A wide array of species throughout the animal kingdom has shown the ability to distinguish between quantities. Aside from being important for optimal foraging decisions, this ability seems to also be of great relevance in group-living animals as it allows them to inform their decisions regarding engagement in between-group conflicts based on the size of competing groups. However, it is often unclear whether these animals rely on numerical information alone to make these decisions or whether they employ other cues that (...) may covary with the differences in quantity. In this study we used a touch screen paradigm to investigate the quantity discrimination abilities of two closely related group-living species, wolves and dogs, using a simultaneous visual presentation paradigm. Both species were able to successfully distinguish between stimuli of different quantities up to 32 items and ratios up to 0.80, and their results were in accordance with Weber's law (which predicts worse performances at higher ratios). However, our controls showed that both wolves and dogs may have used continuous, non-numerical cues, such as size and shape of the stimuli, in conjunction with the numerical information to solve this task. In line with this possibility, dogs' performance greatly exceeded that which they had shown in other numerical competence paradigms. We discuss the implications these results may have on these species' underlying biases and numerical capabilities, as well as how our paradigm may have affected the animals' ability to solve the task. (shrink)

Este trabajo constituye una primera aproximación a la teoría del origen en común tal como aparece en On the Origin of Species, de Charles Darwin. Luego de exponer las diferencias entre esta teoría y la teoría de la selección natural y la teoría de la evolución, se presentan algunos debates en torno a la determinación de homologías, el vocabulario de la teoría y su ley fundamental. Finalmente, se discute la TOC-teoricidad de los términos involucrados y los candidatos a especializaciones de (...) TOC. (shrink)

En este trabajo discutimos la extensión de la influencia que el pensamiento de Richard Owen tuvo sobre el de Charles Darwin. Además, se intentará mostrar lo heterogéneo de tal influencia, que va desde teorías específicas a giros retóricos. Esta influencia es en muchos casos subestimada, dando la sensación de que la novedad darwiniana consistió únicamente en mirar con ojos desprejuiciados lo que los otros no habían visto. Esta visión resulta injusta con Owen, y también con el esfuerzo conceptual llevado adelante (...) por Darwin con las piezas brindadas por sus precursores. Finalmente, este es un caso interesante para entender el tipo de novedad aportada por las revoluciones científicas y el modo sofisticado en que tal novedad se sustenta sobre el trabajo de los enfoques previos. (shrink)

Resumen: La capacidad unificadora de una teoría científica es un rasgo usualmente contemplado a la hora de evaluar su adecuación. Kitcher ha elucidado satisfactoriamente tal noción mediante su enfoque de los patrones explicativos. Sin embargo, su perspectiva adolece de ciertas carencias. Concretamente, sostendremos que el requisito de rigurosidad de los patrones para evaluar la capacidad unificadora debe ser repensado, pues atenta contra la heterogeneidad característica de las diferentes aplicaciones de teorías unificadoras. A su vez, mostraremos cómo estas dificultades bien pueden (...) ser subsanadas desde el marco del estructuralismo metateórico sin por ello resignar ninguna de las acertadas intuiciones de Kitcher. -/- Palabras clave: Explicación, Kitcher, estructuralismo metateórico, unificación, unificación espuria. -/- Abstract: Kitcher has satisfactorily explicated unification using his particular approach to scientific explanation. However, we believe that his perspective has certain problems, which have been inherited by more recent approaches to the topic. Specifically, the requirement of stringency of patterns that Kitcher proposes to determine the unifying power of an explanatory pattern undermines the typical and peculiar heterogeneity we can find in different applications of unifying theories. We will show how this topic can be better addressed by the perspective built by metatheoretical structuralism without sacrificing any of Kitcher’s correct intuitions. -/- Keywords: Explanation, Kitcher, metatheoretical structuralism, spurious unification, unification. (shrink)

