全书共分9章,主要内容包括:形上之域与存在具体性;存在的价值之维;认识、存在与智慧;存在与方法;语言的形上内蕴;美的本体论意义;道德与存在等.

The examination of names and words constitutes an important aspect of the philosophy of Zhuangzi. With the debate over the relationship between name and reality as its background, this examination not only involves the connection between form and meaning, but also targets at the connection between concepts and objects. The debate over the relationship between name and reality correlates with the discussion of the connection between words and meanings or ideas. For Zhuangzi, the function of names and words is first (...) and foremost embodied as the classification and distinction of being, while the Dao, as the universal principle of being, is characterized by equality and throughness. This leads to an inherent disparity and tension between names, words and the Dao. Zhuangzi℉s thinking and argument concern the connections between name and reality, words and ideas, and the Dao and words. This displays multiple theoretical perspectives and the complexity of its thought. (shrink)

In _On Human Action and Practical Wisdom_, Yang Guorong offers a description of wisdom and action based on his “concrete metaphysics.” Yang attempts to go beyond the excessively linguistic, logical, and abstract focus found in the American analytic tradition.

In _Philosophical Horizons_ Yang draws freely from Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist texts, alongside great Western philosophers to provide penetrating discussions of some of the most important issues in modern philosophy—especially those topics related to comparative and Chinese philosophy.

Virtue, as a tendency toward goodness, has an interrelated structure made up of a stable disposition of intentions and emotions on the one hand and the ability to make rational analysis and obtain moral knowledge on the other. All these elements of knowing, feeling, and willing in the structure of virtue cannot be fully understood merely from a psychological perspective. Emotion, will, and rationality in virtue always have certain moral content. Virtue, as a structure with good disposition, constitutes a moral (...) agent and consequently an intrinsic foundation for moral practice. Of course, virtue is not a priori. On the contrary, its development is closely associated with an individual’s social and historical background. Because of virtue, an agent goes beyond the rational compulsion and intended efforts into a realm of nature. (shrink)