Biomedical engineering technologies such as brain–machine interfaces and neuroprosthetics are advancements which assist human beings in varied ways. There are exciting yet speculative visions of how the neurosciences and bioengineering may influence human nature. However, these could be preparing a possible pathway towards an enhanced and even posthuman future. This article seeks to investigate several ethical themes and wider questions of enhancement, transhumanism and posthumanism. Four themes of interest are: autonomy, identity, futures, and community. Three larger questions can be asked: (...) will everyone be enhanced? Will we be “human” if we are not, one day, transhuman? Should we be enhanced or not? The article proceeds by concentrating on a widespread and sometimes controversial application: the cochlear implant, an auditory prosthesis implanted into Deaf patients. Cochlear implantation and its reception in both the deaf and hearing communities have a distinctive moral discourse, which can offer surprising insights. The paper begins with several points about the enhancement of human beings, transhumanism’s reach beyond the human, and posthuman aspirations. Next it focuses on cochlear implants on two sides. Firstly, a shorter consideration of what technologies may do to humans in a transhumanist world. Secondly, a deeper analysis of cochlear implantation’s unique socio-political movement, its ethical explanations and cultural experiences linked with pediatric cochlear implantation—and how those wary of being thrust towards posthumanism could marshal such ideas by analogy. As transhumanism approaches, the issues and questions merit continuing intense analysis. (shrink)

The idea of human-like robots with artificial intelligence (AI) engaging in sports has been considered in the light of robotics, technology and culture. However, robots with AI can also be used to clarify ethical questions in sports such as boxing with its inherent risks of brain injury and even death.This article develops an innovative way to assess the ethical issues in boxing by using a thought experiment, responding to recent medical data and overall concerns about harms and risks to boxers. (...) The thought experiment imagines a fight between a human and a robot. Critical issues about head trauma and brain injuries are then discussed. These can be summed up in two ethical questions: ‘why is it acceptable for a boxer to deliver concussive and recurrent subconcussive punches to a human head (skull and brain), powerful enough to achieve a knockout, or score more points, or to potentially inflict an injury immediately or eventually resulting in death?’, with the reciprocal question, ‘why is it acceptable to allow oneself to be injured in a like manner, possibly fatally, by an opponent?’The two questions are explored using the thought experiment in two matching perspectives: where the human boxer is attacking and the robot boxer is defending; and conversely, where the human boxer is on the receiving end of punches delivered by the robot. Each perspective opens with some general remarks, followed by an analysis of the boxing contest and eliciting some implications for future opportunities for the sport. (shrink)

Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) is a diagnostic category indicating cognitive impairment which does not meet diagnostic criteria for dementia such as Alzheimer’s disease. There are public health concerns about Alzheimer’s disease (AD) prompting intervention strategies to respond to predictions about the impacts of ageing populations and cognitive decline. This relationship between MCI and AD rests on three interrelated principles, namely, that a relationship exists between AD and MCI, that MCI progresses to AD, and that there is a reliable system of (...) classification of MCI. However, there are also several ethical issues and problems arising in the AD/MCI relationship. These include early diagnosis and interventions, the effects on people with MCI, and the newer neuroimaging and neuropharmacological approaches used in diagnosis and treatment. All these issues pose questions about the principles of MCI in relation to AD, with implications for how MCI is understood, diagnosed, treated, and experienced by patients. This article analyses four challenging areas for neuroethics: the definition and diagnosis of MCI; MCI in relation to AD; clinical implications of MCI for ethical disclosure, diagnosis, and treatment; and the research implications of MCI. The significant connections between these areas are often overlooked, together with uncertainties overall. Patients, healthcare systems and society are best served by informed clinicians, academics and researchers. After 35 years, the store of MCI knowledge is expanding and evolving. (shrink)

