In this second edition, Joseph Rychlak has retained his analysis of the philosophical antecedents of psychology and, at the same time, has considerably revised more complicated material illustration rigorous humanism to make the book more accessible for students. Rychlak here offers an analysis of the philosophical traditions underlying the social sciences and shows how functionalism came to dominate the modern science of psychology in America.

Offering an alternative to the theories of Skinner and other behaviorists, Rychlak draws upon recent research to support his belief that people can alter the grounds for their behavior and assume greater responsibility for it.

This paper examines the theoretical differences obtaining between a mechanist like Moore and a teleologist like Rychlak. It is shown that mechanistic formulations invariably reduce the account to material and efficient causation, whereas teleologists want to bring in formal-final cause descriptions as well. Mechanists frame their explanations in third-person terms whereas teleologists often seek a first-person formulation of behavior. Moore's references to "private events" are shown to be extraspectively understood. A major theme of this paper is that Skinner actually capitalized (...) on the intentional nature of human behavior, and that it would be fairly easy to reconceptualize his theory and its empirical support in teleological terms. Careful examination of both the contingency and the discriminative-stimulus constructs are made in support of this contention. (shrink)

After demonstrating that Freud could not adapt his basically teleological image of humanity to the mechanistic accounts of his day, a change in terminology is proposed to allow for telic formulations to be made in the future. Psychology's total reliance on efficient causation is the reason why there are only machine models available today. Drawing on final causation, the concept of telosponsivity is introduced and then elaborated in terms of its reliance on predication, tautology, and oppositionality. In pursuing his "logical (...) learning theory," the author has provided empirical research support for the concept of telosponsivity. (shrink)

The interpretation given by Craik and Lockhart of the findings by Hyde and Jenkins involving supposed depth of incidental-task processing on subsequent word recall is brought into question by the tenets of logical learning theory. It is shown that Craik and Lockhart overlooked the possible role of oppositionality in this research. An alternative explanation relying on an oppositional context and predication is offered. Two experiments present evidence supporting the hypothesis that oppositionality in an incidental task facilitates subsequent word recall . (...) In both experiments, the importance of taking a subject's meaningful understanding of the task instruction into consideration is highlighted. The discussion contrasts Boolean "binary" disjunction with the logic of oppositionality. It is shown how oppositionality allows us to conceptualize a testable theory of human agency. (shrink)

In the past four or five years I have been especially dependent on Aristotle's writings as I have initiated a series of experiments that can legitimately be called empirical efforts to prove Aristotelian conceptions to be true. In actuality, of course, I am trying to prove my own theory to be true—that is, worthy of consideration because it is consistent with observed human actions. However, by extension, I am surely seeking evidence for Aristotle's image of human cognition. There are two (...) Aristotlelian conceptions that underwrite my theoretical and empirical efforts: predication and opposition. When we speak of a "predication" in cognition we refer to a process that is fundamentally creative. Predications deal in meanings; and the way in which we align meanings, lending the meaning of one concept to another is what predication is all about. Predication is the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying certain patterns of meaning in relation to other patterns of meaning. The second Aristotelian conception that I have been employing theoretically and investigating empirically is "opposition." Although association through frequent contact was recognized by Aristotle , he also appreciated that there is often an intrinsic tie of opposite meanings to be seen in human reason. In my own interpretation of Aristotle, I believe that we can see the ultimate necessity of predication stemming from the opositional ties of meanings like this. If I am cognizing within a congerie of interlacing meanings which relate to and, indeed, delimit the definitions of their opposite meanings, then it is up to me as a cognizer to continually "take a position" on just what I am going to affirm—or not! 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In the past four or five years I have been especially dependent on Aristotle's writings as I have initiated a series of experiments that can legitimately be called empirical efforts to prove Aristotelian conceptions to be true. In actuality, of course, I am trying to prove my own theory to be true—that is, worthy of consideration because it is consistent with observed human actions. However, by extension, I am surely seeking evidence for Aristotle's image of human cognition. There are two (...) Aristotlelian conceptions that underwrite my theoretical and empirical efforts: predication and opposition. When we speak of a "predication" in cognition we refer to a process that is fundamentally creative. Predications deal in meanings; and the way in which we align meanings, lending the meaning of one concept to another is what predication is all about. Predication is the act of affirming, denying, or qualifying certain patterns of meaning in relation to other patterns of meaning. The second Aristotelian conception that I have been employing theoretically and investigating empirically is "opposition." Although association through frequent contact was recognized by Aristotle, he also appreciated that there is often an intrinsic tie of opposite meanings to be seen in human reason. In my own interpretation of Aristotle, I believe that we can see the ultimate necessity of predication stemming from the opositional ties of meanings like this. If I am cognizing within a congerie of interlacing meanings which relate to and, indeed, delimit the definitions of their opposite meanings, then it is up to me as a cognizer to continually "take a position" on just what I am going to affirm—or not! 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Many scientists proclaim that consciousness is an illusion, a mere byproduct of chemical activity in the brain. In the computer age, scholars have further conceptualized consciousness as the software that regulates human functions, reducing our foibles and feats to complex but ultimately predictable robotics.

