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We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. (...) We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law. (shrink)

The principle argument of the book is that, given the background of philosophy of mind, it is possible to identify a notion of human agency which goes beyond the limitations which Hume seems to have imposed upon empiricism and which takes advantage of a version of Aristotle's notion of 'soul.' Action, as it has been developed recently, particularly by those of an utilitarian inclination, has been subject to two criticisms: it makes responsibility a rather cheap and ordinary commodity, it makes (...) human agency simple and identifiable. The author accepts this first criticism, but spends most of his effort arguing against the second; he does not contend that action is always simple, but he does argue that the human agent can be identified with precision and that effects can be attributed to him in his role as someone who considered his act and decided to bring about the observed effect. The starting point is a consideration of embodiment, the situation in which considered effects are seen to be situated in the same realm as simple inanimate interactions; any version of human action will have to first of all differentiate itself from inanimate action; the fact that a man is involved in an event is no guarantee that the effect is the result of genuine action. Having done justice to what might be termed the empirical nature of the human condition, the author follows out his announced program: he argues that Hume's empiricism restricts and reduces the human agent and that if we mean by soul nothing much more than what Anscombe means when she typifies the agent as one for whom the question of his own activity arises, then the human agent may be said to have his own unique point of view in virtue of his soul. Whether agent or spectator, there is something uniquely purposeful about the being in the empirical order who manifests this view; it is this view which classical empiricism does not appreciate, and which enables the author to review a set of examples in order to determine what kind of conditions must be satisfied in order to be able to meaningfully attribute an effect to an agent. The examples are intentionally very simple, but the thesis of the argument is not.--J. J. E. (shrink)

This book basically traces the historical movements that saw Aristotelian thought introduced to Islamic studies. The most significant translation movement was begun in Baghdad in the eighth century and sporadically continued until the middle of the eleventh century. When this movement was completed, every extant work of Aristotle was translated into Arabic. Peters offers a formidable collection of bibliography, doxography, and gnomonology that appeals more to eastern classical scholars than to Aristotelian philosophers. No significant philosophical issues are raised--this is really (...) not the author's intention. Whenever a remote philosophical point does arise, however, it does so a bit arbitrarily. For example, when Peters introduces a chapter on the triumph of Kalam in Islamic thought, he asserts, "it was the Greeks themselves who reduced philosophy to its status of 'handmaiden of theology'." No further explanation is given and Peters continues on his more certain ground--Islamic culture.--J. J. R. (shrink)

This is a collection of sixteen essays by the late Arnold Isenberg. All but one of the essays has had prior publication in journals, but only three of them have been reprinted in other anthologies. The collection is divided into three sections titled "Aesthetics," "Criticism," and "Ethics and Moral Psychology" respectively.

Elders' work is patterned after Ross's editions of Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Analytics, except that Elders does not include the Greek text to accompany his commentary. Each chapter of the four books of De Caelo is briefly summarized and a line by line commentary ensues with special consideration given to the more controversial passages. In an introduction to his commentary, Elders develops the essential themes surrounding Aristotle's cosmology: 1) The proper historical setting, 2) The notion of natural movement and elementary (...) bodies, 3) The role of metaphysics in Aristotle's cosmology, Aristotle's notion of science and methodology. Elders seems to gloss over the main problem that Aristotle's Cosmology engenders, viz., whether the heavenly spheres move by a natural necessity or are moved by a supra-celestial principle. His comment on the first chapter of Book III points out Aristotle's intention of including both the heavens and the sub-lunar sphere under the study of Physics. He correctly points out that if one is to understand the De Caelo, then one must "look upon cosmology the way its author did, viz., as a science of intellectual vision, rather than as a labor of toilsome research: the study of the cosmos is an intellectual effort which finds its end and its reward in itself."—J. J. R. (shrink)

This account should be of great help in dispelling some of the mystery that surrounds the subject for the uninitiated. The author, concentrating on Sartre and Heidegger, locates modern existentialism in the history of philosophy; outlines typical existentialist positions on such issues as the human condition, freedom, authenticity, and death; and makes critical comments on these positions from Anglo-American viewpoints, especially pragmatism.--J. J.

