We discuss how transgenerational communitarianism deals with public decisions involving tradeoffs between different generations’ wellbeing and having global consequences. Policies for tackling climate change are an example. Although there is a natural, evolutionary, basis for intergenerational altruism, most people lack the competencies for constituting a transgenerational community. Moreover, greater attention to future generations’ wellbeing need not substitute for collective action: a lower discount rate reflecting a stronger concern for future generations may even worsen their wellbeing. Finally, in a world of (...) irreducible value pluralism, there is no community of persons sharing moral values that can legitimize common policies for addressing global problems: only the common interest of avoiding destructive consequences may motivate collective action to face problems like climate change. (shrink)

1. Il fenomeno morale -- 2. L'uomo in relazione -- 3. La società e l'uomo.

The political legacy of classical German philosophy can contribute in a crucial way to the most recent developments of contemporary political thought, thereby also making sense of the contradictions underlying the social practices and institutional values of our societies. What justifies this perspective is, in the first place, the complexity of contemporaneity, which holds within itself a doubleness that can be understood in the light of the conceptual tools of classical German philosophy. On the one hand, contemporary societies seem to (...) be facing relentless crises in the modern idea of democracy, the political subject of the nation-state, and capitalist economic structures. On the other hand, there is an ever-increasing demand for rights and new forms of recognition, not to mention the emergence of grassroots movements that strive for greater political participation and generate new collective subjectivities. By radically questioning traditional philosophical categories, Kant, Fichte and Hegel provide a new and insightful understanding of the crucial challenges of modernity. They outline a conception of practical rationality and its multiple manifestations that is irreplaceable for philosophically understanding our contemporary world. (shrink)

I consider a problem for functional reductionism, based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On the one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a, then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus, we ask: how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are (...) the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension, by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description. (shrink)

The printed images in the frontispiece of modern philosophical books were not simply meant as decorations, but offered in remarkable cases a pictorial synthesis of the ideas expounded in the book. This is true not only of Bacon’s Instauratio magna, on the background of an explicit theoretical reflection on the use of fables and metaphors in the exposition of scientific truth, but also of Hobbes’ Leviathan, notwithstanding Hobbes’ own criticism of metaphorical language. One third impressive example is the “dipintura” of (...) Vico’s La Scienza Nuova, which is the object of a lengthy hermeneutical analysis by the author himself. The paper argues that the prominent importance of the image in these modern classics reflects the search for a more immediate connection between words and things, whose actuality is still debated in XXthcentury philosophy. (shrink)

Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics turn the usual Schrödinger equation into a stochastic dynamical law. In particular, in this paper, I will focus on the GRW theory. Two philosophical issues that can be raised about GRW concern (i) the ontology of the theory, in particular the nature of the wave function and its role within the theory, and (ii) the interpretation of the objective probabilities involved in the dynamics of the theory. During the last years, it has been claimed (...) that we can take advantage of dispositional properties in order to develop an ontology for GRW theory, and also in order to ground the objective probabilities which are postulated by it. However, in this paper, I will argue that the dispositional interpretations which have been discussed in the literature so far are either flawed or – at best – incomplete. If we want to endorse a dispositional interpretation of GRW theory we thus need an extended account that specifies the precise nature of those properties and which makes also clear how they can correctly ground all the probabilities postulated by the theory. Thus, after having introduced several different kinds of probabilistic dispositions, I will try to fill the gap in the literature by proposing a novel and complete dispositional account of GRW, based on what I call spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities. I claim that such an account can satisfy both of our desiderata. (shrink)

Principi e ordinamento romano : una riflessione sulle orme di Fritz Schulz -- Homo liber e homo sacer : due archetipi dell'appartenenza -- L'humanitas tra diritto romano e totalitarismo hitleriano -- Sull'eccezione di dolo generale -- L'arbitraggio sul prezzo -- Diritto romano e scienza del diritto -- Roma e i suoi giuristi nel pensiero di Nicolás Gómez Dávila -- Tradizione e misura umana del diritto: considerazioni sulla figura del giurista a partire da Giuseppe Grosso.

