Schaffer offers us in the last section of “On What Grounds What” (2009) an applied illustration of his allegedly Aristotelian metaontological position. According to this illustration, Schaffer’s metaontological position, supplemented with a few Aristotelian theses about substance and grounding, would converge in a view remarkably similar to his priority monism (Philosophical Studies, 145, 131–148, 2009b; Philosophical Review, 119, 31–76, 2010a), the view that there is one single fundamental substance. In this paper, I will argue against Schaffer’s suggestion that priority monism (...) represents a viable development of Aristotelian metaphysics. In particular, I will hold that the most plausible version of Schaffer’s priority monism by Aristotelian standards fails to satisfy basic Aristotelian tenets about dependence, composition, change, and persistence, and suggest that this is evidence that Aristotelians are more at home with a pluralism rather than a monism about substance. (shrink)

Introduction to the monographic section on contemporary analytic metaphysics.

Según la caracterización extendida del debate entre endurantistas y perdurantistas, los objetos materiales persisten temporalmente o bien en virtud de estar totalmente presentes en distintos momentos de tiempo, o bien en virtud de poseer partes temporales en distintos momentos de tiempo. El presente artículo se propone realizar una defensa de la teoría endurantista de las objeciones presentadas por Barker y Dowe (2003; 2005) y Hofweber y Velleman (2011). Dichas objeciones intentan mostrar que el Endurantismo (i) supone lógicamente la tesis característica (...) de la teoría perdurantista y (ii) es internamente incoherente. En contra de estas objeciones, argumento que al menos en algunas de sus versiones, la teoría endurantista es perfectamente coherente y no supone ningún compromiso con la existencia de partes temporales. (shrink)