The Gödel translation provides an embedding of the intuitionistic logic$\mathsf {IPC}$into the modal logic$\mathsf {Grz}$, which then embeds into the modal logic$\mathsf {GL}$via the splitting translation. Combined with Solovay’s theorem that$\mathsf {GL}$is the modal logic of the provability predicate of Peano Arithmetic$\mathsf {PA}$, both$\mathsf {IPC}$and$\mathsf {Grz}$admit provability interpretations. When attempting to ‘lift’ these results to the monadic extensions$\mathsf {MIPC}$,$\mathsf {MGrz}$, and$\mathsf {MGL}$of these logics, the same techniques no longer work. Following a conjecture made by Esakia, we add an appropriate version (...) of Casari’s formula to these monadic extensions (denoted by a ‘+’), obtaining that the Gödel translation embeds$\mathsf {M^{+}IPC}$into$\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$and the splitting translation embeds$\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$into$\mathsf {MGL}$. As proven by Japaridze, Solovay’s result extends to the monadic system$\mathsf {MGL}$, which leads us to a provability interpretation of both$\mathsf {M^{+}IPC}$and$\mathsf {M^{+}Grz}$. (shrink)

Much recent work in philosophy of memory discusses the question whether episodic remembering is continuous with imagining. This paper contributes to the debate between continuists and discontinuists by considering a previously neglected source of evidence for continuism: the linguistic properties of overt memory and imagination reports (e.g. sentences of the form ‘x remembers/imagines p’). I argue that the distribution and truth-conditional contribution of episodic uses of the English verb 'remember' is surprisingly similar to that of the verb 'imagine'. This holds (...) despite the presence of some remarkable truth-conditional differences between 'remember' and 'imagine'. I show how these differences can be explained by a continuist account of remembering on which remembering is past-directed, referential, and accurate experiential imagining. (shrink)

In everyday life, there are many things we ought to do. Some are required by law, some perhaps by morality. But a considerable number of the things we ought to do are required neither by law nor by...

This paper distinguishes between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation and argues that the latter is required for self-consciousness. It is further argued that self-consciousness requires an awareness of other minds and that this awareness develops over the course of an increasingly complex perspectival differentiation, during which information about self and other that is implicit in early forms of social interaction becomes redescribed into an explicit format.

There is widespread agreement among both supporters and opponents that affirmative action either must not violate any principle of equal opportunity or procedural justice, or if it does, it may do so only given current extenuating circumstances. Many believe that affirmative action is morally problematic, only justified to the extent that it brings us closer to the time when we will no longer need it. In other words, those that support affirmative action believe it is acceptable in nonideal theory, but (...) not ideal theory. This paper argues that affirmative action is entirely compatible with equal opportunity and procedural justice and would be even in an ideal world. I defend a new analysis of Rawlsian procedural justice according to which it is permissible to interfere in the outcomes of procedures, and thus I show that affirmative action is not morally problematic in the way that many have supposed. (shrink)

Saul Goodman, Slipping Jimmy, Charlie Hustle, Gene Takavic, Viktor Saint Claire, and many others — all seem to be aliases of one James McGill. The characterization question, from the point of view of the metaphysics of identity, is trying to answer what determines personal identity. The notion of persistence describes necessary and sufficient conditions for a person to continue or cease to exist as a person. The practical importance of persistence includes both responsibility for a person's actions and the fact (...) that identity matters practically because of a person's selfish care about his or her own future. From a Better Call Saul perspective, we are combining metaphysical issues of identity — that pinpoint what it takes for someone to remain the same person — with the pendulum of various James McGill personae. -/- James McGill does seem to have both biological and psychological continuity while shifting from one character to another, but we will argue that psychological continuity is only relevant at the lowest level and that the narrativist account seems to better explain different Jimmy personae. Narrativism answers the persistence question by stating that we are persisting as the same person because of the stories we tell about ourselves, which influence our lives and our decisions. Identity is being constituted at a narrative level, that is — Jimmy is his (current) story, determining when he begins and ends. In this paper, by analyzing character development throughout the series, we are trying to show that James McGill may not always be equated with his aliases because of different spatial and temporal narratives, which also could open various ethical implications of responsibility for past actions. (shrink)

