouvelle justice»?Diese Untersuchung befasst sich mit dem § 301 der Fröhlichen (...) Wissenschaft, gestützt auf § 98 desselben Werks. Im Zuge der "neuen Gerechtigkrit", die in § 289 kurz dargestellt worden war, formt dieser § 301 den traditionellen Gegensatz zwischen dem Aktiven und dem Contemplativen grundlegend um. Die schrittweise Betrachtung dieses Aphorismus erlaubt dann, den "gerechten Menschen" zum Problem zu machen: wer ist dieser "gerechter Mensch"? Brutus? Shakespeare? Der "Dichter"? Und somit: wie ist die "neue gerechtigkeit" aufzufassen? This articles considers § 301 of The Gay Science in the light of § 98 of the same work. In the wake of the "new justice" briefly presented in § 289, § 301 is an in-depth reconsideration of the traditional opposition between the active and the contemplative; thus a step by step approach to this aphorism allows one to establish "the just man" as a problem: who is that "just man"? Brutus? Shakespeare? The "poet"? Hence, how is the notion of "new justice" to be grasped? (shrink)

Resumo: Se Nietzsche critica o próprio conceito de verdade, ele emprega, no entanto, com muita regularidade essa expressão, como em Ecce homo e em O Anticristo. Apontar essa tensão é insuficiente: há uma contradição ou antes uma polissemia? Este estudo, que distingue o perspectivismo e o relativismo, examina os diferentes sentidos de “verdade” na obra de Nietzsche a fim de construir uma resposta a essa questão. Ela mostra que a verdade depende da interpretação em busca de justiça, ainda que essa (...) orientação continue problemática.: Though Nietzsche critiques the very concept of truth, he nonetheless uses the word very regularly, even in such late texts as Ecce Homo or The Antichrist. Merely taking note of this tension is not enough: is it contradictory, or rather a case of polysemy? This study, which distinguishes, along the way, between perspectivism and relativism, examines the different meanings of “truth” in Nietzsche’s work, so as to figure out an answer to this question. It shows that truth is a matter of interpretation in search of justice, even if this movement itself remains something of a problem. (shrink)