Pragmatism is typically understood as a philosophy embedded in scientific inquiry. Thinkers, like Charles Peirce (1877), C.I. Lewis (1923) and Susan Haack (1998) envisioned pragmatism and its scientific inquiry as a method of systematizing our beliefs and acquiring knowledge. They thought that scientific practice and its implied standards, techniques, and values is the only source of hope for scientific and philosophical progress. In this dissertation, I construct a pragmatic approach to the meta-ethical questions of our moral truths, beliefs and principles (...) that proposes a normative systematization of ethics grounded in moral practice, development and experimentation. I argue that maintaining a pragmatic faith in the origination and formation of our moral constitutions will provide us with a realist, cognitivist and objective view of reality subject to the capacities of our human cognition and empirical evidence and not subject to metaphysical and universal methods of reasoning. (shrink)

Previous research on whether source memory is enhanced for emotionally valenced sources yielded inconclusive results. To identify potential boundary conditions, we tested whether encoding instructions that promote affective versus different types of non-affective item-source-processing foster versus hamper source-valence effects. In both experiments, we used neutral words as items superimposed on emotional (positive & negative) or neutral pictures as sources. Source pictures were selected based on valence and arousal ratings collected in a pre-study such that only valence varied across sources. Source (...) memory was measured via multinomial modelling. In Experiment 1, we applied an affective, item-focused orienting task (OT; i.e. word-pleasantness ratings) during item-source encoding and found enhanced source memory for emotionally valenced (positive & negative) compared to neutral sources. In Experiment 2, we systematically manipulated encoding instructions and again found enhanced source memory for emotionally valenced sources with an affective OT. No such effects occurred in the non-affective conditions, where participants were instructed to integrate item and source (item-source-fit judgments), to focus on the item (living-non-living judgments), or to encode the items only, respectively. With intentional item encoding, however, source memory was surprisingly better for positive than negative sources. We conclude that source-valence effects might unfold only under affective processing. (shrink)

Recent arguments claim that behavioral science has focused – to its detriment – on the individual over the system when construing behavioral interventions. In this commentary, we argue that tackling economic inequality using both framings in tandem is invaluable. By studying individuals who have overcome inequality, “positive deviants,” and the system limitations they navigate, we offer potentially greater policy solutions.