This paper inquiries into the complex issue of informed consent applying artificial intelligence in medical diagnostic consultations. The aim is to expose the main ethical and legal concerns of the New Health phenomenon, powered by intelligent machines. To achieve this objective, the first part of the paper analyzes ethical aspects of the alleged right to explanation, privacy, and informed consent, applying artificial intelligence in medical diagnostic consultations. This analysis is followed by a legal analysis of the limits and requirements for (...) the explainability of artificial intelligence. Followed by this analysis, recommendations for action are given in the concluding remarks of the paper. (shrink)

Current education paradigms were informed by the classical Newtonian worldview of brain functioning in which the mind is simply the physical activity of the brain, and our thoughts cannot have any effect upon the physical world. However, researchers in the field of quantum mechanics found that the outcomes of certain subatomic experiments are determined by the consciousness of the observer, leading philosophers to propose that the observed and the observer are linked. Quantum mechanics also demonstrates that distant minds may behave (...) in simultaneous correlational ways, in the absence of being linked through any known energetic signal. Further, researchers in this field propose that an external memory space is operating in the human brain, suggesting that this proposed external memory space may be a quantum field surrounding the brain and interacting with other fields, generating a global mental field of information flow. This article proposes that current education paradigms, which have been informed by a classical Newtonian physics worldview may need to be expanded to include a quantum mechanics worldview. The author seeks to understand if, and how, quantum mechanics could inform education practices, theories and paradigms and invites discussion, debate and speculation on the implications this would have for education systems. (shrink)

Mind wandering is typically operationalized as task-unrelated thought. Some argue for the need to distinguish between unintentional and intentional mind wandering, where an agent voluntarily shifts attention from task-related to task-unrelated thoughts. We reveal an inconsistency between the standard, task-unrelated thought definition of mind wandering and the occurrence of intentional mind wandering (together with plausible assumptions about tasks and intentions). This suggests that either the standard definition of mind wandering should be rejected or that intentional mind wandering is an incoherent (...) category. Solving this puzzle is critical for advancing theoretical frameworks of mind wandering. (shrink)

The social-philosophical discourse of the last 20 years pictured recognition mainly as medium of human autonomy. In recent years however, concerns have been raised over whether recognition might not occasionally work in the opposite direction, as means of subjection. This article contends that these concerns rely on a misconstruction of the relationship between recognition and subjection as merely contingent. Developing themes from Foucault’s work, it argues that recognition rather always necessarily involves a moment of subjection. In the first part, I (...) show that Foucault, especially in his power-analytic writings, can plausibly be read as theorist of recognition insofar as every relation of power presupposes the recognition of the other as free. In the second part, I elaborate that every concrete relation of power depends on conditions - knowledge and norms - that precede it and that are formed and transformed in complex historical processes, in which the authority of individual subjects is always only a limited one. Against this background, it will become visible that recognition indeed allows us to conduct ourselves autonomously as certain kinds of subjects according to certain norms but as such also always subjects us as it ties our freedom to conditions that we remain largely exposed to. (shrink)

In this article, we give an overview over both past and present as well as possible future debates around recognition in and in connection with feminist thought. In principle, recognition can involve persons, collectives, and institutions, but here we are primarily concerned with the recognition of persons by other persons. In the first section, we start with a discussion of care as a form of recognition and the recognition of care work. In the second section, we turn to critiques of (...) recognition in feminist thought. In the third section, we outline a new field of research that should be of interest to both feminist and recognition theorists, namely our credibility economy. Since there is a separate article on Judith Butler and queer feminism in this handbook, we exclude their contributions from our discussion here. (shrink)

This volume congregates articles of leading philosophers about potentials and potentiality in all areas of philosophy and the empirical sciences in which they play a relevant role. It is the first encompassing collection of articles on the metaphysics of potentials and potentiality.

Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 67-69.

