This book shows that the breakoff of narrative causal explanation in physics, although remarkable, is no basis for the negative view of scientific knowledge.

An essay first published in 1917 presents key insights and ideas that shaped Whitehead’s physics and metaphysics. It also displays his apparently lifelong view that science cut off from philosophy (which for him meant, or at some point led to, metaphysics) will fall short in its vital mission of explaining facts and phenomena—a view dissenting sharply from reigning doctrines of the modem era. His largely implicit criticism of the modem assumption that science as such can do without philosophy merits clarification (...) and evaluation. (shrink)

A. N. Whitehead's approach to physical theorizing contrasts with that of mainstream or official physics in being centrally concerned with articulating a background explanation of physical facts and phenomena in general that would take the place of the “ether” of classical physics, a project otherwise unpursued by the science in its modern period. Unlike Einstein's, Whitehead's approach to relativity primarily seeks explanation rather than utility ; also, it avoids the philosophical problems with Einstein's theory alleged by Whitehead and a range (...) of other philosophers. This stops short of a finding as to the comparative worth of Whitehead's alternative basis for quantitative formulations. (shrink)

While efforts to frame a Whiteheadian response to problems of quantum interpretation have looked primarily to the later metaphysical writings, a powerful potential in this regard is contained in the ideas of the philosophy of nature period.

While efforts to frame a Whiteheadian response to problems of quantum interpretation have looked primarily to the later metaphysical writings, a powerful potential in this regard is contained in the ideas of the philosophy of nature period.