Philosophers are notorious for their disagreements and this seems to be intensified in the area of aesthetics. One of the few matters in aesthetics on which there has been general agreement concerns the concept of beauty. The prevailing attitude in our century towards theories of beauty has been that they are useless or nonsensical or worse. That there has been general agreement with this thesis is evident from the fact that discussions about beauty are rare today and favorable discussions of (...) beauty are rarer still. Thus, it is surprising to read the bold thesis in Sircello’s title. Not only does he report that beauty is a respectable topic for philosophical investigation, but he offers a "new theory" designed to overcome the deficiencies of those which preceded his. (shrink)

This edition of Aristotelian scholarship contains the proceedings of the third Symposium Aristotelicum. Choosing to discuss one work of Aristotle, the Topics, the participants were thus able to center their discussions around Aristotle's notion of dialectics. Owen has arranged the papers into interesting categories, some of which contain critical analyses of the text. There is also a valuable index of sources. One especially interesting chapter deals with the question of the relationship between Aristotelian thought and Platonic thought. Under the specific (...) scrutiny of the Symposium, the question is: to what extent do the dialectics of Aristotle rely upon Plato's theory of Forms and the method of diaeresis that leads up to the Forms? Friedrich Solmsen, the most emphatic of all the writers on this point, claims that the dialectics of the Topics ignore any ontological reference. According to Solmsen, Aristotle accepted the logical structure of Plato's dialectic and diaeresis but then prescinded from any commitment to the Forms. C. J. De Vogel agrees with Solmsen insofar as Aristotle begins to see the theory of Forms as "problematic" due to the immaturity of Aristotle's own theory. De Vogel cites several passages that would seem to counter the position of Solmsen. For example, in defining "justice" as a virtue, Aristotle prefers the abstract term δικαιοσύνη as properly falling under the category ἀγαθόν, rather than the concrete δίκαιον. In a paper by Gilbert Ryle it is claimed that Aristotle never formally learned dialectical philosophy at Plato's academy, so that questions of how and why Aristotle broke from his master are unreal. Ryle suggests that the second part of Plato's Parmenides was written to exemplify the categories of the Topics and to school the more advanced students in the art of dialectics which was not taught to those under thirty years of age. How much Aristotle's dialectical philosophy is indebted to Plato is still a debatable point; but it is debated very well in these papers.--J. J. R. (shrink)

This survey of American philosophy first presents the classical "Golden Age of American Philosophy" with selections from Peirce, James, Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, and Mead. This first part also includes selections from the schools of new and critical realism with R. B. Perry, A. O. Lovejoy, R. W. Sellars among the representatives. Part Two is entitled "The Contemporary Philosophical Scene" and has selections from the works of C. I. Lewis, Carnap, C. L. Stevenson, Quine, M. Black, B. Blanshard, Tillich, S. Hook, (...) and E. Nagel. Anthologies rarely please everyone. Some may feel that Josiah Royce should have been included in the "Golden Age" section. There are two good features of this volume, however, that make it suitable as either a text for a seminar in American philosophy or as a research manual or both. Each philosopher or philosophical movement is adequately introduced by the editor, and each section is concluded with a rather complete bibliography.—J. J. R. (shrink)

A reprint of the first edition together with three new chapters and an enlarged index. The new chapters include some previously published material and discuss Aristotle's modal logic of propositions, Lukasiewicz' new system of modal logic, and Aristotle's modal syllogistic. The author relates his interpretation of Aristotle's modal logic to the philosophical issues raised by modern modal logics. -- J. J. C.