Ethical issues around triage have been at the forefront of debates during the Covid‐19 pandemic. This essay compares both discussion and guidelines around triage and the reality of what happened in the United States and in Europe, both in anticipation of and during the first wave of the pandemic. Why did the issue generate so many vivid debates in the United States and so few in most European countries, although the latter were also affected by the rationing of health care (...) resources? Are countries with socialized health care systems better equipped to face the hard choices of triaging? Important lessons in transparency, trust, and accountability for policy‐makers can be drawn from this comparison, demonstrating that fostering public involvement and ethical debate remains a critical element for the sustained acceptance of any triage plan. (shrink)

Judith Butler is often referred to as a thinker who disputes the positive view of recognition shared by many social and political philosophers today and advances a more "ambivalent" account of recognition. While I agree with this general characterization of Butler’s account, I think that it is not yet adequately understood what precisely makes recognition ambivalent for Butler. Usually, Butler is read as providing an ethical critique of recognition. According to this reading, Butler believes that it is important for persons (...) to be recognized but that recognition is at the same time experienced as oppressive and hence is ethically ambivalent. Against this reading, I advance the view that Butler does not develop an ethical critique but rather an ideology critique of recognition. What makes recognition ambivalent for Butler is, as I will argue, that it can serve social functions behind the backs of the participants and be implicated in the reproduction of problematic social orders. I elaborate this argument by drawing on Butler’s analyses of the violent exclusion of genders that are not unambiguously male or female from the social realm, which, on my reading, is directly connected to the recognition of persons as male or female in everyday life. (shrink)

In today’s pandemic, many countries have experienced shortages of medical resources and many healthcare providers have often been faced with dramatic decisions about how to allocate beds, intensive care, or ventilators. Despite recognizing the need for triage, responses are not the same everywhere, and opinions and practices differ around what guidelines should be used, how they should be implemented, and who should ultimately decide. To some extent, triage issues reflect community values, revealing a given society’s moral standards and ideals. Our (...) goal is to study two countries which share many common features—Italy and France—as they deal with the pandemic, revealing the moral organization of medicine and healthcare, the power structures, and the nature of the disruptions in each context. (shrink)

In todays’ super-diverse societies, communication and interaction in clinical encounters are increasingly shaped by linguistic, cultural, social and ethnic complexities. It is crucial to better understand the difficulties patients with migration background and healthcare professionals experience in their shared clinical encounters and to explore ethical aspects involved. We accompanied 32 migrant patients during their medical encounters at two outpatient clinics using an ethnographic approach. Overall, data of 34 interviews with patients and physicians on how they perceived their encounter and which (...) difficulties they experienced are presented. We contrasted the perspectives on the difficult aspects and explore ethical questions surrounding the involved issues. Patients and physicians describe similar problem areas, but they have diverging perspectives on them. Two main themes were identified by both patients and physicians: >patients’ behaviour in relation to doctors’ advice relationship issues<. A deeper understanding of the difficulties and challenges that can arise in cross-cultural settings could be provided by bringing together healthcare professionals’ and patients’ perspectives on how a cross- cultural clinical encounter is perceived. Ethical aspects surrounding some of the difficulties could be highlighted and should get more attention in clinical practice and research. (shrink)

This chapter treats Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skilled coping as part of his wider project of demonstrating the sovereignty of practical intelligence over all other forms of intelligence. In contrast to the standard picture of human beings as essentially rational, individual agents, Dreyfus argued powerfully on phenomenological and empirical grounds that humans are fundamentally embedded, absorbed, and embodied. These commitments are present throughout Dreyfus’ philosophical writings, from his critique of Artificial Intelligence research in the 1970s and 1980s to his rejection (...) of John McDowell’s conceptualism in his 2005 APA Presidential Address. The present chapter articulates Dreyfus’ proposal for a contentless, non-mentalistic form of intentionality by contrasting his position with that of his U.C. Berkeley colleague John Searle and defending it as a plausible alternative to the so-called “Standard Story” of intentional action as the effect of an agent’s mental states. (shrink)

In this book, Kristina Musholt offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. Traditionally, self-consciousness has been central to many philosophical theories. More recently, it has become the focus of empirical investigation in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt draws both on philosophical considerations and on insights from the empirical sciences to offer a new account of self-consciousness—the ability to think about ourselves that is at the core of what makes us human. -/- Examining theories (...) of nonconceptual content developed in recent work in the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a model for the gradual transition from self-related information implicit in the nonconceptual content of perception and other forms of experience to the explicit representation of the self in conceptual thought. A crucial part of this model is an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and awareness of others, Musholt argues, are two sides of the same coin. -/- After surveying the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, the notion of nonconceptual content, and various proposals for the existence of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist theory, according to which the self is not part of the representational content of perception and bodily awareness but part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes between implicitly self-related information and explicit self-representation, and describes the transitions from the former to the latter as arising from a complex process of self–other differentiation. By this account, both self-consciousness and intersubjectivity develop in parallel. (shrink)

