What counts as human rationality: reasoning processes that embody content-independent formal theories, such as propositional logic, or reasoning processes that are well designed for solving important adaptive problems? Most theories of human reasoning have been based on content-independent formal rationality, whereas adaptive reasoning, ecological or evolutionary, has been little explored. We elaborate and test an evolutionary approach, Cosmides' social contract theory, using the Wason selection task. In the first part, we disentangle the theoretical concept of a “social contract” from that (...) of a “cheater-detection algorithm”. We demonstrate that the fact that a rule is perceived as a social contract — or a conditional permission or obligation, as Cheng and Holyoak proposed — is not sufficient to elicit Cosmides' striking results, which we replicated. The crucial issue is not semantic, but pragmatic: whether a person is cued into the perspective of a party who can be cheated. In the second part, we distinguish between social contracts with bilateral and unilateral cheating options. Perspective change in contracts with bilateral cheating options turns P & not-Q responses into not-P & Q responses. The results strongly support social contract theory, contradict availability theory, and cannot be accounted for by pragmatic reasoning schema theory, which lacks the pragmatic concepts of perspectives and cheating detection. (shrink)

The paper asks: are all tautologies true in a language with truth-value gaps? It answers that they are not. No tautology is false, of course, but not all are true. It also contends that not all contradictions are false in a language with truth-value gaps, though none are true.

Affective congruency effects in the evaluation task can be explained by either spreading of activation or response competition. Eliminating effects of response compatibility by using other tasks (semantic categorisation, naming task) typically also eliminates affective congruency effects. However, there is no need for processing the affective information of the stimuli in these tasks either, which could be necessary for an affectively mediated spreading of activation (Spruyt et al., 2007, 2009, 2012). We introduced a new task to further test this hypothesis. (...) The valent/neutral-categorisation task does not confound affective congruency with response compatibility, but still requires a processing of the stimuli's valence. No affective congruency effect was obtained with this task in two experiments, disfavouring a conditional spreading activation account. On the other hand, a significant priming effect was found for associated word pairs in Experiment 1, providing evidence for the sensitivity of the task to detect spreading activation processes. (shrink)

Bd. 1. A bis Kybernetik.--Bd. 2. Lamaismus bis Zweckmässigkeit.

Hegels _Wissenschaft der Logik_ stellt eine Revolution im philosophischen Denken dar, sie repräsentiert eine moderne und ungebrochen aktuelle Metaphysik. Hegel's _Science of Logic_ represents a revolution in philosophical thought, advancing a modern and still relevant metaphysics.

Describes the classicall law theory basics. Translaltion from German.

The idea underlying the Begriffsschrift account of identities was that the content of a sentence is a function of the things it is about. If so, then if an identity a=b is about the content of its contained terms and is true, then a=a and a=b have the same content. But they do not have the same content; so, Frege concluded, identities are not about the contents of their contained terms. The way Frege regarded the matter is that in an (...) identity the terms flanking the symbol for identity do not have their ordinary contents, but instead have themselves as their contents. In ?Uber Sinn und Bedeutung? Frege became convinced that if an identity a=bis about the signs aand b, then it expresses no proper knowledge. So, since it is evident that many such identities do express proper knowledge, Frege concluded that identities are not about their contained signs. So he became convinced that his Begriffsschrift account was incorrect. What was the error in the argument that led Frege to that account? It was thinking that the content of a sentence is a function of the contents of its constituent signs, that is, the things it is about. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag analysiert auf der Basis theoretischer Überlegungen sowie empirischer Ergebnisse Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer „interkulturellen Öffnung“ von Sportvereinen, worunter Strukturanpassungen verstanden werden, die auf die Inklusion und Integration von Personen mit Migrationshintergrund zielen. Es wird gezeigt, inwiefern eine nachhaltige interkulturelle Öffnung der Vereine von der programmatischen Anbindung an den Vereinszweck, von der kontinuierlichen Behandlung in den Kommunikationswegen, von spezifischen Personalentscheidungen und der Kompatibilität mit der Organisationskultur abhängig ist.

