There is a lot of damage that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused and it is too early to know its real cost, especially when governments have difficulties to coordinate effective policies to combat the disease, which avoid the negative impact on the general population and, particularly, groups in situations of greater vulnerability. This work reflects on the impact of COVID-19 on the black Brazilian population, starting with the debates made by specialists in Health of the Black Population and other social (...) agents in the period from April to May 2020. It is a documentary and bibliographic research that focuses on thematic interpretation of content, divided into three parts: first, the delimitation of what is understood in this work by the black population; later, the discussion between the health of the black population and public policies in Brazil; and finally, the systematization of the debate on the impact on the black population of COVID-19, highlighting the issues of inclusion by color / race, gender and housing, lethality, impact on the periphery, social isolation and the problem of precarious black lives. Considerations about necropolitics and black bodies, Indians and African immigrants are addressed; and the proposals for tackling the pandemic made by the Brazilian Association of Public Health (ABRASCO). (shrink)

With the advance of COVID-19 in the world, it is necessary to reflect on how the different realities influence the processes of advancement and containment of the impacts generated from the pandemic. Guinea-Bissau, being a country that has been recording military coups since 1980, has become a vulnerable country in all respects. The vulnerability of the country is so great that structural reform has not been possible in the state apparatus since its independence from the yoke Portuguese in 1973; in (...) this way this Democratic Republic is economically dependent on its international partners even for the implementation of its general state budget. With cashew nuts as the main and almost only product that moves the economy, the country has seen the needs and demands of the population worsen with the arrival of the new coronavirus, thus having the increase in the expenses of families in acquiring food and hygiene products to cope with the disease, in view of the economic weakness of its citizens. This article aims to analyze the sociopolitical processes that influence the management of the pandemic in Guinea Bissau. Its work methodology is a review of literature obtained through scientific journals and portals. It was observed in this path the need for training of new professional staff and greater investment in the structure, both economic and health, so that we can manage moments of crisis as faced. This will only be possible through the alignment between state and civil society around a participatory and supportive development project. (shrink)

O trabalho se ocupa da infância como expressão estética em dois filmes do alemão Wim Wenders, Alice nas cidades e Lisbon Story. Para isso procura construir um jogo entre ambos, em que cada uma das obras aparece simultaneamente como testemunho histórico e síntese de questões que dizem respeito à existência e às próprias possibilidades do cinema. Comparecem, portanto, o amor, a amizade, a memória, a reelaboração do passado, as cidades, o progresso e a regressão, bem como as técnicas de captação (...) e produção de imagens e sons, os destinos e a memória do cinema como inconsciente onírico de uma época. O apoio se encontra principalmente em Walter Benjamin, nem tanto em seus comentários sobre cinema, mas muito mais no que se refere ao que escreveu sobre a infância na cidade, demarcando, assim, como Wenders o fará, um olhar infantil, oblíquo em relação ao seu destino, mas não infantilizado, sobre as coisas do mundo. (shrink)

Developing countries have recently experienced a burgeoning of small-scale individual entrepreneurs (SIEs) – who range from petty traders to personal service workers like small street vendors, barbers and owners of small shops – as a result of market-based reforms, rapid urbanisation, unemployment, landlessness and poverty. While SIEs form a major part of the informal workforce in developing countries and contribute significantly to economic growth, their potential is being undermined when they engage in irresponsible and deceptive business practices such as overpricing, (...) sale of underweight or substandard products, or attempts to hoard goods, to name a few. Despite the growing interest in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of small businesses in developing countries, the SIEs have received almost no attention. To address this void in the literature, we explore the reasons for the less than optimal level of social responsibility demonstrated by some SIEs in developing countries. We do so by drawing upon the existing literature to develop a comprehensive framework of social responsibility of SIEs highlighting their unique characteristics and the different contextual factors that they encounter in developing countries. Based on this framework, we then present a set of propositions specifying the influence of these contextual factors such as business environment, cultural traditions, socio-economic conditions, and both international and domestic pressures on the business practices of SIEs. The framework offers an explanation for the lack of responsible entrepreneurship of SIEs and has important implications for promoting sustainable business practices in developing countries where businesses are striving hard to survive and compete. (shrink)

