This study utilized a multiple baseline design across two study skills to examine the impact of a self-monitoring checklist and follow-up performance feedback on the generalization of study skills for seven college students with disabilities. All training and follow-up support took place in a remedial college course. The accuracy of study skill use was analyzed to evaluate whether training gains occurred in a college level subject area different than the course in which the skills were taught in the absence of (...) teacher-guided stimuli and verbal prompts. Results provide evidence that relatively simple, classroom-based training and follow-up support markedly increased the accurate use of the notetaking and study guide skills immediately for three of the seven students. However, following a booster session, all but one student’s performance increased following intervention. Results were socially validated by students who indicated they were generally satisfied with the intervention and found it to be useful when studying for the college class. This type of training is critical because low retention rates in college programs are a likely outcome for students with disabilities when study skills are not used. (shrink)

This paper is based on the comments I gave to Alfred Mele regarding his original Zygote Argument during my presentation at a small workshop on manipulation arguments in Budapest back in 2012. After those comments, Mele changed the conclusion of his original Zygote Argument (OZA) from a positive, explanatory conclusion to a negative, non-explanatory conclusion--and, correspondingly, redefined 'incompatibilism' so that it would no longer refer in his work to the view that determinism precludes (undermines, eliminates, destroys, etc.) free will, but (...) refers narrowly to the perhaps spurious association claim that appears in the conclusion of the revised Zygote Argument (Mele 2013+). Yet, over the last decade, Mele has made no comment in print about the changes he made, the invalidity objection that led to them, nor to the fact that his revised Zygote Argument was originally presented by me as a (non-optimal) reaction to my invalidity objection to his original Zygote Argument. To my knowledge, Mele has only mentioned this 2015 paper once, at it was not in the context of understanding manipulation arguments; it was, rather, in the context of defending his revised, non-explanatory definition of 'incompatibilism' at the opening of Aspects of Agency (p. 6, n. 4). There, Mele singles out *just this 2015 paper* as a place where they'll find what Mele degrades as a type of nonstandard/nontraditional definition of 'incompatibilism' that he rejects. This is notable because Mele provides no empirical evidence that his preferred definition is standard, and most (including Lehrer, who coined the term) reject the negative, non-explanatory, association-based definition that Mele came to endorse in the aftermath of my invalidity objection to OZA. So, if Mele had a genuine concern about philosophers who use the term 'incompatibilism', then Mele could have--and should have--named almost any leading figure in free will for this purpose (since most--including Pereboom, Vihvelin, Haji, etc.) reject the non-explanatory definition that Mele-2013+ now endorses. Yet, for untold reasons, Mele isolated the working definition of 'incompatibilism' used in one paper by one unemployed junior researcher to use as his example--even though Neil Levy had used this same definition in previously published work (eg. Levy 2011). Moreover, if Mele were genuinely interested in helping his readers understand the ambiguity of terms like 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' it is a mystery that he referenced a paper in which nothing of substance hung on the definitions given to these terms -- especially considering that he might have instead pointed them to my OTHER 2015 paper, "A Critique of Vihvelin's Three-Fold Classification" in which the MAIN AIM of the paper is to expose the difficulties facing anyone who wants to define the terms 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism' in a way that everyone will accept (including a critique of the negative, non-explanatory "incompossibilist" definition that Mele adopted after my objection to OZA). By all appearances, Mele's main aim in citing specifically THIS paper and none of my other work was to give readers the false impression that my working definition of 'incompatibilism' played some role in my charge that his argument is invalid (which it doesn't, given that the term doesn't appear in either the premises or conclusion of that argument). Mele adds to this unseemly rhetorical campaign in his book *Manipulation Agents* where he mentions an invalidity objection in the intro (p. 84) and then discusses that objection in the final lines of Chapter 5 of the book (p. 120-121). The invalidity objection discussed here is completely pedantic, has never been seriously raised in the primary literature (and was previously addressed in multiple places my multiple philosophers, including me), and has nothing whatever to do with my invalidity objection. In other words, Mele was content to discuss an invalidity objection that no one has ever had to an argument that is clearly valid while completely ignoring the ONLY substantive invalidity objection to his argument in print. This is unfortunate, because it has led to serious confusion --including the patently false description of my invalidity objection to OZA as an objection to the revised version of the Zygote Argument that Mele adopted in *response* my objection (e.g., Capes mistakenly claims "Mickelson (2015) contends that arguments like this [i.e. like the revised Zygote Argument] are invalid. But that’s because she defines “incompatibilism” differently than I’ve defined it here" in his "Manipulation Arguments and Direct Arguments" chapter in the 2023 Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will; I did not say this, and the definition of 'incompatibilism' is irrelevant to my objection). In "The Zygote Argument Is Invalid--Now What?", I simply use the invalidity of the simple 2-premise Zygote Argument as a foil to make a series of more philosophically significant points (e.g. regarding the dialectical structure of the free-will debate, the role of best-explanation reasoning, and to develop the first-ever "master manipulation argument"). Mele has yet to address my reasons for calling attention to the non-trivial invalidity of his OZA or to any of my answers to the "Now What?" question in this paper, even though this question and my proposed answers to this question are the paper's main point. For those interested in a more recent discussion of how the logical and metaphilosophical observations made in this "Now What?" paper have helped to move the free-will debate forward, I suggest looking at the discussions of the "paradigm shift" in the free-will debate that helps to explain why the free-will debate has become mired in stalemates and empty verbal disputes that are found, for example, in my contributions to the Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Free Will (Intro and Chapter 4, 2023) and my paper "Free Will, Self-Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck" (2019). (shrink)

Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument is among the most famous and resilient manipulation arguments against compatibilism. I contend that its resilience is not a function of the argument's soundness but, rather, the ill-gotten gain from an ambiguity in the description of the causal relations found in the argument's foundational case. I expose this crucial ambiguity and suggest that a dilemma faces anyone hoping to resolve it. After a thorough search for an interpretation which avoids both horns of this dilemma, I conclude (...) that none is available. Rather, every metaphysically coherent interpretation invites either a hard- or soft-line reply to Pereboom's argument. I then consider a recharacterization of the dilemma which seems to clear the way for the defence of a revised Four-Case Argument. I address this rejoinder by identifying a still more fundamental problem shared by all viable interpretations of the manipulation cases, showing that each involves a type of manipulation which undermines the victim's agency. Because this diagnosis supports a soft-line reply to every viable interpretation of the argument and can be endorsed by any compatibilist, I consider it the final piece of the Soft-line Solution to the Four-Case Argument. Finally, I suggest a new taxonomy of manipulation arguments, arguing that none that employs the suppressive variety of manipulation found in Pereboom's argument offers a threat to compatibilism. (shrink)

The terms ‘compatibilism’ and ‘incompatibilism’ were introduced in the mid-20th century to name conflicting views about the logical relationship between the thesis of determinism and the thesis that someone has free will. These technical terms were originally introduced within a specific research paradigm, the classical analytic paradigm. This paradigm is now in its final stages of degeneration and few free-will theorists still work within it (i.e. using its methods, granting its substantive background assumptions, etc.). This chapter discusses how the ambiguity (...) of the terms ‘incompatibilism’ and ‘compatibilism’ took root and why it matters to the contempory debate. I explain why the ambiguity of these anachronistic terms, though relatively innocuous when they were first introduced, is now encouraging theorists to tolerate and perpetuate serious philosophical errors (e.g. to conflate relations as different in kind and importance as correlation and causation, to knowingly promote invalid arguments, and to equivoate on jargon in ways that keep the free-will debate mired in psuedo-stalemates). I also suggest a new paradigm for anyone looking for relief from the confusion and deadlock created by the use of inadequate classical narratives and jargon. -/- A selection from the publication is available to download here. For full version, please gmail me, username: kristin.mickelson.42 -/- . (shrink)

*As mentioned in Peter Coy's NYT essay "When Being Good Is Just a Matter of Being Lucky" (2023) -/- ----- -/- How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution. This solution both explains why the paradox arises and why moral luck does not exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key connections (...) between the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free will and determinism and the paradox of self-creation. Piecing together intuitions, arguments, and insights from recent work on each of these three problems, I argue that the type of control necessary for moral responsibility can only be had by someone who is a genuine source of his own actions, but the relevant notion of sourcehood admits no coherent characterization. If our commonsense view of moral responsibility is incoherent, it is unsurprising that our commitment to the existence of morally responsible agents commits us to some paradoxical things—e.g. to both the existence and impossibility of moral luck. For more information about this article, please write to gmail account: kristin.mickelson.42. (shrink)

"The Manipulation Argument has recently taken center stage in the free-will debate, yet little else can be said of this newcomer that is uncontroversial. At present, even the most fundamental elements of the Manipulation Argument--its structure, conclusion, and target audience--are a matter of dispute. As such, we cannot begin, as we ideally would, with a simple and relatively uncontroversial overview of the argument. Instead, clarifying the debate over the basic structure and general conclusion of the Manipulation Argument will be our (...) goal." -/- UPDATE: I now refer to an isolated objection to the counterexample step as a hardline reply, an isolated attack on the generalization step a softline reply, and an isolated response to the explanation step as an "al dente" reply. Al dente replies have been given in Mele's 2005 critique of the Four-Case Argument and my 2015 (2012) critique of Mele's Zygote Argument. I also now refer to a manipulation argument which has a generalization step that concludes to impossibilism and an explanation step which proposes an explanation for the impossibility of free will as a "Master Manipulation Argument" (examples of master manipulation arguments include Mickelson 2015 and 2019). (shrink)