The author reviews the various Anglo-American philosophies which align themselves directly in one way or another with mathematics, physics, and logic; this has been done in many ways, but this book does it in such a way that it seems to give more a feel for what is going on in a rather complicated corner of the world than the various histories and anthologies. Radnitzky is engaged in an ambitious critical project, which, put quite simply, says that English-speaking philosophies of (...) science are exercises in irrelevance. His point of view is the hermeneutic-dialectic tradition, and continental philosophy of science; moreover his point of view is that he has a point of view, and he insists that the Anglo-Americans do not; to be ignorant and uncritical insofar as one's own assumptions are concerned is to be open to many serious mistakes, many of which have been made by Americans: they have shifted their attention to less rewarding areas of interest, they have accepted models which are not fruitful, they have not been able to relate to actual scientific activity or methodology, etc. This sweeping criticism is of little value; it is partisan in precisely the manner that English speaking "program" philosophy strenuously attempts to avoid; it suggests that its own philosophy corrects major systematic mistakes in the areas surveyed. But in spite of what might be viewed as divisive and arrogant interference, this book could be of value to two groups of readers: those who are simply interested in what goes on in metascience; those who have some dissatisfaction with the self-knowledge that is displayed in these areas. A fair criticism of the book would be to say that the author exaggerates the lack of self-knowledge, and tends to devaluate the efforts of people like Quine and Goodman to bring logical empiricism to a less strictly positivistic position.--J. J. E. (shrink)

As part of the series Classics in the History of Thought, this volume is more general than its companion volume, American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. The present volume is suited for a study in American Civilization prior to the twentieth century. Its range includes the political, religious, and moral thoughts of the colonial period ; the post-Independence period of "Reason and Revolution" ; conservatism in political theory and philosophy ; transcendentalism ; speculative and absolute idealism ; evolution and Darwinism. (...) There are interesting historical foundations for some contemporary social problems found in these selections, e.g., civil disobedience, church and state relations, racial prejudice. Also, as in the case of its sister volume, the book is rich in bibliographical references.—J. J. R. (shrink)

Almost every aspect of Aristotle's philosophy is touched upon in this book. Part One deals with the intellectual development of Aristotle and repeats Jaeger's claim that Aristotle's thought was a continual process of development and not a static system of concepts. The "First Athenian Period" finds Aristotle as Plato's pupil. The "Period of Travel" embraces the formulation of his theory of causes and substance. The "Second Athenian Period" includes the work at the Lyceum and its contribution to systematic investigation. In (...) this First Part, Lloyd suggests that the greatest enigma surrounding the development of Aristotle's thought is the latter's relation with Plato's philosophy. Lloyd sees Aristotle as more than "Plato's pupil." He sees Aristotle in reaction to Plato; inasmuch as the former rejects the notion of Forms as central to philosophy, introduces the principle of potentiality as an explanation of change, and distinguishes "substance" in a primary sense which gives concrete ground to reality. Yet, while Aristotle is critical of Platonism, certain Platonic notions are retained, e.g., that intelligibility is gained only through universals; that the basic world-view is teleological. The Second Part of the book is concerned with the fundamentals of Aristotle's thought, in which all of the highlights of his thought are outlined and commented upon. Logic, metaphysics, physics, psychology, ethics, poetics, politics--all are given a brief but accurate analysis. The author does not claim to write this book for the Aristotelian scholar; rather, it is directed toward the undergraduate or other interested reader who may want more knowledge of the philosopher from Stagira.--J. J. R. (shrink)

