In this paper, I try to show how the ambition of William Bartley, the founder of comprehensively critical rationalism, can be realized, i.e. how critical rationalism can be comprehensive. I argue that the alleged paradox of comprehensively critical rationalism, formulated, among others, by Bartley himself, depends on a faulty understanding of criticizability. I therefore propose a new understanding of criticizability, and argue that under the new understanding there is no paradox of comprehensively critical rationalism. Finally, I try to explain how (...) critical rationalism can be comprehensive, i.e. without any concession to irrationalism, or to any dogmatic faith, including the faith in reason. (shrink)

Tento článok pojednáva o Watkinsovom útoku na Popperovu teóriu vedy . Watkins tvrdí, že Popperova teória pravdeblízkosti zavádza do PTV justifikacionistické a induktivistické prvky. Cieľom článku je ukázať nepravdivosť Watkinsovej obžaloby. V PTV niet žiadneho dobrého dôvodu pre žiadnu domnienku. Podobne, neexistuje tu ani žiadny „induktívny spôsob“ získavania domnienok.

The aim of the paper is to restate the problem of language dependence as first invented by D. Miller against Tichý’s approach to the problem of verisimilitude. The question is whether the verisimilitude appraisals can be dependent on language in which they are formulated in the sense that this dependence could determine their truth values. If the answer is “Yes”, one of the consequences is that one language, when compared with some other one, may lead to different verisimilitude appraisals in (...) spite of the fact that the situation to be compared is the same. So the answer has to be “No”. The author of the paper tries to explain this by analyzing Miller’s critique of Tichý’s counting method which was a part of Tichý’s theory of verisimilitude. (shrink)

Cognitive overlap between art and science can be found in the processes of learning through experience. What necessarily needs to be present in these processes are not good reasons in favor of what is known or learnt, but the following features: The first feature art and science have in common is the negativity of learning processes: What a cognizer C learns through experience is that her theories, expectations, attitudes, trials, etc. are wrong and should be abandoned in order to advance. (...) This leads us to the second common feature of art and science: if C is to err, and thus to learn through experience, she must create something in advance. It is further argued that C learns through experience due to causal relations between the environment and her sensations and beliefs. This cannot be accomplished, however, if C is not aware of the notion of objective truth. Empirical knowledge is social and public, yet its truth is not reducible to social agreement. More could be learnt about the learning through experience in art and science, if anyone showed that some of the features or relations proposed in this paper are not necessary for learning. (shrink)

The paper tries to analyze critically what is usually taken for granted – the causal relation between empirical knowledge about external world and the world which is (supposedly) known. The aim is neither to propose a new definition of knowledge nor to restate an old one but rather to take a closer look at the claim that knowledge is a true belief caused in a proper way by facts, events, etc. of the external world. This claim is a core of (...) the epistemological approach usually labeled as “causal theory of knowledge”, but there are many causal theories distinct from each other. The paper therefore sketches the causal components of D. Davidson’s epistemology and the roles they play in the process of cognizing, first. Then it exposes more details of Davidson’s approach and pushes some of them further critically. (shrink)

Cieľom tohto článku nie je, primárne, rozobrať Popperovu teóriu vedy, ale 1. predstaviť Lakatosove námietky proti tejto teórii; 2. kriticky ich analyzovať z hľadiska Popperovej teórie; a 3. vysvetliť, prečo justifikacionista Lakatos nemohol oceniť Popperov skepticizmus.

Abstrakt/Abstract Článok argumentuje, že idea tzv. sociálneho obratu, ktorá pochádza z dielne normatívneho pragmatizmu a ktorú v jednom zo svojich textov propaguje aj Vojtech Kolman, neprináša žiadne ovocie, ak je prenesená do oblasti epistemológie. V závere článku je preto načrtnutá alternatívna interpretácia idey sociálneho obratu a jej dôsledky pre epistemológiu. The paper argues that the idea of the so-called social turn introduced by normative pragmatism, and promoted also by Vojtech Kolman in one of his papers, bears no fruit when transferred (...) to the field of epistemology. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the idea of social turn, as well as its consequences for epistemology, is outlined at the end of the paper. (shrink)

[The neverending story of justification].

There are many variants of scientific realism but few of them account for the role of testing by means of experience in empirical sciences. Moreover, if combined with a kind of empiricism, they usually lead to antirealism. The paper aims to expose causes as well as results of this perplexity. The solution is to revise empiricism quite radically, and to set its marriage with realism on methodological rather than epistemological level.

The article distinguishes between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of scientific method, links subjectivism with good reasons, and argues its uselessness for our understanding of science. It applies the distinction to the method of falsification, explains why objectivism regards falsification to be conjectural, immune to the Duhem–Quine thesis, and immune to the problem of underdetermination. It confronts the falsifying mode of inference with the fallacy of begging the question and with the paradox of inference, and suggests how modus tollens helps scientists (...) to find out that a tested theory is false, in spite of the fact that the falsity of the theory is asserted in its premises. (shrink)