The goal of this paper is to propose a unified approach to the split scope readings of negative indefinites, comparative quantifiers, and numerals. There are two main observations that justify this approach. First, split scope shows the same kinds of restrictions across these different quantifiers. Second, split scope always involves low existential force. In our approach, following Sauerland, natural language determiner quantifiers are quantifiers over choice functions, of type <<,t>,t>. In split readings, the quantifier over choice functions scopes above other (...) operators (such as intensional verbs like must or can). Determiner quantifiers leave a choice-function trace when they move and this trace combines with the noun restriction, which is interpreted low. That split scope always involves low existential force is derived, without stipulation, from Kratzer’s idea that low existential force can be achieved via binding (into the noun restriction). (shrink)

We here establish two theorems which refute a pair of what we believe to be plausible assumptions about differences between objectual and substitutional quantification. The assumptions (roughly stated) are as follows: (1) there is at least one set d and denumerable first order language L such that d is the domain set of no interpretation of L in which objectual and substitutional quantification coincide. (2) There exist interpreted, denumerable, first order languages K with indenumerable domains such that substitutional quantification deviates (...) from objectual quantification in K and this deviance remains for all name extensions I of K. We show these assumptions have actually been made, and then prove the refuting theorems. (shrink)

Emotion is conceptualised as an emergent, dynamic process based on an individual's subjective appraisal of significant events. It is argued that theoretical models of emotion need to propose an architecture that reflects the essential nature and functions of emotion as a psychobiological and cultural adaptation mechanism. One proposal for such a model and its underlying dynamic architecture, the component process model, is briefly sketched and compared with some of its major competitors. Recent empirical evidence in support of the model is (...) reviewed. Special emphasis is given to the dynamic aspect of emotion processes, in particular the sequence of appraisal checks and the synchronisation of response systems, as well as the capacity of the model to predict individual differences in emotional responding. (shrink)

It may be that all that matters for the modalities, possibility and necessity, is the object named by the proper name, not which proper name names it. An influential defender of this view is Saul Kripke. Kripke’s defense is criticized in the paper.

Here we give a semantical account of propositional quantification that is intended to formally represent Russell’s view that one cannot express a proposition about "all" propositions. According to the account the authors give, Russell’s view bears an interesting relation to the view that there are no sets which are members of themselves.

A common assumption among philosophers is that every language has at most denumerably many expressions. This assumption plays a prominent role in many philosophical arguments. Recently formal systems with indenumerably many elements have been developed. These systems are similar to the more familiar denumerable first-order languages. This similarity makes it appear that the assumption is false. We argue that the assumption is true.

An account of the logic of bivalent languages with truth-value gaps is given. This account is keyed to the use of tables introduced by S. C. Kleene. The account has two guiding ideas. First, that the bivalence property insures that the language satisfies classical logic. Second, that the general concepts of a valid sentence and an inconsistent sentence are, respectively, as sentences which are not false in any model and sentences which are not true in any model. What recommends this (...) approach is (1) its relative simplicity, and (2) the fact that it leaves the fundamental features of classical logic intact. (shrink)

Anderson and Belnap devise a model theory for entailment on which propositional identity equals proposional coentailment. This feature can be reasonably questioned. The authors devise two extensions of Anderson and Belnap’s model theory. Both systems preserve Anderson and Belnap’s results for entailment, but distinguish coentailment from identity.

The standard response is illustrated by E, J. Lemmon's claim that if all objects in a given universe had names and there were only finitely many of them, then we could always replace a universal proposition about that universe by a complex proposition. It is because these two requirements are not always met that we need universal quantification. This paper is partly in agreement with Lemmon and partly in disagreement. From the point of view of syntax and semantics we can (...) replace a universal proposition about any universe (finite or infinite, countable or uncountable) by a complex proposition (= sentence built up from atomic sentences and the connectives). But from the point of view of communication such a replacement is not possible if the universe is infinite. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a nondenotational semantics for first-order languages which will match one for one each distribution of truth-values available in terms of a denotational semantics.

A doctrine that occurs intermittently in Quine’s work is that there is no extra-theoretic truth. This paper explores this doctrine, and argues that on its best interpretation it is inconsistent with three views Quine also accepts: bivalence, mathematical Platonism, and the disquotational account of truth.

A strong and weak version of the redundancy theory of truth are distinguished. An argument put forth by Michael Dummett concludes that the weak version is vitiated by truth-value gaps. The weak version is defended against this argument. The strong version, however, is vitiated by truth-value gaps.