Functionalism is the view that being x is to play the role of x. This paper defends a functionalist account of three-dimensional entities in the context of Wave Function Realism (WFR), that can explain in detail how we can recover three-dimensional entities out of the wavefunction. In particular, the essay advocates for a novel version of WFR in terms of a functional reductionist approach in the style of David Lewis. This account entails reduction of the upper entities to the bottom (...) ones, when the latter behave appropriately. As applied to WFR, it shows how the wavefunction can turn out to be identical to three-dimensional objects, provided certain conditions. The first major goal of the paper is thus to put forward an improved and more rigorous version of WFR, which dissolves several extant issues about the theory, and can serve as a starting point for future literature on the topic. Moreover, the second major goal of the article is to take WFR as a case study to demonstrate the pros of functional reductionism, especially in the form defended here, thereby helping to bring this view back in the philosophy of science debate. The positive upshots of this paper suggest a possible application of functional reductionism also to other contexts. (shrink)

In the Critique of Practical Reason, Immanuel Kant provides two different propositions of freedom. According to the first, in the “Analytic of Pure Practical Reason,” freedom establishes the possibility of moral agency—i.e., it is the ratio essendi of the moral law. According to the second, in the “Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason,” freedom is the object of one of the practical postulates (CPrR 246–54; AA 5:132–41). Why should Kant postulate something that has been allegedly established as the ground of moral (...) agency? Does Kant appeal to two different conceptions of freedom? In this paper, I argue that Kant (1) in both cases conceives of freedom as an unconditioned form of causality, and (2) pursues two different aims according to two different but complementary arguments. On the one hand (the practical standpoint), he wants to argue that the causality of freedom is actual, through moral agency, in the domain where the laws of nature also apply. On the other hand (the theoretical standpoint), he is aware that the possibility of achieving the highest good would be compromised if we did not assume, along with the other two postulates, a world in which only the causality of freedom applies. While freedom as the ratio essendi of the moral law is actual, freedom as a postulate is a mere object of belief. (shrink)

Three accounts of effective realism (ER) have been advanced to solve three problems for scientific realism: Fraser and Vickers (forthcoming) develop a version of ER about non-relativistic quantum mechanics that they argue is compatible with all the main realist versions (‘interpretations’) of quantum mechanics avoiding the problem of underdetermination among them; Williams (2019) and Fraser (2020b) propose ER about quantum field theory as a response to the problems facing realist interpretations; Robertson and Wilson (forthcoming) propose ER to deal with the (...) dubious ontological status of the entities belonging to superseded theories. This paper argues for the unification of these proposals based on realism about modal structure and the idea of scale relativity of ontology developed by ontic structural realists. This solves problems some or all the accounts of ER face, especially that of making explicit in what way they are realist. Furthermore, we respond to a recent critique that has been raised against the ontic structural realist account of quantum mechanics that we employ. (shrink)

In this paper we compare the strategies applied by two successful biological components of the ecosystem, the viruses and the human beings, to interact with the environment. Viruses have had and still exert deep and vast actions on the ecosystem especially at the genome level of most of its biotic components. We discuss on the importance of the human being as contraptions maker in particular of robots, hence of machines capable of automatically carrying out complex series of actions. Beside the (...) relevance of designing and assembling these contraptions, it is of basic importance the goal for which they are assembled and future scenarios of their possible impact on the ecosystem. We can’t procrastinate the development and implementation of a highly inspired and stringent “ethical code” for human beings and humanoid robots because it will be a crucial aspect for the wellbeing of the mankind and of the entire ecosystem. (shrink)

Society and contemporary culture unquestionably assign much importance to the search for quality. So can this kind of research include the mind? In his analysis, Luigi Longhin examines the causes of mental illness and psychic-mental suffering, the notions of individuality, social violence, and utopia; and he suggests a collaboration between the neurosciences and psychoanalysis, within a correct epistemological approach. The relationship between epistemology and psychoanalysis is examined. The objectivistic and relativistic shift in contemporary epistemology, and the problem of the (...) responsibility of the techno-scientific system are emphasized. Why such a privileged connection with philosophy? The contribution of philosophy is primarily epistemological. However, both epistemology and psychoanalysis run a risk; whilst epistemology runs the risk of being a knowledge which does not know, psychoanalysts run the risk of pursuing scientific knowledge without knowing its foundations. Hence there is a need for collaboration between the two forms of knowledge: the philosophical-epistemological and the scientific-psychoanalytic. Psychoanalysis works in two directions: on the one hand, it tries to eliminate the negative components of the mind, on the other hand, it tries to develop the trusting and creative parts of the self. (shrink)

