This article seeks to bring a focus to the significance of trade and finance in corporate governance outcomes. It explores the theoretical and historical link between micro-economic-level firm structure and macro-economic institutions such as trade and finance. The more open the economy, it argues, the more difficult it is in the long run to sustain an insider model. It then argues that changes in interdependent aspects of macro-economic policy in the UK and the US—primarily trade liberalization and the end of (...) capital controls—combined with the presence of developed capital markets and a self-regulatory ethos, allowed institutional investors to refocus the market-level rules on shareholders despite the managerial bias of their legal systems, and enabled the emergence of the outsider shareholder-oriented systems present there today. The article then argues that core insider systems such as those in Germany and France operated with different financing arrangements which meant that they were less susceptible to immediate change. However, in the long run global economic conditions have continued to push shareholder-oriented norms on insider systems. The article concludes that if these conditions persist, then governments will lose, or may indeed already have lost, sovereignty with regard to choice of corporate governance system. (shrink)

This article argues that corporate law has become the legal platform upon which is erected a social process impeding society’s capacity to lucidly reflect on its primary ends; in this sense, corporate law is in conflict with social autonomy. This process is described here as a social feedback loop, in the structural centre of which lies the corporation which imposes its own purpose as an irrational social end, i.e. irrespective of its potentially catastrophic social consequences. The article argues that resolving (...) the conflict between corporate law and social autonomy is impossible, because it presupposes a change of social paradigm towards one where corporate law as business organisation law has no obvious fit. This questions the social legitimacy of corporate law, signifies its non-permanence and thus opens up the field for seeking radical alternatives in the future. (shrink)

Corporate governance in the European Union (EU) has been traditionally seen as a problem of harmonizing or co-ordinating national systems. Here the focus is on the interactions between corporate governance on the one hand and macroeconomic policy on the other. It is argued that the function of corporate governance is a process determined by a structurally embedded dynamic game between major stakeholders and the corporation. The article argues that Economic Monetary Union (EMU) institutions and policymaking, as elements of the institutional (...) environment in which this game is embedded, determine particular parties’ bargaining power and through this the outcome of the corporate governance game and its trajectory. The main focus is on the bargains between labour and financial capital with the corporation, which is mostly destabilized in the EU–EMU environment. The findings carry an important message for post-crisis restructuring. (shrink)

Until recently, as market forces gradually prevailed over government intervention, the contractarian view had emerged as a preferred method of economic governance due to its attractiveness for business. Following the recent collapse of financial markets and the resulting recession, however, this structural form is now being called into question as the calls for more regulation and government intervention increase. In this context, this article revisits the law versus contract debate in the field of corporate law and governance. Following a theoretical (...) framework utilizing elements of game and resource-based theory of the firm, the company is envisaged as a central counterparty in repeated bargains with its stakeholders. It is shown that power dynamics, which are inherent in the repeated bargains between stakeholders and the company, are prone to imbalance rather than balance by causing cumulative increases in the relative power of stronger parties and vicious spirals of relative power loss for weaker ones. This cumulative power imbalance is then reflected in the organizational rent appropriation process, as weaker parties are eventually expropriated by stronger ones. It is therefore argued that since the contractual model is inherently prone to instability, mandatory power-balancing rules are necessary. Such (re)balancing regulation, however, would need to follow a systemic approach because stakeholder and company power is drawn from, and affected by numerous structural arrangements in the legal and economic system. (shrink)