This essay begins by dividing the traditional problem of free will and determinism into a “correlation” problem and an “explanation” problem. I then focus on the explanation problem, and argue that a standard form of abductive (i.e. inference to the best-explanation) reasoning may be useful in solving it. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of the abductive approach, I apply it to three standard accounts of free will. While each account implies the same solution to the correlation problem, each implies a unique (...) solution to the explanation problem. For example, all libertarian-friendly accounts of free will imply that it is impossible to act freely when determinism is true. However, only a narrow subset of libertarians have the theoretical resources to defend the incompatibilist claim that deterministic laws (qua being deterministic) undermine free will, while other libertarians must reject this incompatibilist view. -/- [Version: Nov. 12, 2018]. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue for the rejection of Vihvelin's ‘Three-fold Classification’ , a nonstandard taxonomy of free-will compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Vihvelin is right that the standard taxonomy of these views is inadequate, and that a new taxonomy is needed to clarify the free-will debate. Significantly, Vihvelin notes that the standard formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ does not capture the historically popular view that deterministic laws pose a threat to free will. Vihvelin's proposed solution is to redefine ‘incompatibilism.’ However, Vihvelin's (...) formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ is flawed according to her own arguments. In addition, Vihvelin's characterization of ‘compatibilism’ is incomplete, and at least two important free-will views are missing from her proposed taxonomy. Given the problems with Vihvelin's arguments for 3-FC, her novel view of the dialectic between the major free-will views lacks support. (shrink)

Background:Attention to ethical leadership in nursing has diminished over the past several decades.Objectives:The aim of our study was to investigate how frontline nurses and formal nurse leaders envision ethical nursing leadership.Research design:Meta-ethnography was used to guide our analysis and synthesis of four studies that explored the notion of ethical nursing leadership.Participants and research context:These four original studies were conducted from 1999-2008 in Canada with 601 participants.Ethical considerations:Ethical approval from the original studies covered future analysis.Findings:Using the analytic strategy of lines-of-argument, we (...) found that 1) ethical nursing leadership must be responsive to practitioners and to the contextual system in which they and formal nurse leaders work, and 2) ethical nursing leadership requires receiving and providing support to increase the capacity to practice and discuss ethics in the day-to-day.Discussion and conclusion:Formal nurse leaders play a critical, yet often neglected role, in providing ethical leadership and supporting ethical nursing practice at the point of patient care. (shrink)

The term “principle of sufficient reason” (PSR) was coined by Leibniz, and he is often regarded as its paradigmatic proponent. But as Leibniz himself often insisted, he was by no means the first philosopher to appeal to the idea that everything must have a reason. Histories of the principle attribute versions of it to various ancient authors. A few of these studies include—or at least do not exclude—medieval philosophers; one finds the PSR in Abelard, another finds it in Aquinas. And (...) while Leibniz retains pride of place in these histories, Spinoza is sometimes said to precede him “in appreciating the importance of the Principle and placing it at the center of his philosophical system.” In this paper, the author argues that the same should be said of the Islamic philosopher Avicenna. Writing 600 years before his early modern counterparts, Avicenna routinely and consistently appeals to the PSR in generating his metaphysical system. The paper aims first to establish that Avicenna deserves a position of prominence in histories of the PSR, and then to consider how he addresses certain challenges to the PSR, especially the threat posed by necessitarianism. (shrink)

When The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory by Carol J. Adams was published more than twenty years ago, it caused a immediate stir among writers and thinkers, feminists and animal rights activists alike. Never before had the relationship between patriarchy and meat eating been drawn so clearly, the idea that there lies a strong connection between the consumption of women and animals so plainly asserted. But, as the 21 personal stories in this anthology show, the impact of (...) this provocative text on womens lives continues to this day, and it is as diverse as it is revelatory. One writer attempts to reconcile her feminist-vegan beliefs with her Muslim upbringing; a second makes the connection between animal abuse and her own self-destructive tendencies. A new mother discusses the sexual politics of breastfeeding, while another pens a letter to her young son about all she wishes for him in the future. Many others recall how the book inspired them to start careers in the music business, animal advocacy, and food. No matter whether they first read it in college or later in life, whether they are in their late teens or early forties, these writers all credit The Sexual Politics of Meat in some way with the awakening of their identities as feminists, activists, and women. Even if you havent read the original work, youre sure to be moved and inspired by these tales of growing up and, perhaps more important, waking up to the truths around us. (shrink)