Corpus surveys have shown that the exact forms with which idioms are realized are subject to variation. We report a rating experiment showing that such alternative realizations have varying degrees of acceptability. Idiom variation challenges processing theories associating idioms with fixed multi-word form units, fixed configurations of words, or fixed superlemmas, as they do not explain how it can be that speakers produce variant forms that listeners can still make sense of. A computational model simulating comprehension with naive discriminative learning (...) is introduced that provides an explanation for the different degrees of acceptability of several idiom variant types. Implications for multi-word units in general are discussed. (shrink)

The imminent deployment of autonomous vehicles requires algorithms capable of making moral decisions in relevant traffic situations. Some scholars in the ethics of autonomous vehicles hope to align such intelligent systems with human moral judgment. For this purpose, studies like the Moral Machine Experiment have collected data about human decision-making in trolley-like traffic dilemmas. This paper first argues that the trolley dilemma is an inadequate experimental paradigm for investigating traffic moral judgments because it does not include agents’ character-based considerations and (...) is incapable of facilitating the investigation of low-stakes mundane traffic scenarios. In light of the limitations of the trolley paradigm, this paper presents an alternative experimental framework that addresses these issues. The proposed solution combines the creation of mundane traffic moral scenarios using virtual reality and the Agent-Deed-Consequences (ADC) model of moral judgment as a moral-psychological framework. This paradigm shift potentially increases the ecological validity of future studies by providing more realism and incorporating character considerations into traffic actions. (shrink)

Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values (...) are properly understood to be extrinsic epistemic values, that is, values that promote the attainment of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.

This paper critically discusses role functionalism about color and suggests that it is not such a sui generis position as it is often considered to be. The discussionfocuses upon one, hopefully, central point. The main proponent of the idea of role functionalism is Jonathan Cohen who in his book The Red and the Real (2009)suggests a Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. Namely, his proposal implies that color ontology should be divided into relationalist and non-relationalist accounts. Generally, he endorses (...) the relationalist theory of color which roughly claims that colors are constituted in terms of some relation between objects and subjects (inter alia). Specifically, Cohen defends Role Functionalism as the best version of relationalism according to which the relations that constitute colors are functional relations. Based on his role functionalist stance, he distances himself from dispositionalists. However, in this paper I show that he could be interpreted as one and therefore needs to reconsider his Refined Taxonomy of positions on color ontology. (shrink)

This collection of essays offers twelve innovative approaches to contemporary literary criticism. The contributors, women scholars who range from undergraduate students to contingent faculty to endowed chairs, stage a critical dialogue that raises vital questions about the aims and forms of criticism- its discourses and politics, as well as the personal, institutional, and economic conditions of its production. Offering compelling feminist and queer readings of avant-garde twentieth- and twenty-first-century texts, the essays included here are playful, performative, and theoretically savvy. Written (...) for students, scholars, and professors in literature and creative writing, Reading and Writing Experimental Texts provides examples for doing literary scholarship in innovative ways. These provocative readings invite conversation and community, reminding us that if the stakes of critical innovation are high, so are the pleasures. (shrink)

This paper argues that while regulatory frameworks in aged care authorise restraints to protect vulnerable persons living with dementia from harm, they also serve as normalising practices to control challenging monstrous Others. This argument emerges out of an observed unease in aged care discourse where older people living with dementia are described as ‘vulnerable’, while dementia behaviours are described as ‘challenging’. Using narrative analysis on a case study from the Final Report of the Australian Royal Commission into Aged Care Quality (...) and Safety (RCAC), this paper investigates how the RCAC (re)produced constructions of persons with dementia as ‘vulnerable monsters’. Drawing upon monstrous theory about ‘unruly and leaky’ bodies, extracts from the case study reveal how the RCAC repeated and reinforced monstrous constructions of dementia. Dementia behaviours, particularly ‘wandering’, were constructed through a dehumanising crisis frame that produced ‘challenging’ bodies and legitimised ‘last resort’ normalising practices, such as physical and chemical restraints. In failing to resist monstrous constructions of dementia behaviours, the RCAC accepted and authorised a regime of scaled responses leading to restrictive practices for control of challenging bodies in aged care. Although dementia care and restrictive practices received substantial attention in the RCAC, this paper reveals a missed opportunity for deeper review of institutionalised use of restraints that has relevance for ongoing reform of Australian aged care following conclusion of the RCAC. (shrink)