BackgroundFrontal brain dysfunction is a major challenge in neurorehabilitation. Neurofeedback (NF), as an EEG-based brain training method, is currently applied in a wide spectrum of mental health conditions, including traumatic brain injury.ObjectiveThis study aimed to explore the capacity of Infra-Low Frequency Neurofeedback (ILF-NF) to promote the recovery of brain function in patients with frontal brain injury.Materials and methodsTwenty patients hospitalized at a neurorehabilitation clinic in Switzerland with recently acquired, frontal and optionally other brain lesions were randomized to either receive NF (...) or sham-NF. Cognitive improvement was assessed using the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB) and the Test of Attentional Performance (TAP) tasks regarding intrinsic alertness, phasic alertness and impulse control.ResultsWith respect to cognitive improvements, there was no significant difference between the two groups after 20 sessions of either NF or sham-NF. However, in a subgroup of patients with predominantly frontal brain lesions, the improvements measured by the FAB and intrinsic alertness were significantly higher in the NF-group.ConclusionThis is the first double-blind controlled study using NF in recovery from brain injury, and thus also the first such study of ILF NF. Although the result of the subgroup has limited significance because of the small number of participants, it accentuates the trend seen in the whole group regarding the FAB and intrinsic alertness (p = 0.068, p = 0.079, respectively). We therefore conclude that NF could be a promising candidate promoting the recoveryfrom frontal brain lesions. Further studies with larger numbers of patients and less lesion heterogeneity are needed to verify the usefulness of NF in the neurorehabilitation of patients with frontal brain injury (NCT02957695 ClinicalTrials.gov). (shrink)

We contribute to the empirical debate on whether we understand and predict mental states by using simulation (simulation theory) or by relying on a folk psychological theory (theory theory). To decide between these two fundamental positions, it has been argued that failure to predict other people’s choices would be challenging evidence against the simulation view. We test the specific claim that people prefer the rightmost position in choosing among equally valued objects, and whether or not this position bias can be (...) correctly predicted. A series of experiments shows that the bias appears only in a specific spatial arrangement and that it can be correctly predicted given adequate imaginative input. In concert with other recent findings on the correct prediction of choices these findings do actually strengthen, rather than challenge, the simulation account on the prediction of mental states. (shrink)

Despite the recognized importance of bodily movements in spatial audition, few studies have integrated action-based protocols with spatial hearing in the peripersonal space. Recent work shows that tactile feedback and active exploration allow participants to improve performance in auditory distance perception tasks. However, the role of the different aspects involved in the learning phase, such as voluntary control of movement, proprioceptive cues, and the possibility of self-correcting errors, is still unclear. We study the effect of guided reaching exploration on perceptual (...) learning of auditory distance in peripersonal space. We implemented a pretest-posttest experimental design in which blindfolded participants must reach for a sound source located in this region. They were divided into three groups that were differentiated by the intermediate training phase: Guided, an experimenter guides the participant’s arm to contact the sound source; Active, the participant freely explores the space until contacting the source; and Control, without tactile feedback. The effects of exploration feedback on auditory distance perception in the peripersonal space are heterogeneous. Both the Guided and Active groups change their performance. However, participants in the Guided group tended to overestimate distances more than those in the Active group. The response error of the Guided group corresponds to a generalized calibration criterion over the entire range of reachable distances. Whereas the Active group made different adjustments for proximal and distal positions. The results suggest that guided exploration can induce changes on the boundary of the auditory reachable space. We postulate that aspects of agency such as initiation, control, and monitoring of movement, assume different degrees of involvement in both guided and active tasks, reinforcing a non-binary approach to the question of activity-passivity in perceptual learning and supporting a complex view of the phenomena involved in action-based learning. (shrink)

I show that in his De motu animalium Aristoteles proposes a teleology of the practical on the most general zoological level, i.e. on the level common to humans and self-moving animals. A teleology of the practical is a teleological account of the highest practical goals of animal and human self-motion. I argue that Aristotle conceives of such highest practical goals as goals that are contingently related to their realizations. Animal and human self-motion is the kind of action in which certain (...) state of affairs that realize values are mechanized. (shrink)

How do animals make themselves move? Unlike most modern theories, Aristotle answers this question through a general theory of animal movement valid for both humans and animals. This book interprets this theory and analyses its fundamental concepts.

Plato's depiction of the world soul's cognitive activity in Timaeus 37 A 2‐C 5 offers a general account of intellectual cognition. He gives this account by describing the activity of an ideal cognitive agent, involving the very same comparative mechanism that governs human intellectual activity, namely, the active production of a propositional grasp of sameness and difference that things have in relation to each other in several respects. Plato depicts the world soul's intellectual activity as entirely devoid of immediate forms (...) of cognition such as perception and/or intellectual intuition: everything the world soul cognizes is the outcome of its active comparison of things with each other. In particular, there is no direct cognitive grasp of the being of things. The paper ends with a suggestion as to how to understand Plato's account of the world soul's activity as an instance of the ‘like is known by like’ principle of cognition. (shrink)