In 1951 Lukasiewicz [[sic]] linked Aristotle's Prior Analytics with modern formal logic. This book attempts to analyze Aristotle's syllogistic theory in the light of Lukasiewcz's work and the whole tradition of classic interpretations of Aristotle's logic. The first of the book's five chapters shows that for Aristotle the syllogism is basically a relationship of terms couched in conditional form; a relationship of variables rather than concrete terms; and a relationship that sees S linked with P not by the copula but (...) by less metaphysical expressions. The classical S is P form is not Aristotelian at all but a much later renovation. The second chapter maintains that Aristotle distinguishes "relative necessity" from "absolute necessity." Aristotle himself ignores his own distinction at times and thus creates logical difficulties for himself. The oft-fought sea battle is fought again in this chapter. Chapter three deals with the controversial notions of "perfect" and "imperfect" syllogisms. The author asserts that by "perfect syllogism" Aristotle means self-evident syllogisms that serve as axioms for deducing other proofs. Chapters four and five deal with the figures of the syllogism and the syllogism as a deductive system respectively. Patzig concludes that Aristotle's syllogistic theory is purely formal in its structure and can only be properly understood if it is not tied to a metaphysics and converted into a philosophical logic. He denies that it is a universal logic, but rather sees it as a specialized theory of relations.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Distinguishing between the eternal idea of freedom and the changing types of consciousness of freedom in various stages of the history of society, Metzger asks the question: how are we to become conscious of this eternal ideal and realize it in an age of automation-produced, unprecedented dwindling of work and increase of leisure? The question is not answered in this book, however; perhaps the author's forthcoming Philosophie der Gesellschaft im gegenwärtigen Zeitalter will contribute to an answer.—J. J.

Anyone who has ever tried to teach the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein to undergraduate students will welcome this volume as a classroom aid. Using the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations as their basic sources, the authors have collected textual references under eighteen general topics. A partial list of the topics includes: "The Picture-Theory," "Naming," "Private Languages," "Meaning and Use," and "Philosophical Method." In each case there are cross references to the basic texts and, where applicable, references to the Notebooks, the (...) Blue and Brown Books, Zettel and Philosophische Bemerkungen. The great service that this text performs is that it illustrates the unity of Wittgenstein’s thought—a fact that is not immediately apparent in one’s first contact with either the Tractatus or the Investigations. An important feature of the workbook is that, in addition to the references to Wittgenstein’s own work, each topic includes references to classical and contemporary treatments of the issue so that Wittgenstein’s work will not be regarded as a "curiosity in the history of philosophy." On the facing page of each topic the authors have supplied a series of questions for discussion, some of which call for straightforward textual interpretation while others require sophisticated philosophical reasoning. Thus, depending on the competence of the students, the questions can be dealt with on a variety of levels. The program of topics is designed to emphasize the continuity of Wittgenstein’s thought, and to combat the widely held view that the Investigations is a repudiation of most of the doctrines of the Tractatus. Perhaps this is why several important topics, e.g., "Grammar," "Family Resemblances," and "Seeing As," are not treated at all. But there are other sources in which the textual references for these topics can be found, and the neglect of these topics does not take away from the usefulness of the text as a class aid.—J. J. F. (shrink)

This volume represents the majority of papers delivered at the 1966 Workshop of Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal held at the Catholic University of America. The Workshop's main task was to re-evaluate Christian philosophy in the light of contemporary phenomenological and analytic philosophy. Dietrich von Hildebrand's paper on the "Phenomenology of Values in a Christian Philosophy" urges a "rehabilitation" of ethics through an existential "value response." Ethical values are rescued from the "laboratory" of abstract study and returned to the world (...) where they belong. In "Analytic Philosophy and Language about God," W. Norris Clarke cites four basic challenges that analytic philosophy offers a philosophy of God: that theism has not unravelled the confusion concerning the use of "God" as naming or describing; that it is a "category mistake" to state "God is a necessary Being" since "necessary" is a term meaningful only in propositions and not about things; that according to the falsification theory of meaning there is no way to check the validity of statements about God, such as "God is providential and loving," since anything that happens would be providential and loving in a strange and hidden way; that there can be no meaningful predication of God since language would then refer to a realm that transcends experience. Father Clarke sees these challenges as forcing a re-evaluation of a philosophy of God and holds that only by using all the philosophical resources at hand, e.g., phenomenological, semantic, symbolic, metaphysical, will one be able to work out real positive meaning concerning God. Some other themes discussed are "Person," "Freedom," and "Love," written by Mother Mary Clark, L. B. Geiger, and Robert O. Johann respectively.—J. J. R. (shrink)

