This article is the result of research on the occurrences of the terms suppositio, supponere and their linguistic derivations in the literature on fallacies of the second half of the thirteenth century. The authors analysed are Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, Simon of Faversham, the so-called Incerti Auctores, the Anonymous of Prague and John Duns Scotus. The central elements that emerge are the role played by the notion of suppositum and by the linguistic context to determine the denotation of (...) an expression, and the importance of the metaphysical problem of the unity and identity of suppositum in both the theory of predication and the theory of inference. Both subjects, obviously, are closely connected. (shrink)

This book represents a first attempt, after the anti-communist Revolution of 1989, to investigate with analytical methods the reliability of the "official philosophy"in the ex-communist countries - the diamat. It is not a factual, historical or politological approach, but a conceptual analysis of two main topics: the "materialism" and the "dialectics". It is mainly focused on the Romanian case.

Philosophy , October 1974, contains an article entitled ‘Aristotle's Four Becauses’, by Professor Max Hocutt, who contends that Aristotle's aitia means ‘a because’ or ‘an explanation’ rather than ‘a cause’ and should be translated accordingly. He argues that only Aristotle's efficient ‘cause’ is a cause in the English sense of the word, and that ‘Aristotle's theory of “causes” is simply an application of his theory of syllogistic to the analysis of scientific knowledge’ . Both contentions deserve a word.

Proboj zapadne europske filozofske misli na čijem se začelju pojavljuje ime francuskog mislioca R. Descartesa za sobom je donijelo oživljavanje čovjekove svijesti – tzv. post-renesansno intelektualno buđenje koje je navijestilo i označilo početak novog – modernoga doba, koje je na spoznajnoteorijskoj razini prepoznato kao početak vladavine instrumentalnog uma, odnosno, hegemonije Descartesovog cogita.U ovome radu nastoji se istražiti, pojasniti i protumačiti ulogu i značaj cogita u odnosu na moralno djelovanje modernoga čovjeka u percepciji suvremenog i glasovitog kanadskog filozofa, teoretičara i mislioca (...) Charlesa Taylora. Ima li um doista ekskluzivni primat nad čovjekovim djelovanjem, te kako u svjetlu uma objasniti i razumjeti krizu ethosa suvremenog čovjeka i pokušati pronaći adekvatno rješenje za pitanje globalne krize morala koja je zahvatila kompletnu civilizaciju našeg doba? – samo su neka među sličnim pitanjima koja će se propitati u ovome radu.The breakthrough of the Western European philosophic thought, whose final name is that of the French theorist R. Descartes, brought with it the revival of man’s conscience or the so-called post-Renaissance intellectual awakening, which announced and signified the beginning of a new – modern age, that was recognized on the cognitive-theoretical level as the beginning of the rule of instrumental reason, that is, the hegemony of the Descartean cogito.This presentation tends to research, clarify and interpret the role and the significance of the cogito in relationship with man’s moral action and generally, with the theory of morality of the modern Canadian philosopher, theorist and thinker Charles Taylor. Does reason indeed hold exclusive supremacy over man’s actions and how does one explain and understand the crisis of the modern man’s ethos in the light of reason, and try to find an adequate solution for the issue of a global morality crisis, which has taken over the entire civilization of our time? – are only some among a number of similar questions that will be discussed in this paper. (shrink)

§ 1. Of all the subjects which for well over two thousand years have remained the more or less constant topics of philosophical discussion, I can think of none which has not at some time by some philosopher been dismissed as a nonentity or an illusion. The history of philosophy seems to show that we cannot begin fairly to estimate the nature of any element in the universe until we have steadily contemplated a universe from which that element has been (...) hypothetically eliminated. (shrink)

For a century or so after his death Hegel's system excited, if not wider diversity of interpretation and more bitter controversy, then certainly more bewilderment, than had ever before befogged the battlefields of speculative thought. A few fervent disciples maintained that their master had achieved a system substantially if not in all detail final and complete, a philosophy destined to set at rest forever all serious philosophic doubt. Others agreed that this claim to finality was inherent in the system, but (...) mocked openly, proclaiming Hegel an arrogant megalomaniac. (shrink)

I Have often wished that someone would write a History of Oxford Honour Schools. But I want that work written for reasons which the title does not immediately suggest.