In “The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What?” (2015), Kristin Mickelson published an objection to the Zygote Argument that she first presented in 2012 as workshop comments on a draft of Mele's "Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet-Biting" (2013). Assuming that the phrase "determinism precludes free will" means something like determinism-related causal factors are what prevent people from acting freely when determinism is true, Mele's original Zygote Argument was invalid. At the workshop, Mickelson presented Mele with two options to (...) address the problem, a premise-preserving option and a conclusion-preserving option. That is, Mele could change the conclusion of the original argument to the negative, non-explanatory thesis entailed by its original two premises, or find a way to add premises that would support the positive, explanatory conclusion of the original argument (which, notably, is the conclusion that Pereboom supports using best-explanation reasoning in his Four-Case Argument). Mickelson used this as an opportunity to explain the key contribution that best-explanation reasoning makes to manipulation arguments -- and why the best variant of the manipulation argument might conclude that incompatibilism is FALSE. In response to Mickelson's objection, Mele changed the conclusion of the argument before "Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet-Biting" went to print, choosing Mickelson's proposal to change its conclusion over the suggestion to change its premises. However, Mele failed to mention Mickelson's invalidity objection in print and that he changed the conclusion of his argument as a direct response to it; nor did Mele mention the costs that Mickelson outlined for the premise-preserving solution that he adopted or the benefits of a conclusion-preserving solution. At the same time, Mele began using the term 'incompatibilism' to pick out the negative, non-explanatory claim supported by the newly revised Zygote Argument--and also started to claim (without providing evidence) that those who use the term 'incompatibilism' to denote the explanatory claim deterministic causal factors *make it the case* that no one acts freely when determinism is true" is guilty of using the term in a nonstandard and nontraditional way that he had "never had any use for"--failing to mention that he clearly used the term in this explanatory sense in his 2005 critique of the Four-Case Argument, which is to be expected give that Derk Pereboom uses the explanatory definition (as do Kadri Vihvelin, Carolina Sartorio, and *most* other contributors to the free-will literature). In THIS reply essay, Mickelson responds to an attempt by Gabriel De Marco (FSU, advisor Alfred Mele) to defend the original Zygote Argument from Mickelson's 2012/2015 critique. Unfortunately, both of De Marco's proposed "solutions" are non-starters. The first is a non-starter because De Marco merely repeats the premise-preserving solution that Mickelson offered to Mele in 2012 and that Mele adopted in print in 2013. In other words, De Marco took credit for the premise-preserving solution to the invalidity objection that Mickelson developed (although he does *redescribe* Mickelson's solution in his own idiosyncratic jargon) and Mele had already adopted in print. De Marco's second solution is a non-starter because it is constituted by a patently invalid argument. Contrary to De Marco's proposal, it's not true that the conjunction of possibilism and incompossibilism deductively entails the positive, diagnostic claim that deterministic causal factors beyond one's control preclude (destroy, undermine, is antagonistically relevant to) free will when determinism is true. *My thanks to the editors of Philosophia for publishing this reply when PhilStudies would not. (shrink)

After acquiring knowledge of the neuroscience of learning, memory, stress and emotions, teachers incorporate more cognitive engagement and student-centered practices into their lessons. However, the role understanding neuroscience plays in teachers own affective and motivational competencies has not yet been investigated. The goal of this study was to investigate how learning neuroscience effected teachers’ self-efficacy, beliefs in their ability to teach effectively, self-responsibility and other components of teacher motivation. A pilot training-of-trainers program was designed and delivered in Liberia combining basic (...) neuroscience with information on social, emotional, behavioral and mental health issues faced by students. Tier I of the professional development was a 2 weeks workshop led by a visiting neuroscientist. A subset of the 24 Tier I secondary science teachers formed a Leadership Team who adapted the content to the Liberian context and subsequently led additional workshops and follow-up sessions for the Tier II secondary science teachers. Science teachers in both tiers completed the affective-motivational scales from the internationally vetted, multiscale Innovative Teaching for Effective Learning Teacher Knowledge Survey from the OECD. Tier II teachers completed the survey in a pre-post-delayed post design. Tier I teachers completed the survey after the workshop with their attitudes at that time and separately with retrospective projections of their pre-workshop attitudes. Ten of the 92 Tier II teachers participated in structured interviews at follow-up. Statistical analysis of survey data demonstrated improved teacher self-efficacy, self-responsibility for student outcomes, and motivation to teach. Qualitatively, teachers expressed more confidence in their ability to motivate students, engage them through active learning, and manage the class through positive rather than negative reinforcement. Teachers’ own self-regulation improved as they made efforts to build supporting relationships with students. Together, these results demonstrated that (i) teacher affective-motivational attitudes can be altered with professional development, (ii) basic neuroscience, as knowledge of how students learn, can improve teacher competency, and (iii) a training-of-trainers model can be effective in a low and middle income country for disseminating neuroscience knowledge, increasing teachers’ knowledge of students’ social and emotional needs, and promoting educational improvement. (shrink)