Academic scholarship has steadily reported unfavourable clinical findings on the sport of boxing, and national medical bodies have issued calls for restrictions on the sport. Yet, the positions taken on boxing by medical bodies have been subject to serious discussions. Beyond the medical and legal writings, there is also literature referring to the social and cultural features of boxing as ethically significant. However, what is missing in the bioethical literature is an understanding of the boxers themselves. This is apart from (...) their brain injuries, the debates about the degenerative brain disease known as chronic traumatic encephalopathy, and related issues about the disease. This article argues that the lives of boxers, their relationships, their careers, and their futures, also requires its own research, particularly in telling stories about their lives, and those lives and futures which boxing affects. The article uses two approaches. First, to imagine a more enduring “whole of life viewpoint” by using an extended future timeframe. Second, to consider perspectives of a person’s significant others. After reviewing the boxing literature, the article discusses social settings and then explores the hidden social relationships in life after boxing. With these longer time and close relationship viewpoints, three important themes emerge: family and kinship; age, stage and career; and the effects of boxing fatalities. These analyses are used in conjunction with relevant clinical findings. which complement the telling of stories to improve medical information, and engages professional and public empathy for people’s experience of illness and difficulties in coping. (shrink)

The face is the first thing that others notice and remember about a person. This is true for the severely facially burned patient, with disfigurement, impaired self-esteem and body image. They and others suffer from chronic devastating facial sequelae resulting from tumors, burns, or congenital malformations and trauma, e.g. ballistic injury to the face. Face transplantation is considered a way to restore eating, swallowing, and speech, and to reestablish esthetics.Alongside these vital bodily functions, the face plays a remarkable role in (...) a person’s identity. Societies place a high value on the face and this gives... (shrink)

Face transplantation is a landmark in reconstructive surgery involving vascularised composite allotransplantation. A recent issue of FT for patients who are blind has arisen. Some bioethicists recommend not excluding a patient who is blind, as this may amount to discrimination. From an ethical standpoint, FT for those with blindness is appropriate in selected candidates. This article seeks to add to the clinical evidence supporting FT for those with blindness by detailing a complementary psychosocial perspective. Currently, there is little relevant research (...) about the subjectivity of the blind. This is critical since the arguments against FT for the blind refer to their inability to see their face and to view the reaction of others to their disfigured faces. We begin with a brief look at examples of FT involving blindness and associated arguments. The next part is a multidisciplinary investigation of the experiences of the blind. These are gleaned from a close reading of the literature and drawing inferences, as direct studies are rare. The discussion analyses identity themes of the blind in relation to their faces: as they experience it; the face they wish to show to the world; and how others perceive and react to their face in a saturated environment of imagery and visual communication. Disability and the blind person’s experience of faces are well-founded considerations for medical practitioners and ethics boards in the process of FT decision-making. (shrink)

According to the dominant account of harming, to harm an agent is to cause her to occupy a harmed state. Matthew Hanser rejects this “state-based” account, arguing that each version of it faces counterexamples. Instead, Hanser argues, to harm an agent is to cause her to suffer harm, where suffering harm is undergoing an event: in particular, it is losing or being prevented from receiving a basic good. In this thesis, I argue that this “event-based” account is, at best, a (...) version of the state-based account. The identity of any event as the suffering of a harm, I argue, derives from the fact that it causes the agent to occupy a harmed state. I then defend the “counterfactual comparative” version of the state-based account against three prominent objections. The intended upshot of my arguments is that the state-based account of harming is superior to its event-based counterpart. (shrink)

The determination of death by neurological criteria (brain death) is practiced in at least 80 countries, though it is a matter of continuing controversy. At the same time, the brain is central to human life, thinking, and behavior; however, a growing “neurocentrism” or a brain‐focused image of human identity became established in most Western and in many non‐Western societies and acts as a forceful ideology. This paper seeks a broader theoretical and sociocultural basis to approaching death bioethically by analyzing criticisms (...) aimed at a neurologically focussed vision of human life, and then turning these towards the brain death criteria exposed to the criticism. The overall critique of the “neuro‐self” has scope to offer alternative perspectives to the contested issues in brain‐death criteria. Specifically, the paper examines two major shortcomings of a narrow brain view of life and culture. First, it considers the reduction of the individual to the brain: this is the crux of the neurological way of determining death, and is a way that is seemingly context‐independent and culturally neutral. Second, it considers how dimensions of society and culture for humans are detached from the brain and have little impact on clinical practice and thinking in brain‐death criteria; however, a deeper exploration reveals that they actually have direct relevance and that social and cultural factors have greater contributions to make to the current debates. (shrink)