This paper is concerned with the question: ‘Did Philo in Hume’s Dialogues succeed in undermining Cleanthes’ argument from design?’ Hume’s commentators have differed on their answers. Norman Kemp Smith speaks of Philo’s destructive criticism as “final and complete.” And Professor Bernard Williams, in a recent symposium devoted to Hume, says that “although the argument from Design lingered on through the nineteenth century, and even to the present time, Hume undermined it in a thoroughgoing and definitive manner.” Professor Alvin Plantinga, on (...) the other hand, while conceding that Hume had succeeded in pointing out differences between the universe and things we know to be designed, nevertheless concludes that “there seems to be no reason to think that these differences ruin the argument.”. (shrink)

In a recent paper T. D. J. Chappell advances the thesis that orthodox Christianity is incompatible with consequentialism. 1 His thesis is grounded on a number of premises; I shall, however, confine my criticism to only one of them, i.e. a consequentialist God could not possibly have created a world. Here is his argument.

Recently there have been in the journals a large number of papers on miracles. The issue debated centred on whether miracles, as violations of natural law by a deity, are possible. Alstair McKinnon, George D. Chryssides and P. S. Wadia contend that the concept of a violation of natural law is defective. Others like Guy Robinson and Malcolm Diamonds claim that the acceptance of miracles constitutes a challenge to scientific autonomy. There have also been defenders of miracles, to name just (...) a few: R. F. Holland, Richard Swinburne and R. C. Wallace. What is, however, overlooked in these polemical discussions is whether theist religions require miracles, and if they do, whether the concept of a miracle required is that of a violation of a law of nature by God. In the present paper I shall argue for an affirmative response to both questions. (shrink)

IN THE PAPER THERE IS AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH THE FOLLOWING THREE PROPOSITIONS: (1) THE CONCEPT OF MIRACLE IS NOT DEFECTIVE; (2) MIRACLES ARE NOT OBSTACLES TO SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS; (3) THE BEST EXPLANATION FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF CERTAIN RADICAL ANOMALOUS EVENTS IS THAT THE AGENCY OF A SUPERNATURAL BEING WAS PART OF THEIR CAUSE. THE ARGUMENT IS NOT INTENDED TO PROVE GOD’S EXISTENCE FROM MIRACLES, BUT ONLY THAT THERE ARE NO "A PRIORI" OBSTACLES TO SUCH A PROOF. THERE COULD BE (...) AMPLE HISTORICAL DOCUMENTATION OR ARCHAEOLOGICAL TRACES TO WARRANT AN INFERENCE THAT MIRACLES HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND THUS PROVING THEISM. (shrink)

Recently there have been a number of attempts at showing that God's attributes are conceptually defective . Foremost among the attributes singled out for criticism is omnipotence. But critics have also questioned the logical compatibility of omniscience and immutability and also omnipotence and omniscience.