The complex and dynamic nature of systems pose a particular challenge to researchers and require the use of a research methodology designed to deal with such systems. The properties of fit, relevance, understandability, generality, control, workability, generalizability, and modifiability make Glaserian grounded theory and grounded action particularly well suited for studying systems. These methods are innovative, systemic, and sophisticated enough to reveal the underlying complexities of systems and plan actions that address their complex, dynamic nature while remaining grounded in what (...) is occurring within the systems as they change over time. (shrink)

Within the field of multispecies ethnography, a lingering question remains regarding how we can understand the nonhuman side of the human–nonhuman encounter. Many authors have ventured into this topic on a theoretical level, but none have proposed an effective methodological approach for how to achieve their goals. After examining the pitfalls experienced when acting as a volunteer at an animal shelter, I propose that in order to get closer to the feline gaze, we must first utilize an understanding of a (...) cat’s sensory capabilities. Recognizing that a cat’s subjectivities are necessarily mediated by their bodies, understanding how they perceive the world involves a sensory experiential methodology. Highlighting the many contributions of phenomenological frameworks along with their limitations, I argue that getting closer to the feline gaze means appreciating species differences rather than arguing for the shared qualities held across species. Because of the species barrier, an interdisciplinary approach must meld phenomenological with ethological methods to grasp the interspecies relationships created by the cat–human encounter. (shrink)

Free-will incompatibilism has become a motte-and-bailey doctrine (Shackel 2014), and is currently being maintained by standard motte-and-bailey strategies. In this paper, I explain why incompatibilism has a motte-and-bailey structure and why philosophers who do not aim to dismantle it are complicit in both the maintenance of this problematic doctrine and the normalization of a host of bad practices engaged in by those who actively exploit it. To solidify the diagnosis, I provide a paradigmatic motte-and-baileying case that has been ongoing for (...) over a decade. Specifically, I discuss how motte-and-baileying has generated widespread confusion surrounding the logical structure and conclusion of manipulation arguments. Even more specifically, I look at Mele's so-called "Zygote Argument for incompatibilism". I point out that Mele currently conflates under two distinct arguments with different logical forms and substantively different conclusions under that heading, and explain how this has needlessly impeded progress in the free-will debate. The original variant of the Zygote Argument was invalid because it aimed to establish that determinism precludes (destroys, undermines, is antagonistic to) free will, but its supported a far weaker non-explanatory conclusion. In direct response to this invalidity objection, Mele took his critic's suggestion to change the conclusion of his argument to the thesis that free will and determinism are perhaps spuriously associated -- but he also covertly changed his preferred definition of 'incompatibilism' to pick out the non-explanatory conclusion of the new variant of the Zygote Argument which allowed him to continue speaking AS IF his argument was still an argument for incompatibilism according to his original definition of 'incompatibilism'. It is not simply that Mele made these changes or that he failed to mention in print that he made them (despite having over a decade to do so), but that he has actively attempted to discredit his critics by insisting--contrary to fact--that those who do not use his negative definition of 'incompatibilism' are using the term in a nonstandard and nontraditional way that he has "never had any use for" and there is some kind of connection (which he does describe) between the invalidity objection to his original argument that the definition of 'incompatibilism' one prefers. Oddly, Mele has mentioned only one "invalidity objection" in print, but this objection is direct at the revised Zygote Argument--even though no one had ever pressed an invalidity objection to his new argument (the form of which is patently valid). As a direct result of Mele's evasive behaviors (covertly redefining jargon to cover changes to the form/conclusion of his argument), many people--including Mele's own former graduate students--have published articles in which they fail to recognize that Mele changed his argument and redefined terms, thereby perpetuating the false narrative that the new Zygote Argument has the same "incompatibilist" conclusion as the original (which, notably, had the same conclusion as its predecessor, Pereboom's Four-Case Argument). Moreover, Mele has not even ONCE corrected those who "misdescribe" his revised argument as concluding that determinism is antagonstic to (precludes, undermines, rules out, etc.) free will. For example, Mele never corrects those who mistakenly claim that the revised Zygote Argument has the same "incompatibilist" conclusion as Pereboom's, nor has Mele ever mentioned that he now defines the term 'incompatibilism' differently than Pereboom--since Pereboom since uses this term to refer to the explanatory conclusion of the original Zygote Argument, which had the same explanatory conclusion of his Four-Case Argument. To further throttle his critics, Mele has obliquely suggested that the invalidity objection to his original Zygote Argument works only if one accepts his critic's idiosyncratic definition of 'incompatibilism' -- a patently false charge (since the term 'incompatibilism' doesn't even appear in his arguments) and one that has needlessly confused his audience. Indeed, other philosophers have now made this false and quite indefensible accusation explicitly in print, thereby helping Mele and others to continue motte-and-baileying with impunity. I close by preemptively responding to strategies commonly used by motte-and-bailey apologists to suppress legitimate criticisms of their equivocation and well-poisoning strategies (e.g. "Philosophers are allowed to define their technical terms however they like" and "the motte/bailey divide is a distinction without a difference") which have hitherto kept their philosophical audience from participating in a legitimate discussion about why tracking the distinction between the the "motte" thesis (a negative, arguably spurious association claim) and the "bailey" thesis (a positive explanatory claim) is not trivial, but is instead one that is absolutely essential to making progress in the free-will debate. Of course, a single critic cannot (almost by definition) undermine a motte-and-bailey doctrine once it has been established. As such, even if every diagnosis in this essay is accurate, it will not change the discourse. The motte-and-baileying will continue, and the debate will remain in needless deadlock, until a critical threshold of OBSERVERS learn about the motte/bailey distinction and ask apologists for motte-and-bailey incompatibilism to stop their motte-and-baileying. -/- Manuscript available upon request, plz gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42@. (shrink)

