Greek philosophy, especially Aristotelianism, because of the concept of God present in this thought, did not raise the issue of divine omniscience and divine knowledge of evil. The divine omnisciene seemed to be contrary to God’s perfect being. In the time of Themistius, whose thought I present in this paper, Neoplatonism and Christian Neoplatonism showed new possibilities of solving this problem. Themistius being aware of these new topics and including them in his own philosophy, still however represents ancient Aristotelianism with (...) all its limitations. He asked about divine knowlegde of evil, but in his answer he repeated only the Aristotelian doctrine: God knows only Himself, because He Himself is the most perfect object of knowledge and cannot know less perfect beings. (shrink)

In this article the author analyses two polemics against the stoic conception of fate – by Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Chalcidius. Alexander, who wants to show the Aristotelian doctrine of fate, presents the subject against a background of the stoic conception, pointing out its disadvantages. He deals with the ideas concerning the existence and meaning of possibility in determinism. He also discusses issues referring to the free will of a man, free choices and their consequences. Chalcidius talks about the (...) matters of evil and its beginnings, as he finds the stoics unable to give satisfactory answers to these questions. Not only similarities are there between Alexander and Chalcidius, but many differences as well. They are caused by the different backgrounds of the two critics of determinism. Alexander sees himself as an orthodox peripateticienne, whereas Chalcidius places his conceptions in the context of Platon’s teachings about fate. (shrink)