"In this book, Kenneth F. Rogerson explores the first half of Kant's Critique of Judgment, entitled the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment.

_A study of the first half of Kant’s Critique of Judgment._.

Democratic governments might be required by law to disseminate information to the people. This is called governmental transparency. What is the burden of transparency? We propose a “pragmatic information theory of communication” that places information accessibility as a foundation of transparency. Using a game model—the Transparency Game—we show that the pragmatic theory is the only one that makes it difficult for governments to appear transparent while not actually being transparent. There are two important consequences of understanding transparency through the theory: (...) Accessible information must be actionable, and cognitive science plays a vital role in assessing the accessibility of information. These consequences can have implications for public policies that promote transparency. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give an interpretation of what Kant takes to be the moral importance of aesthetic experience. On my interpretation aesthetic experience pleases since, in general, it is the experience of our finding an object first the aim of our reflective judging efforts. However, satisfying such an aim only makes sense within Kant 's further account of beauty as the expression of aesthetic ideas. In the end I hold that on Kant 's account it is (...) only because beauty can express aesthetic ideas that aesthetic experience can be of moral importance. (shrink)

In the third Critique Kant shifts the focus in his enquiry from the status of factual statements in the Critique of Pure Reason and the grounding of moral imperatives in the Critique of Practical Reason to investigating two methods of considering the world which go beyond the strictly verifiable. This is a move from evaluating the interplay of a ‘determinate’ set of facts and intellectual preconditions to forming what Kant calls ‘reflective’ judgements on these facts. There are two major questions (...) which the Critique of Judgement tackles. On the one hand Kant ambitiously considers how we might properly interpret a set of facts as comprising a larger teleological system and, on the other hand, he is interested in the seemingly quite separate issue of the appreciation of objects as beautiful. It is this latter issue which shall concern us here. Consistent with the reflective stand in the third Critique, Kant argues from the very outset that beauty is not an empirical concept with which we might describe the world. Beauty is not objective in the sense that size, colour or weight might be. Objective properties of this kind belong to the world of scientific understanding. Instead, he holds that judgements of aesthetic merit should be based upon the subjective pleasure we take in experiencing works of art and natural objects. (shrink)

Although Kant is most well-known for his arguments in support of pure or a priori concepts, he also attempts to give an account of how empirical concepts are acquired. In this paper I want to take a close look at this account. Specifically, I am interested in a recent criticism that Kant’s explanation of empirical concept acquisition is, in some sense, circular. I will consider and criticize a recent attempt to solve this problem. Finally, I will argue for my own (...) solution to the circularity problem relying, oddly enough, on Kant’s commitment to pure or a priori concepts of the understanding as well as the pure forms of the imagination. Briefly, I want to argue that Kant can give a coherent and non-circular account of empirical concept acquisition relying primarily on the a priori conceptual tools developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Kant's "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement," which is the first part of his larger Critique of Judgement, is enjoying a renewed interest. This renewed interest, however, has brought with it a renewed controversy over just how Kant's aesthetic theory should be understood. Of the many interpretative questions at issue, perhaps the most fundamental is what it is about an object, on Kant's accounting, that makes it beautiful. Traditionally, Kant has been understood as holding a formalist theory of beauty. That is to (...) say, beauty--or better, our appreciation of beauty--is a matter of the way an object is structured or organized. While there can be no doubt that Kant stresses the importance of form in the early sections of the "Critique," the later portions of the text advance what seems to be a quite different, perhaps even antithetical, paradigm of beauty. In these sections, Kant maintains that for an object to be beautiful it must have some content--specifically, the object must express some "idea." What makes an interpretation difficult is that Kant seems to stand on both sides of a wide gulf in modern aesthetic theory. Within a single work on aesthetics, Kant claims first that beauty depends upon form and, later, that it depends upon content. And, yet, it is typically thought that these positions are mutually exclusive. ;My dissertation is directed specifically to the question of what Kant considers as the features of an object responsible for beauty. Stated broadly, I argue that Kant's consistent position is that for an object to be considered as beautiful we must base our judgment upon how the object is organized , but with an eye to how well this organization is able to express an idea . More precisely, I claim that for Kant both form and expression of ideas are necessary conditions for beauty. To support my thesis I shall follow Kant's own procedure for identifying what makes an object beautiful. In the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement," Kant considers the issue of beauty from the standpoint of an analysis and justification of the judgment that something is beautiful. That is to say, Kant first determines what is meant by such a judgment and then considers what features an object must possess if we are to claim legitimately that something is beautiful. After closely studying Kant's analysis and justification, I argue that an object can be judged as beautiful only if it is organized in such a way as to express an idea. ;In the first two chapters of my dissertation, I describe Kant's project in the Critique of Judgement generally and the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement" more particularly. I devote Chapter III to a close study of the argument of the first half of the text in order to determine the extent to which Kant presents a coherent justification of judgments of beauty. I subsequently argue, in Chapter IV, that the early sections do not complete Kant's justification of judgments of beauty. Further, I argue for what must yet be shown for Kant to make his case. In the final two chapters, V and VI, I describe Kant's theory of expression, argue that it completes Kant's central argument, and, in the end, I support my interpretation that both form and expression of ideas constitute the requirements for beauty in Kant's theory. (shrink)

The purpose of my paper is to interpret kant 's transcendental idealism by looking at his claim that space is "nothing but" ideal. My position is that if we grant to kant the thesis that space is an "a priori" condition for knowing objects, Then it follows that our notion of space can only refer to the character of our experience, Not to properties of things as they may be "in themselves." and this, I argue, Yields a sense of the (...) ideality of space. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues for a position he calls transcendental idealism. And although it comes as no surprise to claim that Kant was an idealist, it is far from clear how this idealism should be understood. Traditionally, Kant’s idealism has been understood as a version of phenomenalism. ‘Objects of experience’ are constructions of mental data caused by mind independent reality. This reading has been labeled the ‘ontological’ interpretation since on this view ‘objects of experience’ are ontologically (...) dependent on our minds and ontologically distinct from the world outside of our minds. And, corresponding to the supposed ‘two worlds’ of objects, it is thought that Kant allows for two perspectives from which objects can be described. Human descriptions are limited to the mere collections of sense data while God can describe the set of objects outside our mind as they really are ‘in themselves.’. (shrink)

For some time now ethical debates have been fought on a field whose boundaries are the historical theories of Kant's deontology and Mill's utilitarianism. Recently, however, several have chosen to leave the battlefield entirely—to suggest, in various ways, that both of the major ethical theories share a common, flawed outlook. Thomas Nagel, for example, has argued that founding ethics on the sole ground of interpersonal obligations unnecessarily “fragments” human value. Such an account has the effect of pitting one species of (...) human value against other quite legitimate values. Or approaching the matter from quite another direction, Philippa Foot also holds that morality, as a system of interpersonal obligations, is too limiting. However, she proposes to counter the advancing forces of modern ethics by championing an Aristotelian doctrine of virtue. (shrink)