This work takes a stand on whether Wallace should be regarded as co-author of the theory of natural selection alongside Darwin as he is usually considered on behalf of his alleged essential contribution to the conception of the theory. It does so from a perspective unexplored thus far: we will argue for Darwin’s priority based on a rational reconstruction of the theory of natural selection as it appears in the writings of both authors. We show that the theory does not (...) appear in exactly the same manner in the writings of each of its alleged co-discoverers: tough we find the same fundamental elements in both works, even in Darwin’s early texts, we discern a more complex unifying and ramified structure than the one we find in Wallace’s Ternate manuscript. Even when we think the badge of the “Darwin–Wallace” theory is well deserved, the unifying force of Darwin’s version has proved to be one of the keys for the ulterior success of the so-called Darwinian revolution in Biology. (shrink)

A given explanatory theory T falls into circular reasoning if the only way to determine its explanandum is through the application of T. To find an underlying theory T′ that determines T′s explanandum helps us save T from this accusation of circularity. We follow the structuralist view of theories in presenting and dealing with this issue, by applying it to particular theories. More specifically, we focus on the relationship between the Darwinian theory of common ancestry and the determination of homologies.

Preface to the Thematic Volume: Models and Theories in Biology.

Jaswal & Akhtar in their target article convincingly argue that subjects with autism do not have diminished social motivation. However, they still recognize that autistic people behave socially in an unusual way. Why? Here we suggest that these behaviours are the results of a multisensory integration deficit. Viewed from this perspective, the assumption that autistic people's unusual behaviours indicate diminished social motivation has to be replaced by the one that they have diminished social prediction skills.

In this commentary on Bastin et al., we suggest that spatial context plays a critical role in the encoding and retrieval of events. Specifically, the translation process between the viewpoint-independent content of a memory and the viewpoint-dependent stimuli activating the retrieval plays a critical role in spatial memory recollection. This perspective also provides an explanatory model for pathological disturbances such as Alzheimer's disease.

In this contribution, we explore a little-referenced effort of Rheticus in favor of the reception of the astronomy of his teacher Copernicus in the religious circle of his time. This appears in his "Treatise on Sacred Scripture and the Motion of the Earth", a document lost for centuries, and rediscovered by Hooykaas in 1972. Here, we offer an elucidation of the main ideas of Rheticus and suggest – from the comparative study of a concrete case – that he should be (...) considered as a precursor of later similar moves, such as that of Galileo in well-known and better-studied letters. (shrink)

En su artículo clásico, Gould y Lewontin (1979) han esgrimido críticas no siempre claras - contra el así llamado "programa adaptacionista". Puesto que una "adaptación" en uno de los sentidos más utilizados del vocablo - refiere a un rasgo cuya fijación en una población se explica por selección natural, el encuentro de adaptaciones ha sido considerado una heurística que guía a los biólogos en la aplicación de la teoría de la evolución por selección natural, procurando extender el campo de aplicación (...) de la teoría a priori, y sin restricción alguna, al mejor estilo kuhneano. Este trabajo procura elucidar, breve, pero integralmente, las críticas contenidas en el artículo aludido, donde se reconocen objeciones de diversa índole, a saber: empíricas, metodológicas, conceptuales, y pragmáticas, aunque con solapamientos. Se evalúa el filo de algunas de ellas, y se estipula la utilidad potencial que elucidaciones conceptuales como las que se ofrecen aquí pueden tener para con la filosofía de la biología. (shrink)

Con la publicación de Principios de Geología, Lyell se propuso mejorar la reputación de la Geología mediante una tregua con la religión y mediante la presentación del uniformitarianismo (término acuñado por Whewell, uno de sus críticos más respetados) como estrategia heurística. Luego de una breve e..

Reseña de: GINNOBILI, S. La teoría de la selección natural. Una exploración metacientífica. Bernal: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2018.

Francisco Ramos Mexía y su nieto José María, célebres personalidades de la historia argentina, contaban con diferentes visiones de la naturaleza. Para uno, ésta era producto de la acción de un creador inteligente; para el otro, la biodiversidad era resultado de la acción exclusiva de la evolu- ción, prominentemente impulsada por la selección natural. Este trabajo consiste en un breve análisis de estas posiciones encontradas.Francisco Ramos Mexía and one of his grandchildren, José María, who were important figures in the history (...) of Argentina, sustained different views on nature. For one of them, nature was the result of the work of an intelligent Creator; for the other, biodiversity was a result of the exclusive action of evolution, prominently driven by natural selection. This paper briefly dis- cusses these two opposing views. (shrink)

