The Surprise Exam Paradox is well-known: a teacher announces that there will be a surprise exam the following week; the students argue by an intuitively sound reasoning that this is impossible; and yet they can be surprised by the teacher. We suggest that a solution can be found scattered in the literature, in part anticipated by Wright and Sudbury, informally developed by Sorensen, and more recently discussed, and dismissed, by Williamson. In a nutshell, the solution consists in realising that the (...) teacher's announcement is a blindspot that can only be known if the week is at least 2 days long. Along the way, we criticise Williamson's own treatment of the paradox. In Williamson's view, the Surprise is similar to the Paradox of the Glimpse and, because of their similarities, both these paradoxes ought to receive a uniform treatment-one that involves locating an illicit application of the KK Principle. We argue that there's no deep analogy between the Surprise and the Glimpse and that, even if there were, the Surprise reasoning reaches a paradoxical conclusion before the KK Principle is used. Rather, in both the Surprise and the Glimpse, the blame should be put on other epistemic principles-respectively, a knowledge retention and a margin for error principle. (shrink)

Epistemic contradictions are now a well-known and often discussed phenomenon among those who study epistemic modals. These contradictions are expressed by sentences like ‘It is raining and it might not be raining’ whose oddness to the common ear demands an explanation. However, it has turned out to be a rather controversial enterprise to provide such an explanation in a sufficiently precise and general manner. According to pragmatic explanations, epistemic contradictions are semantically consistent but pragmatically defective. According to semantic explanations, one (...) should regard epistemic contradictions as plain semantic inconsistencies. Endorsing such a semantic solution is, however, tantamount to rejecting classical logic, which predicts the consistency of epistemic contradictions. After arguing that all existing solutions to this problem face as yet unmet challenges, I will present a new solution that adequately overcomes these challenges. I will propose to view epistemic contradictions as semantically consistent but epistemically defective sentences. The main thesis emerging will be that we need neither abandon the inference rules of classical logic nor the classical truth-conditional approach to semantics to deal adequately with epistemic contradictions. (shrink)

Die globalen Veränderungen fordern unser Wissen über die Welt und über uns selbst heraus. Der Klimawandel, die globale Covid-19-Pandemie und Konflikte um die Bedeutung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse führen uns unweigerlich zu einer Vielzahl komplexer philosophischer Fragen. Dabei rücken verstärkt Themen der theoretischen Philosophie in den Vordergrund: Was ist eigentlich Wissen? Auf welche Informationen können wir uns verlassen? Ist die Wahrheit relativ? Was macht ExpertInnen aus? Was ist gute wissenschaftliche Praxis? Was bedeutet 'evidenzbasiert'? Welchen sozialen und globalen Einflüssen ist unser Wissenserwerb ausgesetzt? (...) In der Ausbildung von Philosophie- und Ethikstudierenden gibt es oft eine große Scheu, Disziplinen wie Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftsphilosophie zu erlernen und zu unterrichten. Zu abstrakt und lebensweltlich irrelevant, sagen viele. Dieses Buch soll diese Berührungsängste beseitigen helfen, indem die theoretischen Grundlagen auf die Probleme der Gegenwart angewendet und mit vielseitigen Methoden erschlossen werden. Zwei Ziele stehen im Vordergrund: Zum einen soll deutlich werden, dass die Beschäftigung mit theoretischer Philosophie für das persönliche und das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Zum anderen zeigen eine Reihe didaktischer Tools, wie man Lernende dabei aktiv in den Lernprozess miteinbezieht. (shrink)