Lam and Esfeld have argued that, within Bohmian mechanics, the wave function can be interpreted as a physical structure instantiated by the fundamental particles posited by the theory. Further, to characterize the nature of this structure, they appeal to the framework of Ontic Structural Realism, thereby proposing a structuralist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. However, I shall point out that OSR denotes a family of distinct views, each of which maintains a different account about the relation between structures and objects, and (...) entails a different kind of ontology. Thus, in this paper I will show how to articulate the structuralist approach to Bohmian Mechanics accordingly to the different standard versions of OSR, and I will evaluate these alternatives. Moreover, I will propose a novel and _sui generis_ kind of structuralist interpretation of Bohmian Mechanics, based on the framework of metaphysical coherentism. (shrink)

It has been argued that Humean Supervenience is threatened by the existence of quantum entanglement relations. The most conservative strategy for defending HS is to add the problematic entanglement relations to the supervenience basis, alongside spatiotemporal relations. In this paper, I’m going to argue against this strategy by showing how certain particular cases of tripartite entanglement states – i.e. GHZ states – posit some crucial problems for this amended version of HS. Moreover, I will show that the principle of free (...) recombination – which is strictly linked to HS – is severely undermined if we add entanglement relations to the supervenience basis. I conclude that the conservative move is very unappealing, and therefore the defender of HS should pursue other, more controversial, strategies. (shrink)

Functional reductionism characterises inter-theoretic reduction as the recovery of the upper-level behaviour described by the reduced theory in terms of the lower-level reducing theory. For instance, finding a statistical mechanical realiser that plays the functional role of thermodynamic entropy allows for establishing a reductive link between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. This view constitutes a unique approach to reduction that enjoys a number of positive features, but has received limited attention in the philosophy of science. -/- This paper aims to clarify (...) the meaning of functional reductionism in science, with a focus on physics, to define both its place with respect to other approaches to reduction and its connection to ontology. To do so, we develop and explore two alternative frameworks for functional reduction, called Syntactic Functional Reductionism and Semantic Functional Reductionism. They represent two different possible stances on the view that expand and improve the basic functional reductionist approach along different lines, and make clear how the approach works in practice. The former elaborates on David Lewis’ account, is connected with the syntactic view of theories, is committed to a logical characterisation of functional roles, and is embedded within Nagelian reductionism. The latter adopts a semantic view of theories, spells out functional roles mainly in terms of mathematical roles within the models of theories, and is expressed in terms of the related structuralist approach to reduction. The development of these frameworks has the final goal of advancing functional reductionism, to make it a fully-fledged alternative account for reduction in science. (shrink)

Este artigo objetiva a partir das considerações de Michel Foucault sobre a dimensão de uma estética da existência relacioná-la às vidas infames, em dois planos que parecem se vincular, a saber, primeiro, de dar destaque às vidas obscurecidas que apenas foram iluminadas quando colocadas como alvos de discursos empreendidos com a finalidade de classificação, controle e exclusão; segundo, da possibilidade de experiências transformadoras no que diz respeito às subjetividades marginalizadas. Examinaremos então em que medida a pesquisa foucaultiana portaria a virtualidade (...) de um deslocamento a um só tempo estético e ético, da modificação de um modo de vida, de um estilo de existência. Uma vez reconhecendo a dimensão estética em Foucault vinculada à arte de existir, pretendemos então tecer um texto que também se componha com as considerações do filósofo da estética Étienne Souriau, apresentadas no livro As Existências Mínimas, por David Lapoujade, no sentido de que os dois pensadores franceses parecem confluir na mesma direção no que liga a arte às transformações de si, isto é, ambos elaboram uma compreensão da estética interseccionada aos modos de existência, buscando tematizar de que modo as vidas que mesmo privadas do direito de existir, podem ainda encontrar espaços de criação e transformação. (shrink)