This article deals with the prospect of genetically enhancing intelligence. We identify and contrast social attitudes (disapproval) to the use of future genetic technology with social attitudes (approval) for environmental methods of enhancing intelligence. Using various forms of the argument that the means by which enhancement is achieved has moral significance, we look for differences that could justify the different attitudes. We find that the different attitudes cannot be ethically justified. We predict that the lack of ethical justification for distinguishing (...) between means of enhancement is likely to result in the eventual acceptance of genetic enhancement of intelligence. (shrink)

This article confronts the challenges and opportunities presented by medical-legal partnerships (MLPs) representing families impacted by the family regulation system. Based on the authors’ experience developing a collaboration between a medical-legal partnership, interdisciplinary law school clinic and nurse home visiting program focused on clients impacted by the family regulation system, the article challenges traditional conceptions of the MLP model and proposes an expanded vision for MLPs to address systemic injustice and improve outcomes for families.

The use of the Internet in conducting psychological research has become increasingly common over the past few decades, as Internet access has become more widespread. Although web-based work has a number of benefits, including lower cost, easy access to large samples, and strict standardization of administration, the limitations must also be considered. Among these limitations are the ethics concerns related to conducting psychological research online. These concerns include limitations in maintaining confidentiality, conducting thorough informed consent, and conducting valid assessment. Particular (...) focus is given to the limitations inherent in conducting a fully automated online study. All of these limitations are discussed in detail through both a review of existing literature and the brief review of a recent study. The recent study identified areas in which participants struggled with completing a fully automated online task. This article discusses the ethics implications of Internet research as well as offering suggestions for researchers who intend to conduct web-based research, and thoughts on future directions as psychology moves forward in web-based research and assessment. (shrink)

The concept of efficient causation originates with Aristotle, who states that the types of cause include ‘the primary source of the change or rest’. For Medieval Aristotelians, the scope of efficient causality includes creative acts. The Islamic philosopher Avicenna is an important contributor to this conceptual change. In his Metaphysics, Avicenna defines the efficient cause or agent as that which gives being to something distinct from itself. As previous studies of Avicenna's ‘metaphysical’ conception of the efficient cause attest, it takes (...) God as a model agent. This essay considers whether Avicenna's ‘metaphysical’ conception of the efficient cause applies to natural agents. It ultimately argues that Avicenna offers a unified view of the efficient cause, which includes both divine and natural agents. On this view, an efficient cause gives being to another and is simultaneous with its effect. While Avicenna's defence of this view is an important chapter in the history of the concept of the efficient cause, it is also of interest in its own right. By appeal to a version of the principle of sufficient reason, it challenges a widespread view that causes are temporally prior to their effects. (shrink)

The chapter begins with a discussion of the determinism relatum (§2) and the free-will relatum (§3). The next section (§4) identifies four relations which are commonly used to characterize (in)compatibilism: metaphysical incompossibility, logical inconsistency, metaphysical incompatibility, and logical incompatibility. In closing (§5), I suggest a way to disambiguate the terms “compatibilism” and “incompatibilism”. -/- For the most recent draft, please gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42.