This third and final volume of the collected papers of the late Alfred Schutz contains for the most part the author's evaluation of later Husserlian thought. As in the first and second volumes, Schutz attempts to show the relevance of phenomenology to social experiences. All the papers in this volume were originally published between 1953-1958, except that in which Schutz compares James' "stream of thought" with Husserl's "stream of consciousness." The sequence of papers that follow the James article is: "Husserl's (...) Ideals, Vol. II," in which Schutz describes Husserl's attempt at a phenomenological analysis of the constitution of nature, beginning with inanimate objects, proceeding to "nature in a second and enlarged sense", and concluding with the region of Geist. "Husserl's Ideas, Vol. III": a brief paper analyzing the Husserlian ambition of a phenomenology which affords a fundamental method of grounding all knowledge. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," in which Schutz pinpoints the problem well: since it is impossible to experience another person's original mental content, how can "another psychophysical ego be constituted in my ego?" How can solipsism be avoided? How can phenomenology be applied to the social sciences? Schutz concludes that with his notion of "pairing" in his Cartesian Meditations Husserl does not succeed in constituting a transcendental intersubjectivity through the conscious operations of a transcendental ego. "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy": the phenomenological look at the problem of universals. "Some Structures of the Life-World": a consideration of the Lebenswelt with an eye toward establishing the relevance to social sciences. The last two papers deal with the philosophy of Max Scheler.—J. J. R. (shrink)

In order to assay the dynamism in the philosophy of Wolff, Father Burns examines "substance," "bodies," and "elements" in Christian Wolff's philosophy, and in so doing provides some valuable information on a philosopher who has had scant attention in the English-speaking world. In the first chapter, simple substance is distinguished from composed substance, with the former being the only true substance for Wolff. Even here, the author contends, substance for Wolff is solely a concept of essences and, hence, Wolff's ontology (...) is restricted to the realm of possible beings and excludes actual existing things. In an informative chapter on "Bodies," the Wolffian notion of active force as the principle of motion in bodies is challenged. The author maintains that an a priori commitment necessitated that Wolff locate the force principle in simple substances; and further, that Wolff's reasoning to simple substances involves a basic fallacy of identifying unity with indivisibility. A brief third chapter identifies the elements or first principles of bodies with the simple substances. While the author rightly claims that the terminology of Wolff makes it necessary to compare and contrast Wolff's ontology-cosmology with Aristotelian-scholastic thought, the conclusion of the book makes it difficult at times to ascertain whether the main task is a critical exposition of Wolff's dynamism or a staunch defense of traditional metaphysics. Within the latter frame of reference, Wolff's notion of force and motion is shown to be physical and/or mathematical rather than metaphysical, and is summarily set down as a distortion of the "true picture of substance and actuality into a caricature."—J. J. R. (shrink)

This study is concerned in general with the relationship in Husserl’s thought between logic, phenomenology, and ontology, although the issue is addressed primarily by means of a study of the Logical Investigations. This limitation is justified, Grünewald contends, because the Investigations is a seminal work for Husserl and because Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology appears as the consequence of his own critical reflections upon the problems found in his early, pre-transcendental phenomenology, especially that of the first edition of the Investigations. According to (...) Grünewald, then, reflection upon these problems and the changes motivated by them in the second edition of the Investigations discloses the motives for the transition to a transcendental phenomenology and provides a way for phenomenologists and non-phenomenologists alike to address the general issue. (shrink)

