John Rawls is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Contemporary political philosophy has been reshaped by his seminal ideas and most current work in the discipline is a response to them. This book introduces his central ideas and examines their contribution to contemporary political thought. In the first part of the book Catherine Audard focuses on Rawls' conception of political and social justice and its justification as presented in his groundbreaking A Theory of Justice. This includes (...) sustained examination of Rawls' moral philosophy and its core thesis, the primacy of justice, the complex relation between Rawls' views and utilitarianism, and his most famous concept, the Original Position Device. In the second half of the book, Audard explores Rawls' more practical concerns for stability and political consensus, citizenship and international justice, and shows the continuity between these concerns and his earlier work. Throughout, Audard contextualizes Rawls' ideas by giving a sense of their historical development, which underlines the intellectual cohesion of his thought. The move between ethics and politics so characteristic of Rawls' work, and which makes for the richness of his philosophy, is shown to also create for it significant problems. John Rawls combines clear exposition with insightful analysis and provides an interpretative and critical framework that will help shape ongoing debates surrounding Rawls' work. (shrink)

John Rawls is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Contemporary political philosophy has been reshaped by his seminal ideas and most current work in the discipline is a response to them. This book introduces his central ideas and examines their contribution to contemporary political thought. In the first part of the book Catherine Audard focuses on Rawls' conception of political and social justice and its justification as presented in his groundbreaking A Theory of Justice. This includes (...) sustained examination of Rawls' moral philosophy and its core thesis, the primacy of justice, the complex relation between Rawls' views and utilitarianism, and his most famous concept, the Original Position Device. In the second half of the book, Audard explores Rawls' more practical concerns for stability and political consensus, citizenship and international justice, and shows the continuity between these concerns and his earlier work. Throughout, Audard contextualizes Rawls' ideas by giving a sense of their historical development, which underlines the intellectual cohesion of his thought. The move between ethics and politics so characteristic of Rawls' work, and which makes for the richness of his philosophy, is shown to also create for it significant problems. John Rawls combines clear exposition with insightful analysis and provides an interpretative and critical framework that will help shape ongoing debates surrounding Rawls' work. (shrink)

What is the appropriate legal response to terrorist threats? This question is discussed by politician Tony McWalter, The Philosophers' Magazine editor Julian Baggini, and philosophers Catherine Audard, Saladin Meckled-Garcia, and Alex Voorhoeve.

Qu'est-ce que l'utilitarisme? Philosophie du bourgeois, philosophie de l'homo oeconomicus, dénoncée, entre autres, par Marx, Nietzsche et Foucault? Ou la seule philosophie morale de taille à concurrencer le kantisme et l'une des bases de l'éthique appliquée contemporaine? L'utilitarisme a cherché à constituer une morale purement rationnelle, critique des croyances religieuses et des conventions sociales. L'exemple le plus illustre est celui de la justice pénale. Bentham, dans des textes révolutionnaires, soutient, à la suite de Beccaria, que la peine doit être proportionnée (...) au tort commis par le coupable, non au besoin de vengeance de la victime et de la société. Dans le premier volume de cette Anthologie, Bentham et ses précurseurs, la filiation entre Bentham et les philosophes des Lumières est établie. De Shaftesbury et Hume à Beccaria et William Paley, on pourra prendre la mesure des continuités, mais aussi du génie du fondateur de ce radicalisme philosophique. Surtout, le lecteur aura accès aux textes majeurs de Bentham qui n'avaient jamais été traduits, en dehors du Panoptique et des Sophismes anarchiques écrits directement en français. On pourra ainsi apprécier combien l'utilitarisme a été et demeure un outil d'analyse et de critique de la morale ordinaire. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

This chapter contains section titled: Cultural Imperialism in Rawls's Law of Peoples Rawls's Answers to the Charge Conclusion: Peace or Justice? Acknowledgements Notes.

Faced with the present migrant crisis and the dismal record of Europe in protecting vulnerable refugees’ and migrants’ rights, what could be the view of the moral philosopher? The contrast between the principles enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the reality of present policies is shocking, but more scrutiny will show that it is the result of a larger trend towards an understanding of freedom mostly in economic terms, at a time when economists such as Amartya Sen (...) have revised their approach to economic growth and prosperity, noting the central role played by a much richer conception of freedom. The paper will scrutinize these inconsistencies and the conception of the person from which they derive and will provide an alternative and more coherent moral vision that could strengthen the legitimacy of the European Charter, at a time of growing dissatisfaction and so‐called democratic deficit. Such a vision could help reconnect the Charter with a conception of the human person as in need not solely of passive legal protection, but also of active promotion of her self‐respect and capabilities, and of her aspiration to a valuable life. (shrink)