This study provides insights on sector-specific characteristics, challenges and issues that affect corporate responsibility in relation to ethnicity and gender on arts boards. Using stakeholder theory, the study explores how arts board composition sets the scene for dynamics that affect CR. Data analysis is based on interviews with 92 board members and stakeholders sitting on 66 arts boards in Australia. Results suggest that the dynamism of gender and ethnic diversity on arts boards makes them responsive to CR; however, their presence (...) does not always lead to CR. For diverse boards to lead to CR, our findings indicate the significance of board member attributes of passion, skill and capability of developing networks, irrespective of gender and ethnicity. The article advances understanding of the implications and relevance of ethnic and gender diversity on non-profit boards and contributes to an important yet under-researched body of literature. (shrink)

Although Strawson’s main aim in “On Referring” was to argue that definite descriptions can be used referentially – that is, “to mention or refer to some individual person or single object . . . , in the course of doing what we should normally describe as making a statement about that person [or] object” (1950, p. 320) – he denied that definite descriptions are always used referentially. The description in ‘Napoleon was the greatest French soldier’ is not used referentially, says (...) Strawson, since it is used not to mention an individual, but only “to say something about an individual already mentioned” (p. 320). This is an example of what we may call a predicative use of a definite description, though such uses might be better illustrated by considering the false sentence.. (shrink)

I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, phenomenal indiscriminability is transitive. For if it were not transitive, we would be precluded from accepting the truisms that if two things look the same then the way they look is the same and that if two things look the same then if one looks red, so does the other. Nevertheless, it has seemed obvious to many philosophers (e.g. Goodman, Armstrong and Dummett) that phenomenal indiscriminability is not transitive; and, moreover, that this (...) non-transitivity is straightforwardly revealed to us in experience. I show this thought to be wrong. All inferences from the character of our experience to the non-transitivity of indiscriminability involve either a misunderstanding of continuity, a mistaken interpretation of the idea that we have limited powers of discrimination, or tendentious claims about what our experience is really like; or such inferences are based on inadequately supported premisses, which though individually plausible are jointly implausible. (shrink)

Saul Kripke pointed out that whether or not an utterance gives rise to a liar-like paradox cannot always be determined by checking just its form or content.1 Whether or not Jones’s utterance of ‘Everything Nixon said is true’ is paradoxical depends in part on what Nixon said. Something similar may be said about the sorites paradox. For example, whether or not the predicate ‘are enough grains of coffee for Smith’s purposes’ gives rise to a sorites paradox depends at least in (...) part on what Smith’s purposes are. If Smith’s purpose is to make some coffee to drink, so that he can wake up and start his day, then we would be inclined to accept, and would find it strange to deny the following sorites sentence. (shrink)

In “Descriptions as Predicates” (Fara 2001) I argued that definite and indefinite descriptions should be given a uniform semantic treatment as predicates rather than as quantifier phrases. The aim of the current paper is to clarify and elaborate one of the arguments for the descriptions-aspredicates view, one that concerns the interaction of descriptions with adverbs of quantification.

Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate—a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some sense (...) in which vague predicates are gappy which may be expressed neutrally by saying that on any appropriately constructed sorites series for a given vague predicate there will be a gap between the objects of which the predicate is definitely true and those of which it is definitely false. Taking as primitive the operator ‘it is definitely the case that’, abbreviated as ‘D’, we may stipulate that a predicate F is definitely true (or definitely false) of an object just in case ‘DF (a)’, where a is a name for the object, is true (or false) simpliciter.1 This yields the following conditional formulation of a ‘gap principle’: (DΦ(x) ∧ D¬Φ(y)) → ¬R(x, y). Here ‘Φ’ is to be replaced with a vague predicate, while ‘R’ is to stand for a sorites relation for that predicate: a relation that can be used to construct a sorites series for the predicate—such as the relation of being just one millimetre shorter than for the predicate ‘is tall’. Disagreements about the sense in which it is correct to say that vague predicates are gappy can then be recast as disagreements about how to understand the definitely operator. One might give it, for example, a pragmatic construal such as ‘it would not be misleading to assert that’; or an epistemic construal such as ‘it is known that’ or ‘it is knowable that’; or a semantic construal such as ‘it is true that’. (shrink)

Let us say that the proposition that p is transparent just in case it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that p, and it is known that it is known that it is known that p, and so on, for any number of iterations of the knowledge operator ‘it is known that’. If there are transparent propositions at all, then the claim that any man with zero hairs is bald seems like a good candidate. (...) We know that any man with zero hairs is bald. And it also does not seem completely implausible that we know that we know it, and that we know that we know that we know it, and so on. (shrink)

This is a perfect overview article that serves as a general introduction to the topic of dispositions. It is composed of six sections that review the main philosophical approaches to the most important questions: Analysis of disposition ascription, the dispositional/categorical distinction, dispositions and categorical bases, the intrinsicness of dispositions and the causal efficacy of dispositions.

s for the Second Workshop on Implementing Machine Ethics.