Although ethical leadership by formal nurse leaders is critical to enhancing ethical health-care practice, research has shown that many nurses feel unsupported by their leaders. In this article, we consider the limited attention directed toward ethical leadership of formal nurse leaders and how our own research on ethical nurse leadership compares to other research in this field. In searching Nursing Ethics since its inception 20 years ago, we found only a dozen articles that directly addressed this topic. We then reviewed (...) nurses’ professional codes of ethics in Canada and found significant retractions of ethical guidelines for formal nurse leaders’ ethical responsibilities over the past decade. We began to seek explanations of why this is so and offer some recommendations for the study and enhancement of ethics for formal nurse leadership. (shrink)

According to Joseph Campbell's "No Past Objection" (NPO), popular formal statements of the Consequence Argument are oddly silent about the freedom status of actors who lack a “remote past,” a time prior to their birth at which their universe existed but they did not. As such, NPO problematizes the common view that the Consequence Argument concludes that determinism (perhaps in combination with other things) conflicts with or poses some kind of threat to free will. In this essay, I present a (...) new "explanatory gap objection" to the Consequence Argument which sheds new light on a problem only hinted at in extant work on NPO. As part of this project, I show that NPO misses its mark when targeted at van Inwagen's original logic-text statements of the Consequence Argument, for these arguments must be interpreted given the background assumptions of the classical analytic paradigm in which van Inwagen and his peers were working. However, when the Consequence Argument is unmoored from its original (and now degenerate) paradigm, this argument may be developed as an argument for its original conclusion, but it may also be developed as argument against that view. That is, contemporary statements of the Consequence Argument may used to attack the type of "incompatibilist" conclusion that most philosophers attribute to it. -/- For the most recent version of this manuscript, plz gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42. (shrink)

Traditional compatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. Humean-law compatibilism (a.k.a. weak-law compatibilism), is the view that free will is compatible with determinism, where determinism is defined in terms of a broadly Humean view of the laws of nature. A growing number of philosophers hold that Humean-law compatibilists are targeted by and have special resources to resist arguments for traditional incompatibilism, including the Consequence Argument (cf. Beebee and Mele 2002, Perry 2004, Hetherington 2006, Berofsky 2012, Mele (...) 2013). In this paper, I argue that Humean-law compatibilism is not a proper target of the Consequence Argument and that Humean-law compatibilists have no unique resources to show that the Consequence Argument is unsound. Moreover, I attribute the rise of the paradoxical notion of Humean determinism, upon which Humean compatibilism is based, to Peter van Inwagen’s failed attempt to capture the traditional metaphysical doctrine of determinism (as he himself characterizes it) in the impoverished language of symbolic logic. -/- For the most recent version of this manuscript, plz gmail me: kristin.mickelson.42. (shrink)

The traditional problem of free will and determinism is ostensibly about settling the relationship between free will and determinism. According to the standard narrative, this problem boils down to settling whether free will stands in a compatibility or incompatibility relation with determinism. Similarly, there is traditional debate over whether a compatibility or an incompatibility relationship holds between free will and indeterminism. Since indeterminism is simply the negation of determinism, anyone who holds that human free will is incompatible with both determinism (...) and indeterminism seems to be committed to free-will impossibilism, i.e. the view that free will is metaphysically impossible. We might summarize this constructive dilemma argument as follows: -/- The Standard Dilemma Argument 1. Necessarily, either determinism or its negation, i.e. indeterminism, is true. 2. Necessarily, determinism is incompatible with free will. 3. Necessarily, indeterminism is incompatible with free will. 4. Therefore, free will is metaphysically impossible; impossibilism is true. -/- In this essay, I argue that the term “incompatible” used in this argument is ambiguous. Since there are two fundamentally different ways to disamabiguate the term “incompatible”, there are at least four substantively different ways to disambiguate the Standard Dilemma Argument. Because these four arguments are typically conflated, the philosophically interesting differences between these four instances of the Standard Dilemma Argument are generally ignored. (shrink)

Hard incompatibilism is a view about free will and moral responsibility that has been developed and defended by Derk Pereboom for almost three decades (Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2014). Succinctly put, hard incompatibilists argue that we do not have free will because, whether determinism is true or false, we are subject to the freedom-undermining effects of causal luck (i.e. causal factors beyond our control). In recent years, Gregg Caruso has become a vocal advocate of hard incompatibilism, and he rests his “public (...) health-quarantine model” and its non-retributive approach to criminal behavior squarely on the foundation of Pereboom’s free-will metaphysics (e.g. Caruso 2012, 2014, 2021, 2022; Pereboom and Caruso 2018, 2022; Dennett and Caruso 2021). More recently, biologist and science popularizer Robert Sapolsky has raised the public profile hard incompatibilism by claiming to endorse this position in his best-selling book Determined: A Science of Life Without Free Will (2023). -/- In this book, I offer a refutation of hard incompatibilism and all instances of constructive incompatibilism. In short, I argue that two central central explanatory tenets of hard incompatibilism are in tension with one another, making it impossible for someone to argue for one without undermining their defense of the other in the process. I then point out that the arguments against hard incompatibilism also undermine Neil Levy's luck-pincer impossibilism (2011). Along the way, I explain why Robert Sapolsky is not a hard incompatibilist and is actually committed to the falsity of hard incompatibilism. In closing, I propose a way for skeptics like Caruso and Sapolsky to maintain their skepticism without any type of constructive incompatibilism as the foundation. -/- [Building from the arguments in "The Problem of Free Will: An Abductive Approach", "Free Will, Self-Creation, and The Paradox of Moral Luck," and "(In)compatibilism"] -/- . (shrink)

