The philosophy of the Presocratics still governs scholarly discussion today. This important volume grapples with a host of philosophical issues and philological and historical problems inherent in interpreting Presocratic philosophers.

The doctrine of recollection is one of the most controversial in the Platonic corpus, and much scholarship has been aimed at altering the doctrine to resolve its paradoxical features, many of which, I argue, are generated by a failure to appreciate the difference between memory (mneme) and the distinct capacity of recollection (anamnesis). In several of the Platonic dialogues, Socrates gives an account of how recollection functions in ordinary contexts, and thus provides a basis for showing how anamnesis may be (...) employed to describe learning in general. The mystery of learning consists in the fact that one must possess someknowledge of the matter being investigated prior to learning about it, and thus learning may be aptly described as a remembrance of some knowledge previously forgotten. I argue that the recollection account was formulated, not to resolve this mystery, but rather to capture descriptively its essential features. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the incorporation of traditional ‘sayings of the wise’ and the mythical presentation of certain doctrines in the Platonic dialogues, particularly the Meno’s myth of recollection and the Philebus’s myth of the limit and the unlimited. I argue against a common view of Platonic myth, which holds that such passages are merely rhetorical devices and naive presentations of philosophical doctrines, whose aura of traditional authority ultimately forestalls and inhibits philosophical reflection. I attempt to show in the (...) case of the Meno and the Philebus that Platonic myths serve to cultivate and sustain a kind of philosophical reflection and to illustrate the search for first principles, causes, and the origins of things. I maintain that Platonic myth represents a mode of understanding and of thought that mediates between the opinions of individuals and knowledge proper or wisdom. (shrink)

This essay explores Socrates’ argumentative strategy in the Philebus, which is a response to the view that pleasure is the good. Socrates leads his interlocutorsthrough a series of steps in order to demonstrate to them the “conditions and dispositions of soul” upon which hedonism rests. Socrates’ aim is not to refute the claim that pleasure is a good, but rather to show the dependence of the experience of pleasure on intellect and the other elements of the life of mind. In (...) this manner, Socrates is able to show the superiority of the life of mind, or philosophy, in terms that are intelligible to the pleasure-seeker. (shrink)

This essay explores Socrates’ argumentative strategy in the Philebus, which is a response to the view that pleasure is the good. Socrates leads his interlocutorsthrough a series of steps in order to demonstrate to them the “conditions and dispositions of soul” upon which hedonism rests. Socrates’ aim is not to refute the claim that pleasure is a good, but rather to show the dependence of the experience of pleasure on intellect and the other elements of the life of mind. In (...) this manner, Socrates is able to show the superiority of the life of mind, or philosophy, in terms that are intelligible to the pleasure-seeker. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the incorporation of traditional ‘sayings of the wise’ and the mythical presentation of certain doctrines in the Platonic dialogues, particularly the Meno’s myth of recollection and the Philebus’s myth of the limit and the unlimited. I argue against a common view of Platonic myth, which holds that such passages are merely rhetorical devices and naive presentations of philosophical doctrines, whose aura of traditional authority ultimately forestalls and inhibits philosophical reflection. I attempt to show in the (...) case of the Meno and the Philebus that Platonic myths serve to cultivate and sustain a kind of philosophical reflection and to illustrate the search for first principles, causes, and the origins of things. I maintain that Platonic myth represents a mode of understanding and of thought that mediates between the opinions of individuals and knowledge proper or wisdom. (shrink)

This volume contributes to scholarship in several ways: first, it brings into print selections from Scotus’s writings on the univocity of the notion of being—a central claim in his philosophical system. Second, it provides a clear translation into modern German of the Lectura, one of Scotus’s three commentaries on Lombard’s Sentences. Third, it gives an overview of the philosophical motivations and the historical precursors of Scotus’s work.