One reason to think that names have a predicate-type semantic value is that they naturally occur in count-noun positions: ‘The Michaels in my building both lost their keys’; ‘I know one incredibly sharp Cecil and one that's incredibly dull’. Predicativism is the view that names uniformly occur as predicates. Predicativism flies in the face of the widely accepted view that names in argument position are referential, whether that be Millian Referentialism, direct-reference theories, or even Fregean Descriptivism. But names are predicates (...) in all of their occurrences; they are predicates that are true of their bearers. When a name appears as a bare singular in argument position, it really occupies the predicate position of what in this essay is called a denuded definite description: a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. Sloat provided good evidence for this. The definite article is sometimes pronounced with names in the singular: ‘The Ivan we all love doesn't feel well’. Sloat proposed a disjunctive generalization of when the definite article must be pronounced with a singular name. This essay shows that by slightly revising Sloat's generalization, we arrive at a simple, nondisjunctive, syntactic rule that governs the overt appearance of the definite article with singular names. But Ivan does not necessarily bear the name ‘Ivan’, so one might worry that the sentence “Ivan might not have had ‘Ivan’ as a name” would incorrectly be predicted false. This essay shows that Predicativism does not have this consequence by showing that incomplete definite descriptions in general and incomplete denuded descriptions, such as ‘Øthe Ivan’, in particular are rigid designators. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: If an event of one kind does not always lead to an event of a second given kind, it does not follow (of course) that the occurrence of an event of the first kind can never explain the occurrence of an event of the second kind. I’m concerned here with cases of belief. In the service of defending a plausible “boundary-shifting” solution to the sorites paradox, I argue that a certain paradoxical belief(in the universally-generalized premise of the sorites paradox) (...) can be explained by our having reasonable beliefs that entail it (beliefs in the instances of that generalization). Some have argued against boundary-shifting solutions on the grounds that beliefs in instances do not always lead to beliefs in generalizations over those instances. I argue that the objection flounders. An event of one kind can explain an event of another kind even if events of the first kind do not always lead to events of the second kind. One does not impugn an explanation merely by pointing to its defeasibility. (shrink)

An object's disposition to A in circumstances C is masked if circumstances C obtain without the object Aing. This paper explores an analogous sense in which abilities can be masked, and it uses the results of this exploration to motivate an analysis of agents' abilities in terms of dispositions. This analysis is then shown to provide the resources to defend a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against Frankfurt-style counterexamples. Although this principle is often taken to be congenial to (...) incompatibilism concerning free action and determinism, the paper concludes by using the dispositional analysis of abilities to argue for compatibilism, and to show why the 'master argument' for incompatibilism is unsound. (shrink)

I propose that the meanings of vague expressions render the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing them sensitive to our interests. For example, 'expensive' is analyzed as meaning 'costs a lot', which in turn is analyzed as meaning 'costs significantly greater than the norm'. Whether a difference is a significant difference depends on what our interests are. Appeal to the proposal is shown to provide an attractive resolution of the sorites paradox that is compatible with classical logic and semantics.

In “Descriptions as Predicates” (Graff 2001) I argued that definite and indefinite descriptions should be given a uniform semantic treatment as predicates rather than as quantifier phrases. The aim of the current paper is to clarify and elaborate one of the arguments for the descriptions-as-predicates view, one that concerns the interaction of descriptions with adverbs of quantification.

O artigo propõe uma interlocução entre o filósofo francês Michel Foucault e o filósofo norte-americano Richard Rorty. Apresenta a descrição que Rorty realizou do colega francês. Analisa essa leitura e oferece, a partir do próprio Foucault, uma interpretação alternativa, que aponta para algumas imprecisões cometidas por Rorty, em sua interpretação. Conclui com um comentário sobre a conversação proposta.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the field, charting its key ideas and movements, and addressing contemporary research and enduring questions in the philosophy of language.