§ 22. Logic for Bradley, who follows the Kantian tradition, means primarily a theory of judgment. His definition of judgment is made so wide that it really covers inference as well. The “reference of an ideal content to reality,” as soon as that content is taken as complex and as not atomic, covers inference denned as ideal self-development of an object. Though the definition of judgment has a subjective flavour due to the way in which Bradley finds it necessary to (...) distinguish it from psychical fact, he does not mean to imply that it is any less objective than inference. We learn from the second edition of the Logic that judgment so far as it is mediated is inference, and that mere unmediated judgment is nothing. Judgment, he says, though distinct from inference in form, is everywhere inference really though not explicitly; and almost the first words of the Terminal Essay on Judgment are: “Whatever else and however much else an inference may be, an inference still is a judgment.”. (shrink)

§ 22. Logic for Bradley, who follows the Kantian tradition, means primarily a theory of judgment. His definition of judgment is made so wide that it really covers inference as well. The “reference of an ideal content to reality,” as soon as that content is taken as complex and as not atomic, covers inference denned as ideal self-development of an object. Though the definition of judgment has a subjective flavour due to the way in which Bradley finds it necessary to (...) distinguish it from psychical fact, he does not mean to imply that it is any less objective than inference. We learn from the second edition of the Logic that judgment so far as it is mediated is inference, and that mere unmediated judgment is nothing. Judgment, he says, though distinct from inference in form, is everywhere inference really though not explicitly; and almost the first words of the Terminal Essay on Judgment are: “Whatever else and however much else an inference may be, an inference still is a judgment.”. (shrink)

Is the State organic? Does it, or should it, in some way transcend the individual natures of its citizens, so as itself to be an individual more complete and of higher value than the singular individuals who compose it? Is it thus in some sense an organism, and are its citizens in some sense organs of it which gain for themselves a higher value and significance in subserving it?

Se constructions designate a set of polysemous constructions along a transitivity continuum marked by the clitic se that perform various functions: reflexive/reciprocal, middle, anticausative, passive, and impersonal. A counterpart of these constructions without the clitic – the null se construction – is also attested. Based on an extensive usage-feature and profile-based analysis, and using multivariate statistical methods, we analyze, considering Cognitive Grammar, the conceptual, structural, and lectal factors that determine the choice between overt and null se constructions. The results of (...) the study show that the null constructions are far more frequent in Brazilian (BP) than in European Portuguese (EP). In BP, the focus on the moment of change is a crucial factor for the overt/null variation in reflexive/reciprocal, middle, anticausative, and impersonal constructions. If the moment of the change of state is profiled, the overt se construction is usually produced. If the moment of change is not profiled, the null se construction is preferred. External factors also play a role in the variation. Register is an important predictor for the observed variation of the anticausative construction, and the only predictor for the overt/null variation in the case of the passive construction. In EP, the null se variant is mainly limited to anticausative constructions. In all cases of null constructions, there is a shift to an absolute construal, which has an impact on the way that the transitivity continuum is conceptualized. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

§ 22. Logic for Bradley, who follows the Kantian tradition, means primarily a theory of judgment. His definition of judgment is made so wide that it really covers inference as well. The “reference of an ideal content to reality,” as soon as that content is taken as complex and as not atomic, covers inference denned as ideal self-development of an object. Though the definition of judgment has a subjective flavour due to the way in which Bradley finds it necessary to (...) distinguish it from psychical fact, he does not mean to imply that it is any less objective than inference. We learn from the second edition of the Logic that judgment so far as it is mediated is inference, and that mere unmediated judgment is nothing. Judgment, he says, though distinct from inference in form, is everywhere inference really though not explicitly; and almost the first words of the Terminal Essay on Judgment are: “Whatever else and however much else an inference may be, an inference still is a judgment.”. (shrink)

§ 1. The purpose of this paper is to inquire what distinction can or should be drawn between logic on the one hand and on the other psychology, so far as psychology concerns itself specifically with the problem of knowledge. The suggestions I have to make are very provisional, and are based mainly on a criticism of the late Mr. Bradley's views of the nature and scope of logic and psychology. For this reason I have for my title adapted from (...) Bradley's article on “Association and Thought” a famous phrase which seems to me to illustrate fairly well the meeting-point of these two sciences in his thinking. At the same time this very criticism is itself chiefly founded upon philosophical considerations with which Bradley at least as much as any other writer has taught me to sympathize. In short, I assume some sort of Absolute Idealism; and my excuse must be the further assumption—which I hope the reader will more readily tolerate— that the proper criticism of any theory is that which it can be shown to pass upon itself in the course of its own development. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.