La question de la cohérence de la théorie rawlsienne de la justice et de son tournant politique a été depuis longtemps une source de débats et de malentendus. Pour certains interprètes, l’abandon par le second Rawls d’un fondement kantien des principes de justice au profit d’un libéralisme purement politique serait un prix trop élevé à payer pour obtenir un large consensus sur des principes de justice dans des sociétés démocratiques traversées par des conflits de valeurs insurmontables. « La vérité dérangeante (...) ( inconvenient truth ) que Rawls découvre est qu’il est impossible, écrit Robert Taylor (2011), de parvenir à un consensus par recoupement sur une conception kantienne de la personne ou plus largement sur la justice comme équité », mais qu’en même temps, sans un tel fondement, la force morale de la théorie de la justice serait diluée. Dans cet article, je voudrais répondre à ces critiques et montrer que, bien loin de conduire au relativisme, l’exigence d’autonomie doctrinale et d’indépendance des principes de justice à l’égard de toute conception substantielle du Bien exprimée par Rawls ( Libéralisme politique, p. 133) exprime le sens qu’a pour lui l’idéal démocratique : le respect pour l’autonomie morale des personnes et le rejet de « la pratique séculaire de l’intolérance comme condition nécessaire à l’ordre et à la stabilité de la société » ( Libéralisme politique, p. 14). Mais un tel idéal n’est-il pas irréaliste? Faire ainsi confiance à l’autonomie des citoyens, à leur capacité à distinguer entre leurs doctrines morales personnelles et des principes publics de justice ( Libéralisme politique, p. 7) ne risque-t‑il pas d’affaiblir les démocraties au lieu de garantir leur stabilité, comme l’espère Rawls ( Libéralisme politique, p. 4)? Cette ambition d’autonomie doctrinale est-elle une force ou une faiblesse de la théorie rawlsienne? (shrink)

O artigo procura mostrar que sem uma comunidade civil democratizante de justificação, em lugar do atual sistema internacional, as normas da justiça global não passam de uma ficção, uma mera expressão do imperialismo cultural e político, um instrumento de controle e dominação dos povos em escala mundial, segundo um modelo colonizador ampliado que torna as declarações dos direitos humanos inoperantes. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Direitos humanos. Ética. Habermas. Justiça global. Normas internacionais. Rawls. ABSTRACT The article seeks to show that without a civil, (...) democratizing community of justification, replacing the current international system, the norms of global justice remain a fiction, a mere expression of cultural and political imperialism, an instrument of control and domination of the peoples worldwide, according to an enlarged colonizing model which render the declarations of human rights inoperative. KEY WORDS – Ethics. Global justice. Habermas. Human rights. International norms. Rawls. (shrink)

The reception of Rawls in France has been an extremely complex story where forces of innovation have been, in the end, overwhelmed by the resistance of `philosophical nationalism'. This is surprising as, in many ways, France was going through tremendous changes and modernization at the time of the translation of A Theory of Justice in 1987. In that context, Rawls's project seemed to have something useful and suggestive to offer: bridging the gap between freedom and equality in a new version (...) of social democracy, combining social justice and market efficiency, respecting the plurality of values within civil society and creating a consensus on democratic legitimacy. But the intellectual obstacles, represented mostly by the French idiosyncratic brand of republicanism, were to prove too strong to allow for a true `liberalization' of French intellectual and political life. Whereas a number of lawyers, economists and political scientists as well as proportion of the French civil service saw all the benefits of a rigorous engagement with Rawls, philosophers and the intelligentsia on the whole, with the exception of Paul Ricoeur, reacted negatively to Rawls. (shrink)

" La justice, écrit John Rawls, est la première vertu des institutions sociales comme la vérité est celle des systèmes de pensée. " Rawls renoue ainsi avec la grande tradition de la philosophie politique classique, kantienne en particulier. Les principes de justice qui gouvernent nos démocraties peuvent faire l'objet d'un accord unanime, légitimé par la procédure suivie et non plus par référence à une conception du souverain bien. Mais sa démonstration suppose une société unifiée. Or cette condition n'est plus valable (...) étant donné la diversité culturelle de nos sociétés multiethniques. La nouvelle question qui se pose est donc celle " de savoir comment une société juste et libre est possible dans des conditions de conflits doctrinaux profonds sans espoir de solution. " Dans Libéralisme politique, Rawls amorce une réponse. Le consentement recherché sur des principes de justice ne doit pas être compris comme une adhésion globale : c'est un consentement uniquement " politique " qui laisse toute liberté en matière philosophique, morale ou religieuse. Mais peut-on ainsi séparer le politique et le métaphysique? Est-il possible et même utile de rester " philosophiquement superficiel " pour parvenir à un consensus politique? (shrink)

. In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so‐called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see (...) a contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability. (shrink)

In this paper the nature and the role of Rawls's idea of a “free public reason” are examined with an emphasis on the divide between the private and the public spheres, a divide which is the hallmark of a liberal democracy. Criticisms from both the so-called Continental tradition and the Communitarian opponents to liberalism insist on the ineffectiveness of such a conception, on its inability to establish a political consensus on democracy. But it would be a mistake to see a (...) contractarian theory of justice, such as Rawls's justice as fairness, as grounding the social contract in a public use of reason. Such a contract would indeed be susceptible to endless conflicts and renegotiations and would never achieve consensus. Therefore, a distinction must be made between the values of justice that are present in and through the “original” contractual position and the that regulate the public sphere and guarantee its stability. (shrink)

This is French version of John Stuart Mill's essay "On Nature" accompanied by a introduction by the translator and a lexicon of English words (used in moral philosophy) often wrongly translated into French and a short reflection on the two senses of the word "law" that often cause confusion.

The main challenge facing democracies in the post-Communist era is probably not so much the threat of totalitarianism as the consequences of pluralism, of the existence within these societies of a plurality of incompatible cultural allegiances. How are they to survive their fragmentation into communities many of whom no longer share the basic moral requirements of a democratic regime: recognition of the liberty of conscience, of equality of rights, and the like?