This volume of selections provides a fresh translation of some of the major philosophical and literary achievements of the beleaguered editor of the Encyclopedie. For the most part, the selections follow a chronological sequence with each selection given a brief explanation in which the reader is referred to the 1875 Assezat and Tourneux edition of Diderot's works. The main thrust of Diderot's philosophical materialism is embodied in D'Alembert's Dream, in which the author argues that the mechanized-physical view gives coherent unity (...) to cosmological, biological, and moral speculation. Yet, if Diderot is to be a materialist, he is to be a humanistic one, for in his Refutation of Helvetius he rails against the latter's view of man as a mere sensory-bound animal devoid of real moral feelings. Thus there is in Diderot a vacillation between a heartfelt desire for moral values which beg to be grounded on reason, and a reason that cannot accept the basis for the values of his day since experience seems to contradict such a basis. Diderot expresses this dichotomy well in Rameau's Nephew. In the mastery of his dialogue form, Diderot plays the man of moral stability while the nephew represents the moral nihilist. It is interesting to note that Hegel saw in the nephew a cultural alienation or self-estrangement which gradually produced the characteristic cleavage between faith and reason in the age of the French Enlightenment. Since he bore this inner tension within himself, and since it is men who make up "ages," one can say that Diderot was the French Enlightenment.—J. J. R. (shrink)

A third edition of the 1937 lectures that form perhaps the best short introduction to Jaspers' thought. Included is the postscript to the second edition, written in 1956, in which Jaspers describes his attitudes toward the conditions in Germany at the time the lectures were given, and the function that he meant them to perform under those conditions.--J. J.

This reconstruction of Empedocles' thought for the most part depends upon how the notions of rest and movement are related to the elements. Many traditional interpretations have both the love and strife forces of Empedocles as moving causes which combine and separate the elements respectively. O'Brien claims, however, that there is really only one moving cause: strife; and therefore there is only one time of rest in the cosmos, when love unites the elements into the Sphere. Strife is seen as (...) Empedocles' explanation of diversity in the world, and love as his explanation of unity. O'Brien's reconstruction, then, would rank Empedocles as a serious metaphysician coping with the problem of the one and the many; rather than as a naive pre-scientist explaining the genesis of animals by the combining of "separated limbs." O'Brien suggests that Empedocles is attempting to save the Parmenidean notion of unity without relegating movement to the realm of illusion. In this way, Empedocles also appears to anticipate Plato's attempt to explain the spatial and temporal world in terms of what is non-spatial and timeless. Roughly speaking, as Plato's Forms are to the physical world, so love and strife are to the elements. O'Brien's reconstruction project is carefully done with a rather thorough analysis of all the sources. Appended to the work is a 61-page bibliography which includes every book and article exclusively on Empedocles written from 1806 to 1965.--J. J. R. (shrink)

One of the many recent endeavors to carry phenomenology beyond the programmatic stage, this book makes extensive and illuminating use of unpublished Husserl manuscripts dealing with the constitution of visual and tactile space. It thus illustrates the ways in which detailed phenomenological analyses of the Husserlian variety can help in clarifying certain problems, while ignoring others, such as the perceptual problems of causality, illusions, etc., that are bypassed by the suspension of the "general thesis" of existence. Besides a consideration of (...) the problems of the constitution of space, there are discussions of such general phenomenological concepts as "world," "essence," and "hyle," whose meaning and interrelation are unclear until related to specific problems, as the author shows.—J. J. (shrink)

The first part shows that the contemporary "Sprachanalytische" interpretation of Aristotle is based on neopositivism and therefore distorts Aristotle. The second part uses the frequently recurring "anthropos anthropon genna" formula to show that he held principles to be actual entities constituting the reality of things.--J. J.

Six essays on contemporary representatives of existentialist ontology: on Heidegger, "Nichten" and "Soteriology and Nazism"; on Marcel, "System and Ontological Mystery"; on Wahl, "Metaphysics and Feeling"; on Gilson, "Form and Existence"; on J. B. Lotz, "The Mediated Experience of God."—J. J.