This work represents an investigation of the most important properties of the human mind consciousness, apperception and reflection - and of their significance for Leibnizian philosophy. The development of Leibniz's thinking in the course of his treatment of these themes receives especially detailed treatment, and is thoroughly documented on the basis of the original texts. The concepts of consciousness and reflection were the object of intensive discussion in the l7th century. Starting out from the problem of the distinction between humans (...) and brutes - Descartes' view of animals as mere machines was always decisively rejected by Leibniz-Kulstad shows the significance of these concepts in the early writings of Leibniz. He shows how Leibniz was then stimulated by Locke to add the word "apperception" into his philosophy. The author sets out the influence of Locke on Leibniz and demonstrates how Leibniz adopted a firmer and more constant position as to the relation between consciousness and reflection than one finds in Locke's own writings. From the beginning to the end of his life Leibniz defends the thesis that both consciousness and reflection consist in the memory of one mental act via another. The author shows how Leibniz hereby aligns himself with an European philosophihical tradition which can be traced back to Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Of course, a clarification of the meanings of words such as "consciousness", "reflection" and "apperception" is important not only for an understanding of Leibniz's philosophy but also for contemporary metaphysics and theory of knowledge. Leibniz certainly recognized and thought through the problems associated with these words, but he never developed a final, coherent theory, a fact which certainly reflects in part the complexity of the underlying problems. By exploiting not only all the relevant Leibnizian writings but also the results of more receent philosophy in this field, Kulstad is able to draw a reliable picture both of Leibniz's treatment of these problems and of the influence of his views on his contemporaries and successors. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz analysiert Leibniz' Begriff der Expression. Er ist eine Vorstudie zu einer umfassenden Untersuchung der Lehre, daß jede einfache Substanz das ganze Weltall ausdrückt. Leibnizens Beispiele und Definitionen von Expression werden besprochen, und dann wird die Analyse des Begriffs in zwei Stufen entwickelt.

Wie geartet ist das Verhältnis zwischen den zentralen Begriffen „Bewußtsein“ und „Reflexion“ in Lockes Essay? Sind diese Begriffe für Locke identisch oder voneinander verschieden? Falls sie verschieden sind, wie ist der Unterschied genau zu bestimmen? Diese Arbeit untersucht die Fragen, unter Berücksichtigung der unterschiedlichen Deutungen in der Sekundärliteratur; sie sichtet und prüft den Text des Essays sorgfältig und breitet ein breites Spektrum philosophischer Implikationen von Lockes Ausführungen über das „Bewußtsein“ und „Reflexion“ aus. Der abschließende Teil legt dar, daß Locke niemals (...) eine feste Position gegenüber dem Verhältnis zwischen den beiden Begriffen eingenommen hat, sondern daß er zwischen verschiedenen Positionen schwankte -als Resultat der starken philosophischen Kräfte, die ihn bald in die eine, bald in die andere Richtung zogen. (shrink)

Die folgenden Ausführungen gehen der Frage nach, ob Leibniz die Auffassung vertreten hat, daß nur Geister apperzipieren. Die Untersuchung dieser Frage führt zu neuen Einsichten in die Bedeutung des Begriffs der apperceptio, welcher zu den zentralen Begriffen der Leibnischen Philosophie gehört. Der Aufsatz ist in drei Teile gegliedert: 1. die herrschende Meinung, 2. Gegenargumente gegen diese Meinung, 3. die Bedeutung dieser Argumente fur die herrschende Auffassung.

"Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy is a selection of some of the best work being done in early modern philosophy by Anglo-American philosophers today.... The essays in this collection are historically informed and philosophically challenging. The book is a fitting tribute to Jonathan Bennett." -- Daniel Garber, University of Chicago.

Robert M. Adams has recently and controversially discussed the question whether Leibniz’s conception of God was ever Spinozistic. His affirmative answer has been opposed by Christia Mercer but supported by the present author. In this paper the debate is briefly sketched as a preliminary to the presentation of a new middle position, one that incorporates elements of both of the opposing interpretations. Along the way, the paper discusses Leibniz’s interesting treatment of God as the one and the all, as both (...) the unity and the multiplicity in the world, and as the key to universal harmony. (shrink)

This paper paper will examine some very different positions that Leibniz held or explored on monism, force, and substance during his long philosophical life. For reasons to be explained, positions drawn from Leibniz’s youth as well as his maturity will be considered. It will prove useful to consider these Leibnizian positions on these issues in relation to some of the leading alternatives of his age, in particular, those of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche. A guiding idea of this paper is that (...) by meditating seriously on some key ideas explored by Leibniz on our topics, one can gain new insight into the philosophical options of his era. A few introductory remarks on Descartes, followed by an overview of the main divisions and aims of the present paper, will help set the stage for these Leibnizian meditations. (shrink)

