Cornford assures us that the theory of sensation developed in the Theaetetus must be Plato's own. He offers three considerations in support of this contention.

In a recent essay, Quentin Smith revisits a question of philosophical cosmology. Why does the universe exist? This is one way of asking the existence question EQ. Smith notes that all theistic philosophical cosmologists have answered this question in terms of God’s creative choice. Smith favors an “atheistic” philosophical answer: “The universe exists because it has an unconditional probability of existing based on a fundamental law of nature.” He further declares: “This law of nature... is inconsistent with theism and implies (...) that God does not exist.” The structure of Smith's reasoning in defense of these claims is the following: (1) The answer to EQ of theistic philosophical cosmologists is logically inconsistent with the answer of atheistic philosophical cosmologists. (2) Therefore, theistic and atheistic philosophical cosmologies are logically inconsistent with each other. (3) The atheistic answer to EQ is a complete answer to EQ. (4) Therefore, theism is demonstrably false. I shall argue that Smith’s reasoning in defense of (1) is not sound. From that, it follows that (2) is not a proven truth. Assumption (3) is controversial, and in the present context question-begging. It presupposes that materialism is true. Therefore, (4) is not a proven truth. (shrink)

Literally, προσβάλλον and προσβαλλόμενον mean, respectively, "that which strikes" and "that which is struck." The first suggests activity; the second passivity. Consequently, it would seem that the προσβάλλον should be said to emanate from the agent and the προσβαλλόμενον from the patient. And, since Plato explicitly identifies the agent with the perceptual object and the patient with the sensing organ, we should, it would seem, identify the προσβάλλον with the motion from the perceptual object and the προσβαλλόμενον with the motion (...) from the sensing organ, which is the reverse of what I did in the article. (shrink)

The principle of the generalization argument,, is stated in "fully" elaborated form on p. 73.

This essay is a defense of Platonic eudalmonism. Plato identified human excellence with mental health, mental health with psychic harmony, psychic harmony with the rule of reason, and he conceived reason to he the synergetic union of the power to know and the power to love. Plato believed that virtue is a constitutent of eudaimonia, that, therefore, it is its own reward. Plato was right on all these counts but one. He misunderstood the nature of the love that is a (...) constituent of reason. That love is not the eras of the Symposium. It is what I call'undemanding love'. In this essay I describe the structure of undemanding love and I explain its connections with reason, mental health, and the moral excellence that is characteristic of a rational being. (shrink)

What is a good man, and how does he become good? My aim in this paper is to unravel and to assess Plato's and St. Paul's very different answers to these questions. The pivotal texts are the Republic and Paul's Epistles.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The First Socratic Paradox GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN THE SOCRATIC PARADOXES MAY BE REGARDED as aphorisms that contain the essentials of the Socratic ethics. There are three Socratic paradoxes. They are: first, that no man desires evil, all men desire the good; second, that no man who (knows or) believes that an action is evil does it willingly--on the contrary, all the actions that a man does willingly he does with (...) a view to achieving some good; and, third, that it is better to suffer injustice at the hands of others than to do unjust acts oneself. These paradoxes are related to psychological egoism and to the dictum that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance. In this essay I shall concentrate on the first paradox and the ways in which it relates to psychological egoism and to the dictum that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance. The doctrine that Socrates has in mind in connection with the first paradox can be more fully and less misleadingly stated if we begin by distinguishing four types of desires and the aversions corresponding to them: A type I desire is a desire for something in the mistaken belief that the thing is good. A type I aversion is an aversion for, or repugnance to, something in the mistaken belief that the thing is evil. A type II desire is a desire for something in the knowledge or in the true belief that the thing is good. A type II aversion is an aversion for, or repugnance to, something in the knowledge or in the true belief that the thing is evil. A type III desire is a desire for something in the knowledge or in the true belief that the thing is evil. A type III aversion is an aversion for, or repugnance to, something in the knowledge or in the true belief that the thing is good. A type IV desire (aversion) is a desire (aversion) for something in the absence of any belief about its goodness or badness. With the help of these distinctions, we may state the essential content of the first Socratic paradox as follows: in a man all desire for some evil and all aversion to some good is of type I. This is the core of the first paradox. It is the first paradox. From this it follows that in a man there is no desire for some evil and no aversion to some good that is of type HI or type IV. I shall formulate all the arguments in the Socratic dialogues that are offered in defense of this paradox. I shall explain what the conceptual and psychological assumptions of these arguments are. We shall then understand what Socrates means by the premises and conclusions of his arguments. This will put us in a position to evaluate the arguments for cogency. When all this is done, we should [11 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY have a good idea as to how the first paradox is related on the one hand to psychological egoism, and, on the other hand, to the dictum that knowledge is virtue and vice is ignorance. In the Socratic dialogues there are two passages where Socrates argues for the first paradox. These are at Meno, 77B-78B, and Gorgias, 467C-468E. There are other passages, e.g., Apology, 25C, and Protagoras, 358C, where Socrates assumes the first paradox to prove one or the other of the remaining paradoxes or some other propositions that are very much like them. The argument that actually occurs in Meno 77B-78B does not clearly state as its conclusion the first paradox as I have formulated it. The argument grants that there are men who desire evils believing them to be goods, and it concludes that there are no men who desire evils knowing them to be evils. The conjunction of these two propositions does not say or imply that all men who desire evils do so on the mistaken belief that what they desire is good. This conclusion, however, is deducible from premises that are explicitly employed or implied or thought to be obvious in 77B-78B. From these typically Socratic premises we can construct three arguments... (shrink)

Nature exhibits a rich variety of adaptations. Cells contain complex biomolecular structures, such as proteins, that are exquisitely adapted to perform specific biological functions. Evolutionary biology explains how biomolecular structures evolve. Intelligent design creationists reject evolutionary explanations. They want to believe that all adaptations in nature are the handiwork of God. Their critics aver that “it ain't necessarily so.” The anthology under review is an excellent display of the issues between intelligent design creationists and their critics. I agree with the (...) critics. (shrink)