In this paper, I provide an interpretation of the symploke ton eidon at Soph. 259e. My goal is to show that the specific metaphysical view expressed by the interweaving of forms best accounts for Plato’s explanation of truth and falsehood. In the first section, I introduce the fundamentals of the interpretation of the greatest kinds and their functions. After that, I propose an interpretation of the assertion at 259e, the upshot of which is that the interweaving of forms only deals (...) with extra-linguistic items, that it is related to both truth and meaning of linguistic items, in a very complex way which I aim to explain throughout the paper, and that it never involves sensible particulars. In the second section, I put forward my reading of the Stranger’s description of how logoi are structured and how they work. I pay particular attention to the view that words reveal being when they intertwine to form a statement. In the third section, I interpret the statements concerning Theaetetus. My goal is to advance a new reading of the specific role that kinds and their interweaving play with regard to the truth and falsehood of the statements concerning Theaetetus. The result is the very specific view that the kinds, which are the separated ontological cause of what happens in space and time, are the grounds of both the truth and the meaning of statements. (shrink)

In this essay, I analyse Timaeus’ prescription at 37e3–38b3 on how to use some tensed and tenseless phrases, with particular regard to the verb “be”. I provide an interpretation of (i) what the meaning of the εἴδη (forms or aspects) of time is, and (ii) some epistemological and semantical implications of the tenseless use of “is”. Then, I connect this passage to two famous sections of Timaeus’ proemium, namely the distinction between being and becoming (28a1–4), and the statement that λόγοι (...) are interpreters (ἐξηγῆται) and kin of (συγγενεῖς) what they speak about (29b2–c3). I show that the connection between the two parts of the dialogue is actually quite close and that they illuminate each other. My main interpretive proposal is that the relation between λόγοι and the temporal or atemporal status of their objects is so strict that not only does it affect their epistemic status but also their form. (shrink)

I analyse Theaet. 200e-201c. I hold that this passage provides specific insights into: first, the nature of sensible things and events; second, the nature of knowledge. I show that the text should be taken as an analogy, which means that Plato does not consider eye-witnessing to be a case of knowledge. Finally, I consider the relation between the trial analogy and the dialogue as a whole.