Onto-semiotisch kann man eine Theorie nennen, welche angibt, wo die Zeichen an die Welt anknüpfen. Wittgenstein hat über dieses Problem viel nachgedacht, ohne eine rechte Lösung zu finden. Erforderlich ist eine Konzeption, die beide Arten von Zeichen, Repräsentatoren wie Indikatoren zu vereinigen vermag. An eben dieser Aufgabe scheitert Saussure, dem es nicht gelingt, Mentalismus und Strukturalismus so zu verbinden, daß die Konkurrenz von Repräsentatoren und Indikatoren aufgehoben wird. Dies gelingt Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. Er fundiert die Repräsentationssemiotik so in (...) einer onto-semiotischen Lehre von den Verweisungen, daß schließlich der Weltbezug der Zeichen deutlich wird. (shrink)

Ranging from Plato to Marx, one can only find a few philosophers who have talked about money without detesting it. Naturally, economists are avoiding such an attitude. But they deliver only functional definitions, nothing which could give a hint at the essence of money. The essay tries to clarify it by delineating a currency as an ‘ens ficitivum’ – created by our semiotic activities, which have been analysed by Charles Sanders Peirce. So, the thesis is: Money is basically a sign (...) indicating at a present time one’s ability to handle future events. (shrink)

Discussing some aspects of Carl Schmitt’s, Chantal Mouffe’s, Paul Ricoeur’s, and Jacques Rancière’s political theories the paper tries to determine the proper subject of political and social philosophy. To that end the author constructs two terminological oppositions: ‚the social’ versus ‘the society’, ‘the political’ versus ‘politics’. These four nouns form a terminological square which marks the social and the political difference. The social appears when underprivileged people demand a redistribution of wealth and influence, i. e. a reconstruction of a given (...) society. The political emerges when the hidden normative framework of politics comes into vie. Confronting the social and the political difference in this way makes it possible to determine: politics are the matter of the political sciences, the difference between politics and the political, conversely, is the theme of political philosophy; society is the subject of sociology, the difference between the social and any form of society, however, is the issue of social philosophy. (shrink)

The paper tries to contribute to the discussion of the following problem: Nearly every government acts as if it has a natural right to collect taxes – if necessary by force. How legitimate is such an act of expropriation? To find an acceptable solution, three different theories of property are discussed – eventually favouring the Kantian approach. Subsequently, possible vindications of taxation are presented: (1) control of conduct, (2) financing public institutions, (3) reduction of social differences. All three justifications turn (...) out to be de ficient. What remains is John St. Mill's almost forgotten theory; he sees taxes as a sacrifice and, on this account, pleads for a proportional taxation. (shrink)

The paper tries to contribute to the discussion of the following problem: Nearly every government acts as if it has a natural right to collect taxes - if necessary by force. How legitimate is such an act of expropriation? To find an acceptable solution, three different theories of property are discussed - eventually favouring the Kantian approach. Subsequently, possible vindications of taxation are presented: (1) control of conduct, (2) financing public institutions, (3) reduction of social differences. All three justifications turn (...) out to be deficient. What remains is John St. Mill’s almost forgotten theory; he sees taxes as a sacrifice and, on this account, pleads for a proportional taxation. (shrink)

A response to Lindsay Craig's essay, The So-Called Extended Synthesis and Population Genetics.

In this paper I first introduce Tomasello’s notion of thought and his account of its emergence and development through differentiation, arguing that it calls into question the theory bias of the philosophical tradition on thought as well as its frequent atomism. I then raise some worries that he may be overextending the concept of thought, arguing that we should recognize an area of intentionality intermediate between action and perception on the one hand and thought on the other. After that I (...) argue that the co-operative nature of humans is reflected in the very structure of their intentionality and thought: in co-operative modes such as the mode of joint attention and action and the we-mode, they experience and represent others as co-subjects of joint relations to situations in the world rather than as mere objects. In conclusion, I briefly comment on what Tomasello refers to as one of two big open questions in the theory of collective intentionality, namely that of the irreducibility of jointness. (shrink)