This research replicates Bhattacharjee et al. :1167–1184, 2013) moral decoupling model and extends the original along the dimensions of theory, method, and context. Adopting a branding perspective and focusing on the corporate domain rather than the public figures investigated by Bhattacharjee and colleagues, this research examines the proposition that consumers dissociate judgments of morality from judgments of performance to justify purchasing from companies deemed to act immorally. The original study is further extended by applying the model in a different cultural (...) context and employing a more realistic stimulus to establish external and ecological validity. The results of the replication generally support the original findings, in particular, under conditions of higher product involvement, a theoretical extension. (shrink)

This article gives an overview of 4 important lacunae in political liberalism and identifies, in a preliminary fashion, some trends in the literature that can come in for support in filling these blind spots, which prevent political liberalism from a correct assessment of the diverse nature of religious claims. Political liberalism operates with implicit assumptions about religious actors being either ‘liberal’ or ‘fundamentalist’ and ignores a third, in-between group, namely traditionalist religious actors and their claims. After having explained what makes (...) traditionalist religious actors different from liberal and fundamentalist religious actors, the author develops 4 areas in which political liberalism should be pushed further theoretically in order to correctly theorize the challenge which traditional religious actors pose to liberal democracy. These 4 areas are: the context of translation; the politics of exemptions; the multivocality of theology; and the transnational nature of norm-contestation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this article I examine Axel Honneth’s positive theory of recognition. While commentators agree that Honneth’s theory qualifies as a positive theory of recognition, I believe that the deeper reason for why this is an apt characterisation is not yet fully understood. I argue that, instead of considering only what it is to recognise another person and what it means for a person to be recognised, we need to focus our attention on how Honneth pictures the practice of recognition as (...) a whole, which according to him works to make societies into places of greater freedom. This conception of recognition as a freedom-enhancing practice is supposed to provide a solution to a key problem of Frankfurt School critical theory, namely of how to determine the emancipatory practice in which critical theory is rooted, which becomes apparent as soon as one turns to the context in which Honneth originally develops his theory of recognition. At the end of the article, I offer a few reasons for doubting the overly positive picture of the practice of recognition that Honneth provides us with. (shrink)

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um Kritik und spezifischer um verschiedene Begründungsformen der kritischen Theorie spielt die kritische Theorie der Anerkennung, wie sie von Axel Honneth über die letzten 25 Jahre entwickelt worden ist, eine zentrale Rolle. Diese Theorie soll im vorliegenden Beitrag vorgestellt werden. Um den Aufbau und die Funktionsweise dieser Theorie richtig zu verstehen, ist es unabdingbar, sich zunächst zu vergegenwärtigen, wie sich Honneth in der Tradition der kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie positioniert, also innerhalb jenes Theorieprojekts, das seine Wurzeln bei Hegel (...) und Marx findet und durch Horkheimer in den 1930er Jahren Programm geworden ist. Nach der Lesart, die ich vertreten möchte, entwickelt Honneth seine Anerkennungstheorie vor dem Hintergrund eines wahrgenommenen Scheiterns der ersten und zweiten Generation der Frankfurter Schule an der methodischen Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, die für das Projekt einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie definierend ist. Beides – die methodische Anforderung einer immanenten Kritik, wie sie Honneth begreift, und das Scheitern, das Honneth bei Horkheimer, Adorno und Habermas wahrnimmt – wird Gegenstand des ersten Teils (1) dieses Beitrags sein. „Anerkennung“ wird von Honneth als der Begriff eingeführt, mit dem das Kernproblem einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie gelöst werden soll. Mit dem Begriff der Anerkennung soll es nämlich, wie wir im zweiten Teil (2) eingehender nachvollziehen werden, möglich sein, Zugang zu konkreten Ansprüchen auf Befreiung zu finden, die von der Gesellschaft geschaffen und zugleich verletzt werden. In einer Diskussion ideologischer Anerkennung werde ich zuletzt (3) mögliche Grenzen der kritischen Theorie der Anerkennung Honneths aufzeigen, die sich unmittelbar aus dem Erbe der Frankfurter Schule, wie Honneth es begreift, ergeben. (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition has recently been criticised on the grounds that it conceives of the relationship between recognition and power in terms of an opposition. According to Honneth’s critics, this is too simple because recognition and power are often intertwined. My aim in this article is twofold: On the one hand, I seek to understand why Honneth conceives of recognition and power as opposed. As I will argue, this is not the result of bad theorising; rather, there are (...) important methodological considerations that account for this conception – specifically, the idea that one can develop an immanent critique of power in line with the tradition of the Frankfurt School only by adopting the participant perspective. On the other hand, I agree with the gist of what Honneth’s critics say and want to make a systematic proposal as to why opposing recognition and power is too simple. This proposal will build on the argument developed in the first part and will consist in the claim that to treat recognition and power as opposed is to consider recognition relations exclusively from the participant perspective in contrast to the observer perspective. As a result, the potential entanglement of recognition with problematic social arrangements cannot come into view. (shrink)

