The transformative power of artificial intelligence (AI) is coming to philosophy—the only question is the degree to which philosophers will harness it. In this paper, we argue that the application of AI tools to philosophy could have an impact on the field comparable to the advent of writing, and that it is likely that philosophical progress will significantly increase as a consequence of AI. The role of philosophers in this story is not merely to use AI but also to help (...) develop it and theorize about it. In fact, we argue that philosophers have a prima facie obligation to spend significant effort in doing so, at least insofar as they should spend effort philosophizing. (shrink)

In this work I consider two arguments for the conclusion that nonhuman animals are not owed justice. Some argue that justice is solely a matter of distributing material goods and that this excludes nonhuman animals from the sphere of justice. This argument fails for two reasons. First, even if it's true that justice is solely a matter of distributing material goods, it's not clear that it follows that nonhuman animals are not owed justice. Second, the claim that justice is solely (...) a matter of distributing material goods is false. Some argue that the recipients of justice can be determined by some contractarian theory--and that contractarian theories exclude nonhuman animals. Against this, I note that many contractarian theories have implausible consequences and that the most plausible forms of contractarianism don't exclude nonhuman animals. I then explore briefly what including nonhuman animals in the sphere of justice would look like. (shrink)