The Nikāyas contain several apophatic descriptions of a state of cessation that occurs during the life of an individual. Furthermore, some texts suggest that this cessation paradoxically coincides with liberating insight. This article attempts to draw out philosophical implications of these passages and to reconstruct the ideas serving as their basis. To make better sense of these ideas, the article compares early Buddhist views with certain developments in modern philosophy of mind. It argues that cessation of khandha-s and saḷāyatana-s may (...) be viewed as suspension of various aspects of globally available phenomenal consciousness. It hypothesizes that this suspension is necessary due to the latter's processed character, which precludes direct cognition of reality. It attempts to account for a cognitive nature of cessation by suggesting the possibility of the mind (citta) working independently of phenomenal consciousness. It also considers the issue of cognitive content of cessation and of its expressibility. (shrink)

It is widely believed, that the Buddha practiced the most radical forms of asceticism and self‑mortification prior to his awakening. A critical analysis of the suttas depicting that crucial period of his life shows, however, that the only text which portrays the bodhisatta as a foremost ascetic is the Māhasīhanāda Sutta. The aim of this paper is to examine the issue of the authenticity of this text and thus to answer the question as to whether there is enough ground to (...) claim that the Buddha was an ascetic at all. Through a comparative analysis, I show that the structure and content of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta cannot be reconciled with other suttas from the MajjhimaNikāya, which describe the bodhisatta’s path to awakening. I point out certain late features of the Māhasīhanāda Sutta. Then, through a comparative analysis I try to show that some parts of the Buddhist text may have been borrowed from the Jain yāraṃga Sutta. Next, I attempt to reinterpret the term attakilamathānuyogo from the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta in such a way which will not pertain to asceticism. In the final part of the paper, I try to explain how the view that the Buddha was a foremost ascetic prior to his awakening could have arisen. (shrink)

The relation of the meditative state of jhāna to the development of insight and liberating knowledge is one of the most controversial issues in studies on early Buddhism. In the Suttapitaka and later Buddhist meditative texts, one can find discrepancies which are difficult to reconcile. In this paper, I propose a new model of meditative insight using an interdisciplinary approach based both on critical philological studies of the Suttapitaka and the results of the dynamically developing cognitive science. I also highlight (...) and examine the difficulties related to the traditional Buddhist model of insight. In order to propose a plausible model of insight as an element organically linked to jhāna, I refer to several new developments in the field of cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss some philosophical problems connected with the notion of regarding the aggregates (_khandha_) as self in the Nikāyas. In particular, I focus on the attitude represented by the formula “I am this” (_esohamasmi_) which may be labeled as that of identifying with the aggregates. In the first part of the paper, I point out and analyze certain similes contained in the Nikāyas which may be read as implying the existence of a distinction between the aggregates and (...) the individual who regards them as self. Then, I consider a hypothesis that the aggregates are not objective constituents of a human being but subjectively experienced representational phenomena. I argue that several Nikāya texts imply the existence of important aspects of a human being, in particular cognitive ones, which are not conceptualized in the terms of the five aggregates. I also discuss the possibility of interpreting _khandha_s as not active in character but as resultant of other cognitive processes. In the last part of the paper I offer a hypothesis that one of the key aspects of regarding the aggregates as self lies in the identification of a human individual with one’s own phenomenal self-representation which results in a mistaken projection of the notions of agency, identity and subjectivity onto something that is inherently devoid of it. I also consider certain parallels between the ideas present in the Nikāyas and the concepts of the modern philosophy of mind. (shrink)