This Viewpoint calls attention to the pervasive wrongs related to knowledge production, use, and circulation in global health, many of which are taken for granted. We argue that common practices in academic global health (eg, authorship practices, research partnerships, academic writing, editorial practices, sensemaking practices, and the choice of audience or research framing, questions, and methods) are peppered with epistemic wrongs that lead to or exacerbate epistemic injustice. We describe two forms of epistemic wrongs, credibility deficit and interpretive marginalisation, which (...) stem from structural exclusion of marginalised producers and recipients of knowledge. We then illustrate these forms of epistemic wrongs using examples of common practices in academic global health, and show how these wrongs are linked to the pose (or positionality) and the gaze (or audience) of producers of knowledge. The epistemic injustice framework shown in this Viewpoint can help to surface, detect, communicate, make sense of, avoid, and potentially undo unfair knowledge practices in global health that are inflicted upon people in their capacity as knowers, and as producers and recipients of knowledge, owing to structural prejudices in the processes involved in knowledge production, use, and circulation in global health. (shrink)

The reproductive justice movement started by black women’s rights activists made its way into the academic literature as an intersectional approach to women’s reproductive autonomy. While there are many scholars who now employ the term ‘reproductive justice’ in their research, few have taken up the task of explaining what ‘justice’ entails in reproductive justice. In this paper I take up part of this work and attempt to clarify the relevant kind of freedom an adequate theory of reproductive justice would postulate. (...) To do so, I compare two approaches to reproductive freedom: an approach based on freedom as non‐interference and an approach based on freedom as non‐domination. I then argue that the non‐domination approach better fits the ideals of the reproductive justice movement as set forth by its founders and should be treated as one of the necessary conditions in any non‐ideal account of reproductive justice. Towards the end, I single out epistemic non‐domination as crucial in shaping the narrative around reproductive justice. (shrink)

Fabi and Goldberg have helpfully shed some light on the wrongs perpetuated by the current funding architecture on research, sponsorship, and career development in the field of bioethics. The...

Some people in global health are systematically subjected to epistemic wrongs, harms and injustices. And sometimes, with these epistemic wrongs, come more fundamental harms to their sense of self or dignity. -/- Each person has a moral right not to be treated as inferior. This moral right has found different forms of protection under dignity-based mechanisms. But these mechanisms do not extend, at least not explicitly, to epistemic wrongs, harms and injustices. -/- This article tries to pave the way for (...) a dignity-based approach to epistemic repair in global health, specifically through the lens of human rights. (shrink)

In the past few years, health and human rights scholars have stressed upon the need for rebuilding or reforming our health systems to make them both more resilient to health emergencies and less prone to nurturing inequalities. Discussions about health reform often centre on the ends of reform: the kind of health systems that should be built and the demands of justice that they should be able to satisfy once reformed. However, little has been said about the demands of justice (...) in or during health reforms. This chapter intends to start that discussion. Borrowing from the literature on transitional justice, we argue that an analogous problem of transitional justice exists in the context of health. We outline some of the key elements of transitional health justice, including some of its key demands, practices, and corresponding institutional framework. We conclude by highlighting an important relationship between transitional health justice and transitional justice. (shrink)

In this paper we extend Heidi Hurd’s “correspondence thesis” to the termination of pregnancy debate and argue that the same reasons that determine the permissibility of abortion also determine the justifiability of acts involving conscientious objection against its performance. Essentially, when abortion is morally justified, acts that prevent or obstruct it are morally unjustified. Therefore, despite conscientious objection being legally permitted in some global south countries, we argue that such permission to conscientiously object would be morally wrong in cases of (...) morally justifiable termination of pregnancy. After presenting and defending our “correspondence argument” we suggest that conscientious objection should be denied as a matter of public health policy in developing counties, even in cases where adequate referral services are possible. Towards the end, we extend our argument to midwives, nurses, and prospective students in the field. Given their essential position in resource‐poor contexts; they too have no claim to conscientious objection. (shrink)

There appears to be a conflict between global bioethical principles and the local understanding and application of these principles, but this conflict has misleadingly been characterized through the east–west dichotomy. This dichotomy portrays bioethical principles as western and as alien to non-western cultures. In this paper, I present reasons to reject the east–west dichotomy. Using the discussion around the principle of informed consent as an example, I propose that while bioethical values are common, bioethical governance must display a certain flexibility (...) akin to Aristotle’s metaphor about the Lesbian rule. Such flexibility combined with a deeper understanding of the lived experiences of bioethical subjects might lead to the purging of tensions between global and local, giving us Glocal Bioethics. (shrink)

Rather than making another attempt at proposing a single and unifying theory of global health justice, this timely collection brings together, instead, scholars from a range of traditions to frame the issue more broadly, highlighting not only different perspectives but also key topics and debates. -/- The volume features chapters that offer both new theoretical approaches to global health justice, as well as fresh takes on existing frameworks. Others adopt a bottom-up approach to tackle specific problems, including the sexual rights (...) of children and adolescents, artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine, framing of neglected tropical diseases, securitization of health, and trademarks in global health. Brought together within one volume, the breadth of these chapters provides a unique and enlightening contribution to the wider Global Health field. -/- This important volume will be a fascinating read for students and researchers across Global Health, Bioethics, Political Philosophy, and Global Development. (shrink)