When Dylann Roof massacred nine people at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, in June of 2015, he re-ignited a long-running debate over the appropriateness of having the flag of the American Confederacy fly over South Carolina’s state house. To many people of all races, it seems inconceivable why anyone would defend flying the Confederate flag over the state house. The flag obviously represents the Confederate States of America; it obviously highlights one of the most painful memories (...) in our nation’s history; furthermore, it obviously has a strong association with slavery and racism. If the flying of the flag celebrates dissent within the union, the death of Americans at each... (shrink)

There is increasing emphasis on the need for collaboration between practice and academic leaders in health care research. However, many problems can arise owing to differences between academic and clinical goals and timelines. In order for research to move forward it is important to name and address these issues early in a project. In this article we use an example of a participatory action research study of ethical practice in nursing to highlight some of the issues that are not frequently (...) discussed and we identify the impact of things not-named. Further, we offer our insights to others who wish to be partners in research between academic and practice settings. These findings have wide implications for ameliorating misunderstandings that may develop between nurse leaders in light of collaborative research, as well as for participatory action research. (shrink)

NOTE TO READERS: My current research program is firmly grounded in the technical aspects of this dissertation. That said, my views have evolved significantly since writing it, e.g. I've flipped my views on the best working definition of 'determinism', and I no longer defend the viability of incompatibilist-impossibilism (I still grant the superficial logical consistency of the two views, but now contend that there is no way to defend one without rejecting the other). I have also given up on the (...) general project of rehabilitating the terms 'compatibilism' and 'incompatibilism', as I now see them as unhelpful hangovers from a degenerated research program. (shrink)

This article analyzes the comparative history of the law and practice of abortion and assisted reproduction in the United States to consider the interplay between medical paternalism and legal paternalism. It supplements existing critiques of paternalism as harmful to women's equality with the medical perspective, as revealed through the writings of Alan F. Guttmacher, to consider when legal regulation might be warranted.

The current study examined youths’ and their parents’ perceptions concerning participation in an investigation of spontaneous and induced pain during recovery from laparoscopic appendectomy. Youth and their parents independently completed surveys about their study participation. On a scale from 0 to 10, both parents and youth rated their experience as positive. Among youth, experience ratings did not differ by pain severity and survey responses did not differ by age. Most youth reported that they would tell another youth to participate. Ethical (...) issues regarding instigation of pain in youth for research purposes are examined. (shrink)

Festschrift for Maḍiniyavela Śrī Mēdhaṅkara, Sri Lankan Buddhist monk; contributed articles chiefly on economic and ethical aspects of Buddhism.

At first glance, Tommy Curry’s project in Another white Man’s Burden may seem like a strange undertaking. While American philosophers have been writing more frequently on Royce over the past decade, he remains a fairly peripheral figure. Those of us in Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy circles may be able to recognize terms like “Beloved Community” or “Loyalty to Loyalty” readily, but we would be hard-pressed to gain an audience for conversations about them at the American Philosophical Association’s (...) regional meetings. Royce rarely ends up on undergraduate syllabuses, and few people read Royce in the greater philosophical community. Royce is not Aristotle, Kant, or even Dewey. He is a... (shrink)

Turkey has a complex character, which has differences from the Western world or Eastern Asia as well as common points. Even after more than a century of efforts to modernise and integrate with the West, Turkish society has values that are different from those of the West, as well as having Western values. It is worth questioning whether ordinary Turkish people show an individualistic character. The principle of respect for individual autonomy arises from a perception of oneself as an individual, (...) and the person’s situation may affect the applicability of the principle. Patients who perceive themselves to be members of a community rather than free persons and who prefer to participate in the common decisions of the community and to consider the common interest and the common value system of the community concerning problems of their life rather than to decide as independent, rational individuals may not be competent to make an autonomous choice. Expectations that such patients will behave as autonomous individuals may be unjustified. The family, rather than the patient, may take a primary role in decisions. A flexible system considering cultural differences in the concept of autonomy may be more feasible than a system following strict universal norms. (shrink)