Objects have dispositions. As Nelson Goodman put it, “a thing is full of threats and promises”. But sometimes those threats go unfulfilled, and the promises unkept. Sometimes the dispositions of objects fail to manifest themselves, even when their conditions of manifestation obtain. Pieces of wood, disposed to burn when heated, do not burn when heated in a vacuum chamber. And pastries, disposed to go bad when left lying around too long, won’t do so if coated with lacquer and put on (...) display in a baker ’s window. Any account of what a disposition is, or of what it takes for an object to have a disposition, should be compatible with these commonplace observations. To date, I believe, no adequate account of dispositions has been given, and the aim of this paper is to defend one. (shrink)

Based on a community psychology perspective, this qualitative study explores the community-inclusion effort of one of the largest pulp and paper companies in the world. Extending the literature on workforce diversity/inclusion, we present the community-inclusive organizational framework, which signifies the dynamics of community inclusiveness of organizations highlighting key managerial accountabilities based on the community psychology perspective. Theoretical and practical implications are presented for promoting community-inclusive organizations, along with avenues for further research.

W3C: The World Wide Web Consortium. Introduction to HTML: A Self Paced Course on Web Authoring : This is now my favorite online HTML tutorial (which is not to say that I've searched exhaustively, or even extensively). I especially like its Table of HTML (4.01) Character Entities , which gives names and ascii codes for special characters, such as the em-dash, section sign, greek letters, etc. Publishing a Personal Web Page using CU People : Basic information for Cornell people who (...) want to create a personal Web Page. Creating Course Web sites : Cornell faculty wanting to create course websites should look here if they need more space than the 5MB allotted by CU People. Wade's HTML Tutorial : This tutorial makes it easy to get started creating web pages by writing html. Beginner's Guide to HTML : Another good introduction; from the NCSA (National Center for Supercomputing Applications). W3C HTML Validator : Check your web pages for errors and compliance with HTML standards. HTML With Style : Biweekly tutorials on making web-pages. Each tutorial contains lots of interesting, opinionated details about the right and wrong way to produce web pages. (shrink)

If you’ve read the first five hundred pages of this book, you’ve read most of it (we assume that ‘most’ requires more than ‘more than half’). The set of natural numbers n such that the first n pages are most of this book is nonempty. Therefore, by the least number principle, it has a least member k. What is k? We do not know. We have no idea how to find out. The obstacle is something about the term ‘most’. It (...) is recognisably the same feature as the feature of ‘heap’ that prevents us from finding an answer to the question ‘How many grains make a heap?’ and the feature of many other expressions that prevents us from finding answers to similar questions involving them. Call this feature, whatever its underlying nature, vagueness. (shrink)

• Suppose we try to “solve” the sorites paradox (i.e., say either why the premises aren’t both true or why the reasoning isn’t valid reasoning) by denying the sorites premise: by saying that it’s *not* the case that any man 1mm shorter than a tall man is tall (for a man).

The formal oversight of medical education in India occurred with the promulgation of the Indian Medical Degrees Act in 1916. Despite an awareness of the need to train ethical doctors and the formal discussion of this as early as 1955, the formal teaching of medical ethics has been restricted to a few colleges as it has not been part of a mandated requirement. In August, 2019, all medical colleges in India will adopt a new Medical Council of India mandated curriculum. (...) An embedded AETCOM module across all years of training is a part of this curriculum and is the first attempt to introduce medical ethics uniformly in close to 500 medical colleges in the country. This paper traces the historical attempts to include medical ethics in medical education in India, and describes the current plan to implement ethics teaching in the undergraduate medical curriculum in India. (shrink)

Moral reasoning typically informs environmental decision-making by measuring the possible outcomes of policies or actions in light of a preferred ethical theory. This method is subject to many problems. Environmental pragmatism tries to overcome them, but it suffers also from some pitfalls. This paper proposes a new method of environmental pragmatism that avoids the problems of both the traditional method of environmental moral reasoning and of the general versions of environmental pragmatism. We call it 'justificatory moral pluralism' - it develops (...) the intuition that normative ethical theories need not be mutually exclusive. This leaves room for important forms of pluralist environmental ethics that do not require a once-and-for-all prior commitment to an ethical theory when deciding about policies or courses of action related to the protection of the environment. Justificatory moral pluralism offers a viable solution to the recurrent conflicts between efficient environmental decisions and the need for moral reasoning. (shrink)

A report of a person's desire can be true even if its embedded clause underspecifies the content of the desire that makes the report true. It is true that Fiona wants to catch a fish even if she has no desire that is satisfied if she catches a poisoned minnow. Her desire is satisfied only if she catches an edible, meal-sized fish. The content of her desire is more specific than the propositional content of the embedded clause in our true (...) report of her desires. Standard semantic accounts of belief reports require, however, that the embedded clause of a true belief report specify precisely the content of the belief that makes it true. Such accounts of belief reports therefore face what I call "the problem of underspecification" if they are extended to desire reports. Such standard accounts are sometimes refined by requiring that a belief report can be true not only if its subject has a belief with precisely the propositional content specified by its embedded clause, but also only if its subject grasps that content in a particular way. Such refinements do not, however, help to address the problem of underspecification for desire reports. (shrink)

Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue (...) that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected. (shrink)

This paper adopts justificatory moral pluralism – a multilevel framework for justifying the choice by different agents of the most appropriate norms and values to guide their decisions and actions – to climate change. Its main objective is to investigate how ethics may effectively help achieve a better result in deciding how to mitigate, adapt, or compensate by enhancing the moral acceptability of the available policies or actions that are most likely to counter the effects of climate change. JMP presents (...) agents – individuals, nonstate, and state – with a thorough yet flexible process of matching policies and actions with ethical theories, raising the robustness of moral reasons for politically efficient and individually motivating courses of action against climate change. JMP triggers climate responsibility and sensibility in agents, engaging them in discussing and finding out individually and collectively the most acceptable paths for the decarbonisation transition that is fast approaching. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that names are predicates when they occur in the appellation position of 'called'-predications. This includes not only proper names, but all names -- including quote-names of proper names and quote-names of other words or phrases. Thus in "You can call me Al", the proper name 'Al' is a predicate. And in "You can call me 'Al'," the quote-name of 'Al' -- namely ' 'Al' ' -- is also a predicate.

Philosophy for the 21st Century, an introductory anthology, is an extraordinarily comprehensive collection of historical and contemporary readings. It covers all major fields, including not only metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of religion, but also philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, political philosophy, and philosophy of art. This volume is unique in drawing on the judgments of a new generation of scholars, each of whom has chosen the articles and provided the introduction for one section of the (...) book. These associate editors--Delia Graff, Robin Jeshion, L. A. Paul, Jesse Prinz, Stuart Rachels, Gabriela Sakamoto, David Sosa, and Cynthia A. Stark--are at the forefront of 21st-century philosophy. Their selections include the work of such leading contemporary thinkers as Nancy Cartwright, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, and Sydney Shoemaker, along with classic works from 2500 years of philosophy. The book has been structured to maximize continuity, and an introductory essay by Simon Blackburn explains the tools of symbolic logic. This groundbreaking volume sets a new standard for introducing students to the importance and fascination of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

RESUMO Mudanças políticas têm intensificado os debates sobre como certos discursos estabelecem agendas e influenciam eleitores. Nesse escopo, a Análise Crítica do Discurso e a Linguística Sistêmico-Funcional, juntamente com o arcabouço teórico-metodológico da Avaliatividade, demonstraram ser bem-sucedidas na investigação da ideologia em textos, bem como na abordagem de tópicos como a polarização política. Portanto, a presente pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar a avaliação social da Teoria da Avaliatividade como um dispositivo ideológico e persuasivo nos discursos de nomeação de Clinton e (...) Trump, em 2016. Os resultados enfatizam usos de estratégias retóricas que podem levar os eleitores à preferência de certos conjuntos de valores e crenças. A análise revelou que, naqueles discursos, os candidatos usaram estratégias diferentes para persuadir os eleitores, construindo abordagens discursivas ideológicas negativas e positivas, aplicando a avaliação social como estratégia retórica central. ABSTRACT Political changes have been intensifying debates about how certain discourses set agendas and influence voters. In this scope, Critical Discourse Analysis, Systemic-Functional Linguistics, and together with the theoretical and methodological framework of Appraisal have proved to be successful in investigating ideology in texts, as well as addressing topics such as political polarization. Therefore, this research aims to analyze the Appraisal’s social evaluation as an ideological and persuasive device in Clinton-Trump nomination speeches in 2016. Outcomes raise awareness over rhetorical strategies that can lead voters to the preference of certain sets of values & beliefs. Results revealed that then-candidates used different strategies to persuade electors by constructing negative and positive ideological discursive approaches by applying social evaluation as a pivotal rhetorical strategy in those speeches. (shrink)

If a counterpart theorist’s understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis’s does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3–32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a ‘cheap substitute for haecceitism,’ which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier (Journal of Philosophy 65(5):113–126, 1968; 68(7):203–211, 1971) ban on there (...) being multiple intra-world counterparts. I argue here that serious problems for ‘cheap haecceitism’ lurk very close to its surface, and they emerge when we consider the effect of using an actuality operator in our language. Among the most serious of the problems is the result that being the case in some possible world does not always suffice for possibly being the case. The result applies to any counterpart theory that employs a purely qualitative counterpart relation. The upshot is that if we are to admit haecceitist possibilities, as we should, then we must reject any purely qualitative relation as the one involved in the analysis of what might have been for an individual. (shrink)