Workplace learning and competence development in work are frequently used concepts. A wide spread notion is that societal, institutional, and organizational changes require the development of knowledge, methods and strategies for learning at workplaces, in both public and private enterprises. In research on learning and competence development at work, the organizational learning and development as well as individual accomplishments are investigated from various perspectives and in different contexts. The theoretical base for research projects can, accordingly, be focused at a number (...) of organizational and system levels. This paper describes a research project called "Workplace development and learning in elder care" in which learning and knowledge were key issues and where Activity Theory was used as the theoretical base. The project was joint project between two research and development field units. These were UFFE, a municipal social services’ field research unit, and Äldrecentrum Västerbotten, a county council field research unit which aims to serve the interests of the elderly. The project was launched in the fall of 2000 and ended in the summer of 2003. I was employed part-time as a research leader at the municipal research unit and became the research leader for this particular project. A number of students, as well as employees from the county council geriatric care services and the municipal elder care participated in the project. The general aims of the project were to: a) investigate the prerequisites for development and learning; b) test and evaluate interventions at a workgroup level; and c) identify the need for new knowledge. The results were expected to be useful for the field research units as well as for the municipal and county eldercare services in their research and development work. I start with a presentation of the theoretical concepts and apply them in order to form a tentative hypothesis on the status of learning and knowledge in elder care. The next section contains a short description of the different parts of the project and the main results are presented. Finally, the results are discussed and related to the conditions and impact of workplace interventions. (shrink)

Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as (...) better than others, the situated knowledge thesis seems to undermine this assumption by suggesting that all knowledge is partial. I argue that a contextualist theory of epistemic justification provides a solution to the bias paradox. Moreover, contextualism enables me to give empirical content to the thesis of epistemic privilege, thereby making it into a testable hypothesis. (shrink)

Šiuo metu vykstančio fenomenologinės psichopatologijos atsinaujinimo kontekste straipsnyje pristatoma viena esminių fenomenologinės psichopatologijos prielaidų – poreikis prasmingai inkorporuoti su patologija susidūrusio subjekto potyrius į jo gyvenimo naratyvą. Aptariama, kaip psichozei progresuojant subjektas palaipsniui praranda agentiškumą savo dėmesio bei prasmių kūrimo atžvilgiu. Pasitelkiant W. Gombrowicziaus romaną Kosmosas rekonstruojamas aktyviosios psichozės stadijos epizodas – subjekto dėmesį ir prasmę struktūruojantys centrai įsisteigia tarytum nepriklausomai nuo jo, jų pagrindu besikuriantiems kliedesiams plečiantis tampa vis sunkiau išlaikyti ryšį su supančiu pasauliu. Naratyvo kūrimas tokioje situacijoje pasirodo (...) kaip savigydos pastanga – mėginimas pakitusio patyrimo epizodus prasmingai inkorporuoti atgal į savo agentiškumo sritį. Dėl šios priežasties pabrėžiama, kad psichoterapijoje svarbu ne mėginti pakeisti subjekto naratyvą racionalizuotu terapeuto kuriamu naratyvu, o įtraukti subjektą į kooperatyvų dialogą apie asmeninę jo potyrių prasmę. (shrink)