Se habla de crisis en la economía, en el trabajo, en la vivienda� Crisis que se explican con datos, con números, que aparecen en los periódicos y las televisiones. Pero hay otras crisis, crisis concretas, que afectan a cada vida particular, experiencias que van más allá de los que se puede contar: Hay más cosas que hay que vivirlas, si no, no se pueden llegar a entender. Más allá de os discursos institucionalizados, son muchos los que han vivido siempre en (...) crisis, desde su nacimiento en una familia y un entorno concretos les colocó en una determinada posición social marcando profundamente sus posibilidades de promoción y los esfuerzos que tendrían que hacer para salir adelante. (shrink)

"El repertorio bibliográfico no presenta resumen".

An interesting metatheoretical controversy took place during the 1980’s and 1990’s between pattern and phylogenetic cladists. What was always at stake in the discussion was not how work in systematics should be carried out, but rather how this practice should be metatheoretically interpreted. In this article, we criticize Pearson’s account of the metatheoretical factors at play in this discussion. Following him, we focus on the issue of circularity, and on the role that phylogenetic hypotheses play in the determination of “primary (...) homologies”. Pearson argues that the recognition of primary homologies cannot be achieved without recourse to previous phylogenetic knowledge, and that to claim otherwise is to state that primary homologies are observable. To show why that view would be inadequate, he appeals to Hanson’s views about theory-laden observation, alongside with a specific case study, which allegedly illustrates the more complex relation between observation and theory. We will argue that the pattern cladists’ point is better addressed by taking a quite different approach: instead of thinking in terms of observability, the topic can be tackled by paying attention to the way in which concepts are determined. We will take the notion of T-theoricity from metatheoretical structuralism and show that, once the issue is discussed with the appropriate metatheoretical framework, the alleged counterexample brought up by Pearson is not problematic at all for pattern cladism. (shrink)

Due to an unfortunate turn of events, the family name of the first author was erroneously published as ‘RoffÕ’ in the original publication. The correct representation of the first author’s family name is listed above and below.

Esta reflexión propone que las Tecnologías de Mejoramiento Humano, en el siglo XXI, se erigen en un dispositivo biopolítico de poder molecular sobre la vida del individuo y de la especie humana, el cual está vertebrado tanto por los mecanismos de Infogeneración e Infogeneración como de líneas de visibilidad, enunciación, fuerza, objetivación y subjetivación. Esta incipiente biopolítica de poder molecular que tiene por blanco de intervención los entresijos de la vitalidad y como finalidad producir artificialmente la vida, genera al (...) menos tres efectos: sobre la subjetividad, el cuerpo y la salud, suscitando, así, interrogantes importantes para la bioética y el bioderecho. En un primer momento, esbozamos las notas características del Dispositivo biopolítico de mejoramiento humano. Después, abordamos el modo en que el DBMh construye inéditas formas de subjetividad, al mismo tiempo que establece nuevas y distintas concepciones del cuerpo humano y de la salud. En la parte final se esboza un modelo de estratigrafía para leer fenómenos asociados a las TMh en el que se articula la bioética, la biopolítica y el bioderecho en un modelo de geometría variable. (shrink)

It is common to hear talk of the aim of belief and to find philosophers appealing to that aim for numerous explanatory purposes. What belief 's aim explains depends, of course, on what that aim is. Many hold that it is somehow related to truth, but there are various ways in which one might specify belief 's aim using the notion of truth. In this article, by considering whether they can account for belief 's standard of correctness and the epistemic (...) norms governing belief, I argue against certain prominent specifications of belief 's aim given in terms of truth, and advance a neglected alternative. (shrink)

Simon May has argued that the notion of a principled compromise is incoherent. Reasons to compromise are always in his view strategic: though we think that the position we defend is still the right one, we compromise on this view in order to avoid the undesirable consequences that might flow from not compromising. I argue against May that there are indeed often principled reasons to compromise, and that these reasons are in fact multiple. First, compromises evince respect for persons that (...) we have reason to think of as our epistemic peers, and acknowledgement of our own finitudes as moral reasoners. Second, compromises are often made morally necessary by the shortfalls that unavoidably separate democratic institutions from democratic ideals. Third, compromises express a desirable form of democratic community. And fourth, compromises are often justified from a consequentialist point of view, in that they allow for the realization of values that would not be realized as well by the failure to compromise. (shrink)

