Except in very poor mathematical contexts, mathematical arguments do not stand in isolation of other mathematical arguments. Rather, they form trains of formal and informal arguments, adding up to interconnected theorems, theories and eventually entire fields. This paper critically comments on some common views on the relation between formal and informal mathematical arguments, most particularly applications of Toulmin’s argumentation model, and launches a number of alternative ideas of presentation inviting the contextualization of pieces of mathematical reasoning within encompassing bodies of (...) explicit and implicit, formal and informal background knowledge. (shrink)

1 Mathematical practice: a short overview This volume is a collection of essays that discuss the relationships between the practices deployed by logicians and mathematicians, either as individuals or as members of research communities, and the results from their research. We are interested in exploring the concept of 'practices' in the formal sciences. Though common in the history, philosophy and sociology of science, this concept has surprisingly thus far been little reflected upon in logic...

1 Mathematical practice: a short overview This volume is a collection of essays that discuss the relationships between the practices deployed by logicians and mathematicians, either as individuals or as members of research communities, and the results from their research. We are interested in exploring the concept of 'practices' in the formal sciences. Though common in the history, philosophy and sociology of science, this concept has surprisingly thus far been little reflected upon in logic...

In current philosophical research, there is a rather one-sided focus on the foundations of proof. A full picture of mathematical practice should however additionally involve considerations about various methodological aspects. A number of these is identified, from large-scale to small-scale ones. After that, naturalism, a philosophical school concerned with scientific practice, is looked at, as far as the translations of its epistemic principles to mathematics is concerned. Finally, we call for intensifying the interaction between both dimensions of practice and epistemology.

The dialogical approach to paraconsistency as developed by Rahman and Camielli ([1]), Rahman and Roetti ([2]) and Rahman ([3], [4] and [5]) suggests a way ofstudying the dynamic process ofarguing with inconsistencies. In his paper on Paraconsistency and Dialogue Logic ([6]) Van Bendegem suggests that an adaptive version of paraconsistency is the natuml way of capturing the inherent dynamics of dialogues. The aim of this paper is to develop a fomulation of dialogical paraconsistent logic in the spirit of an adaptive (...) approach and 'Which explores the possibility of eliminating inconsistencies by tœans oflogicalpreference stmtegies. (shrink)