This paper paper will examine some very different positions that Leibniz held or explored on monism, force, and substance during his long philosophical life. For reasons to be explained, positions drawn from Leibniz’s youth as well as his maturity will be considered. It will prove useful to consider these Leibnizian positions on these issues in relation to some of the leading alternatives of his age, in particular, those of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche. A guiding idea of this paper is that (...) by meditating seriously on some key ideas explored by Leibniz on our topics, one can gain new insight into the philosophical options of his era. A few introductory remarks on Descartes, followed by an overview of the main divisions and aims of the present paper, will help set the stage for these Leibnizian meditations. (shrink)

This paper paper will examine some very different positions that Leibniz held or explored on monism, force, and substance during his long philosophical life. For reasons to be explained, positions drawn from Leibniz’s youth as well as his maturity will be considered. It will prove useful to consider these Leibnizian positions on these issues in relation to some of the leading alternatives of his age, in particular, those of Descartes, Spinoza and Malebranche. A guiding idea of this paper is that (...) by meditating seriously on some key ideas explored by Leibniz on our topics, one can gain new insight into the philosophical options of his era. A few introductory remarks on Descartes, followed by an overview of the main divisions and aims of the present paper, will help set the stage for these Leibnizian meditations. (shrink)

Starting from Leibniz’s complaint that Newton’s views seem to make God the soul of the world, this paper examines Leibniz’s critical stance more generally towards God as the soul of the world and related theses. A preliminary task is determining what the related theses are. There are more of these than might have been thought. Once the relations are established, it becomes clear how pervasive the various guises of the issue of God as the soul of the world are in (...) Leibniz’s thought and how central they are in his debates with contemporaries about the truths of natural religion and even more strictly philosophical issues. Leibniz’s arguments against God as the soul of the world are reconstructed and evaluated, and the difficult question of the exact meaning, or meanings, that Leibniz ascribes to the thesis that God is the soul of the world is taken up. The clearest core of meaning discussed in this paper is most directly relevant to Leibniz’s criticisms of Spinoza and the Stoics, as well as of Descartes. Less clear, but obviously important, are meanings relevant to Leibniz’s debates with the occasionalists and Newtonians. (shrink)

Starting from Leibniz’s complaint that Newton’s views seem to make God the soul of the world, this paper examines Leibniz’s critical stance more generally towards God as the soul of the world and related theses. A preliminary task is determining what the related theses are. There are more of these than might have been thought. Once the relations are established, it becomes clear how pervasive the various guises of the issue of God as the soul of the world are in (...) Leibniz’s thought and how central they are in his debates with contemporaries about the truths of natural religion and even more strictly philosophical issues. Leibniz’s arguments against God as the soul of the world are reconstructed and evaluated, and the difficult question of the exact meaning, or meanings, that Leibniz ascribes to the thesis that God is the soul of the world is taken up. The clearest core of meaning discussed in this paper is most directly relevant to Leibniz’s criticisms of Spinoza and the Stoics, as well as of Descartes. Less clear, but obviously important, are meanings relevant to Leibniz’s debates with the occasionalists and Newtonians. (shrink)

Starting from Leibniz’s complaint that Newton’s views seem to make God the soul of the world, this paper examines Leibniz’s critical stance more generally towards God as the soul of the world and related theses. A preliminary task is determining what the related theses are. There are more of these than might have been thought. Once the relations are established, it becomes clear how pervasive the various guises of the issue of God as the soul of the world are in (...) Leibniz’s thought and how central they are in his debates with contemporaries about the truths of natural religion and even more strictly philosophical issues. Leibniz’s arguments against God as the soul of the world are reconstructed and evaluated, and the difficult question of the exact meaning, or meanings, that Leibniz ascribes to the thesis that God is the soul of the world is taken up. The clearest core of meaning discussed in this paper is most directly relevant to Leibniz’s criticisms of Spinoza and the Stoics, as well as of Descartes. Less clear, but obviously important, are meanings relevant to Leibniz’s debates with the occasionalists and Newtonians. (shrink)

The volume gathers a selection of nineteen contributions from an international conference on the seventeenth-century philosopher G. W. Leibniz held at Rice University in Houston, Texas. It focuses on the writings by the young Leibniz on a variety of subjects such as mathematics, physics, metaphysics, logic, theology and politics. It also contains a subsection with contributions on the much-debated question of the impact of Baruch de Spinoza's philosophy on Leibniz. The objective of the volume is partly to consider the early (...) texts as philosophical statements in their own right, partly to contribute to the understanding of the evolution and genesis of Leibniz's philosophy by tracing the tenets of his mature philosophy back to their origin. (shrink)