Plato's dialogues frequently criticize traditional Greek myth, yet Plato also integrates myth with his writing. Daniel S. Werner confronts this paradox through an in-depth analysis of the Phaedrus, Plato's most mythical dialogue. Werner argues that the myths of the Phaedrus serve several complex functions: they bring nonphilosophers into the philosophical life; they offer a starting point for philosophical inquiry; they unify the dialogue as a literary and dramatic whole; they draw attention to the limits of language and the limits of (...) knowledge; and they allow Plato to co-opt cultural authority as a way of defining and legitimating the practice of philosophy. Platonic myth, as a species of traditional tale, is thus both distinct from philosophical dialectic and similar to it. Ultimately, the most powerful effect of Platonic myth is the way in which it leads readers to participate in Plato's dialogues and to engage in a process of self-examination. (shrink)

A systematic effort to rethink Freud's theory of the unconscious, aiming to separate out the different forms of unconsciousness.

This paper defends the epistemic account of the normativity of requests. The epistemic account says that a request does not create any reasons and thus does not have any special normative power. Rather, a request gives reasons by revealing information which is normatively relevant. I argue that compared to competing accounts of request normativity, especially those of David Enoch and James H.P. Lewis, the epistemic account gives better answers to cases of insincere requests, is simpler, and does a better job (...) incorporating the importance of relationships. I also defend the epistemic account from three objections: that requests are important because they constitute consent, that requests and wishes must be normatively different, and that some requests do not provide any new information. (shrink)

The U.S. election in November 2016 raised and amplified doubts about first-past-the-post (“plurality rule”) electoral systems. Arguments against plurality rule and for alternatives like preferential voting tend to be consequentialist: it is argued that systems like preferential voting produce different, better outcomes. After briefly noting why the consequentialist case against plurality rule is more complex and contentious than it first appears, I offer an expressive alternative: plurality rule produces actual or apparent dilemmas for voters in ways that are morally objectionable, (...) and avoidable under preferential voting systems. This expressive case against plurality rule is both simpler and more ecumenical than its consequentialist counterpart, and it provides strong reasons to prefer alternatives to plurality rule. Moreover, it suggests a distinct way of evaluating different alternatives like preferential voting. (shrink)

Supporters of open borders sometimes argue that the state has no pro tanto right to restrict immigration, because such a right would also entail a right to exclude existing citizens for whatever reasons justify excluding immigrants. These arguments can be defeated by suggesting that people have a right to stay put. I present a new form of the exclusion argument against closed borders which escapes this “right to stay put” reply. I do this by describing a kind of exclusion that (...) has not been discussed in depth, which I call “territorial exclusion.” Territorial exclusion is the process according to which the group that wishes to exclude current citizens secedes from the territory in which those citizens reside. I argue that the wrongness of territorial exclusion explains why there is no pro tanto right for a state to exclude immigrants, because otherwise there would be a pro tanto right for the state to kick people out by seceding from the territory they inhabit. Because kicking people out like this is typically wrong, borders cannot be closed. (shrink)

I ask you to X. You now have a reason to X. My request gave you a reason. How? One unpopular theory is the epistemic account, according to which requests do not create any new reasons but instead simply reveal information. For instance, my request that you X reveals that I desire that you X, and my desire gives you a reason to X. Peter Schaber has recently attacked both the epistemic account and other theories of the reason-giving force of (...) requests. Schaber defends a new theory of the reason-giving force of requests according to which request give reasons because it is valuable for requesters and requestees that requests have this power. In this paper I argue that Schaber's attack on the epistemic account fails, and that his own theory ought to be rejected because it faces compelling objections. (shrink)

“X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we aren’t (...) X-Firsters. Hence the chapter’s two main goals. First, to provide a simple argument that one shouldn’t be an X-Firster about the normative domain, which starts with the observation that analogous views have dubious merits in analogous domains. Second, to offer an alternative view—taking normativity to be a determinable explained in terms of its determinates—that offers an interesting way to think about the structure and unity of normativity. (shrink)