Consider the following sentences: In every race, the colt won; In every race, John won.John Hawthorne and David Manley say that the difference between these two sentences raises a problem for Predicativism about names. According to the currently more standard version of Predicativism, a bare singular name in argument position, like ‘John’ in , is embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article. The problem is supposed to be that permits a covarying reading that allows for different races (...) to have been won by different colts, while does not permit a covarying reading—it can be true only if there is a single John that won every race. But, the objection runs, if the name ‘John’ is really embedded in a definite description with an unpronounced definite article, then the two sentences are structurally parallel and should not differ with respect to covariation. Appealing to Jason Stanley's ‘Nominal Restriction’ , I show that the difference between the two sentences above not only does not raise a problem for Predicativism but also is actually predicted by it. (shrink)

The glass vase on my desk is fragile. It should be handled with care because it it is likely to shatter or crack if it is knocked, dropped, or otherwise treated roughly. The vase has certain dispositions, for example the disposition to shatter when dropped. But what is this disposition? It seems on the one hand to be a perfectly real property, a genuine respect of similarity common to glass vases, china cups, ancient manuscripts, and anything else fragile. Yet on (...) the other hand my vase's disposition seems mysterious, "ethereal" (as Nelson Goodman (1954) put it) in a way that, say, its size and shape properties are not. For my vase's disposition, it seems, has to do only with its possibly shattering in certain conditions, conditions which I hope will never be realized. In general, it seems that nothing about the actual behavior of an object is ever necessary for it to have the dispositions it has. Many objects differ from each other with respect to their dispositions in virtue of their merely possible behavior, and this is a mysterious way for objects to differ. (shrink)

Resumo: A epistemologia é usualmente neutra quanto aos diferentes tipos de objeto que a ciência investiga. Entretanto, seguindo Popper e Stengers, podemos descrever que os objetos vivos impõem à investigação científica uma mudança radical em sua abordagem. As ciências que lidam com objetos vivos não podem mais compartilhar os pressupostos do experimentalismo: o ser vivo não é isolável de seu ambiente. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento; Evolução; Filosofia da ciência.

Here I propose a coherent way of preserving the identity of material objects with the matter that constitutes them. The presentation is formal, and intended for RSL. An informal presentation is in preliminary draft! -/- Relative-sameness relations—such as being the same person as—are like David Lewis's "counterpart" relations in the following respects: (i) they may hold between objects that aren't identical (I propose), and (ii) there are a multiplicity of them, different ones of which may be variously invoked in different (...) contexts. They differ from counterpart relations, however, in that they are weak equivalence relations (transitive, symmetric and weakly reflexive). The likenesses to counterpart relations make them suitable for an analysis of de-re temporal and modal predications. The difference renders the resulting counterpart theory immune to standard criticisms of Lewis's Counterpart Theory (e.g., in Hazen 1979, and Fara and Williamson 2005). (shrink)

In this paper we pursue the study of the variety of m -generalized Łukasiewicz algebras of order n which was initiated in [1]. This variety contains the variety of Łukasiewicz algebras of order n . Given , we establish an isomorphism from its congruence lattice to the lattice of Stone filters of a certain Łukasiewicz algebra of order n and for each congruence on A we find a description via the corresponding Stone filter. We characterize the principal congruences on A (...) via Stone filters. In doing so, we obtain a polynomial equation which defines the principal congruences on the algebras of . After showing that for m > 1 and n > 2, the variety of Łukasiewicz algebras of order n is a proper subvariety of , we prove that is a finitely generated discriminator variety and point out some consequences of this strong property, one of which is congruence permutability. (shrink)

In this paper I trace Quine's early development of his treatment of names, first as abbreviations for definite descriptions with "Frege-Rusell" style substantive content, then as abbreviations for definite descriptions containing simple predicative content, through to a treatment of names themselves as predicates rather than as abbreviations for this or that type of more complex expression. Along the way, I explain why—despite ubiquitous claims and suggestions to the contrary—Quine never actually uses the verbized name "Socratizes".

This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch's paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch's paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that p (...) even if it is metaphysically impossible for anyone to know that p, and that recognizing this fact provides the resources to solve Fitch's paradox. (shrink)