Comments on the views on free will offered by B. D. Slife , M. Gergen , R. N. Williams , M. S. Richardson , and G. S. Howard in light of the classical definition of FW as being capable of doing otherwise. It is argued that FW interpretations differ markedly depending on whether they are viewed as due to a process or to contents within some process. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

The Baconian Criticism holds that it is unnecessary to use final-cause conceptions when an explanation in terms of the other Aristotelian causes is sufficient to the task at hand. It is argued that modern efforts by cognitive psychologists to explain intentionality in machine terminology falls prey to the Baconian Criticism. Cognitive theory is framed extraspectively and relies basically and thoroughly on material/efficient-causation. Introducing final-cause description to such machine processing is superfluous because it adds nothing to our basic understanding of what (...) is taking place. Telosponsivity, on the other hand, is exclusively introspective in formulation and is not open to the Baconian Criticism because of its basic reliance on oppositionality in cognition. The telosponding person is always "taking a position" within a sea of opposite possibilities, which allows for the fact that behavior could have unfolded differently all circumstances remaining the same. This permits a truly teleological understanding of human behavior, one that is not reducible to machine processing. (shrink)

D. Hume's analysis of causation is critically analyzed in light of certain assumptions that he made regarding the classical Aristotelian causes. Using his widely cited analysis of billiard balls colliding and moving about as an example of how efficient causation is supposedly learned, the argument is made that Hume has overlooked the functioning of final causation in this learning. Thus, in order to understand how a learner might reason back from the presumed "effect" to the "cause" in efficient causation, we (...) must appreciate that the learner is actually employing a final-cause process of predication-that is, of reasoning "for the sake of" precedents extending sequaciously to targets. As final causation underwrites telic description, it is concluded that there is an unrecognized teleology in Hume's analysis of causation. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Bornstein has proposed a manuscript submission process based on an adversary legal model, with the manuscript, like a criminal defendant, being presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty by the referees, who act as "prosecutors." The author would be provided with an opportunity for rebuttal, and the associate editor would serve as the trial judge, deciding whether the piece should ultimately be published. The editor-in-chief would hear appeals from decisions made by the associate editor. While there is much to be (...) said about this adversary approach, this paper points out certain problems in using the criminal case as a model. The most significant problem is that the burden of proof is not properly allocated. A better model would be that of the civil law suit, where the plaintiff carries the burden of proof to establish the strength of the claim . This paper also suggests certain modifications to Bornstein's proposal, such as publication of the referees' comments and the author's rebuttal. Although Bornstein's proposal, as modified herein, would not solve all of the problems Bornstein has identified with the current submission process, this paper concludes that the new procedure would do much to advance the science. (shrink)

It is not uncommon today to find the claim made that the computer's capacity to adjust its course of action based on negative feedback satisfactorily explains human agency or free will. Conversely, postmodernism and social constructionism are said to be theories of behavior in which a language system locks people into a cultural determination that denies them agency. The author argues that precisely the reverse is true: computers cannot account for true agency whereas both postmodernism and an important wing of (...) social constructionism do have certain loopholes enabling agential explanations to be developed. The key here is the employment of oppositionality in the theories under analysis. The ability to freely select the grounds for the sake of which one is determined requires an oppositional cast to human cognition and behavior. The author's Logical Learning Theory is offered as an example of theorizing that is amenable to genuine human agency thanks to its central reliance on oppositionality. (shrink)

Questions of both a theoretical and methodological nature are raised concerning Harcum's interesting paper on the resolution of the free will issue. The theoretical questions deal with the meaning of "free" as the supposed capricious disregard of environmental circumstances, the theoretical perspective from which agency is construed, the sort of causation that is involved, the choice of a predication model rather than a mediation model, and the role of opposition in framing alternatives. Methodological questions raised center on the role of (...) the experimental instruction, manipulation of the independent variable, and the reliance on randomness or error variance in the validation of free will conceptions. It is concluded that Harcum's findings are consistent with human agency, but that his theoretical account requires some rethinking. (shrink)

As I view theorizing to be identical to thinking and have offered extensive discussions elsewhere of the nature and function of "a" theory, I would like to address the question of what I look for in a psychological theory from the adjectivial side of the phrase 'psychological theory." The term "psychological" means to me a point of view, descriptive account, formal explication, etc., of human behavior encompassing introspective terminology, based on final causation, as framed in dialectically generated and evaluated premises (...) that incorporate predication. I think that if we can have a psychological theory of this type we will come a lot closer to the understanding of human beings. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Mind Regained by Edward Pols contains an excellent analysis of what the concept of mind would signify if it were not for the historical biases emanating from philosophy and especially science. What I like best about this analysis is the fact that Professor Pols appreciates the important role played by our interpretation of causation in all this. Science has found the concept of mind to be superfluous thanks to its diminished understanding of causation. Pols makes it beautifully clear that to (...) regain its significance in human action, mind must be understood as a real cause of things and not merely as an effect of other antecedents that thrust it lawfully or statistically along without telic drive. (shrink)

A young child serving as a participant in a "theory of mind" experiment is first told the following scenario: "Sally places a marble in a basket and then leaves to take a walk. While she is away, Ann removes the marble from the basket and places it in a nearby box." Puppet dolls, marble, box, and basket are used to act this all out for the participating child. The child is then asked: "Where did Sally put the marble in the (...) beginning? Where is the marble now? Where will Sally look for the marble when she comes back from her walk?" Empirical research apparently establishes that not until the fourth year of life do children acquire the ability to grasp a false belief – namely, that Sally will look into the basket on her return because this is where she placed the marble before she left. When asked, younger children say that she will look for the marble in the box presumably because that is where it is now located. The question which arises is: How do we explain the development of this false-belief phenomenon? (shrink)