This article addresses the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor on the implications of state secularism for the public use of reason. Recent commentators have traced this debate either to Habermas’s and Taylor’s divergent views about the status of Western modernity or to their disagreement about the relation between the good and the right. I argue that these readings rest on misinterpretations of Habermas’s theory of social evolution and understanding of impartial justification. I show that the debate rests on (...) diverging interpretations of what it means for citizens to embed the principles of liberal democracy in their respective conceptions of the good. This difference in turn leads Habermas and Taylor to espouse different criteria of democratic legitimacy. I conclude by suggesting that we have prima facie reasons to prefer Habermas’s conception of legitimacy to Taylor’s, and to that extent, to favor his model of the public use of reason. (shrink)

Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives et Imagerie Ce´re´brale (LENA), Hoˆpital de La Salpeˆtrie`re, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS).

Two decades ago, Rolf Landauer (1991) argued that “information is physical” and ought to have a role in the scientific analysis of reality comparable to that of matter, energy, space and time. This would also help to bridge the gap between biology and mathematics and physics. Although it can be argued that we are living in the ‘golden age’ of biology, both because of the great challenges posed by medicine and the environment and the significant advances that have been made—especially (...) in genetics and molecular and cell biology—we feel that information as an essential aspect of life has been neglected, or at least misunderstood. We therefore summon Maxwell’s Demon and its distant relative the ratchet, and apply these to biology. (shrink)

Pour la première fois en 1649, Descartes consacre une attention méticuleuse à la description de " toute la nature de l'homme ". Les passions ne lui fournissent pas une simple occasion parmi d'autres d'en traiter. Elles l'obligent surtout (et son lecteur avec lui) à se placer du point de vue du composé psychosomatique lui-même, soit à décrire, dans toutes ses manifestations et implications (éthiques notamment), cette " troisième notion primitive " que ni la philosophie première seule, ni la physique seule, (...) ne permettaient de cerner. (shrink)

The notion of antifragility, an attribute of systems that makes them thrive under variable conditions, has recently been proposed by Nassim Taleb in a business context. This idea requires the ability of such systems to ‘tinker’, i.e., to creatively respond to changes in their environment. A fairly obvious example of this is natural selection-driven evolution. In this ubiquitous process, an original entity, challenged by an ever-changing environment, creates variants that evolve into novel entities. Analyzing functions that are essential during stationary-state (...) life yield examples of entities that may be antifragile. One such example is proteins with flexible regions that can undergo functional alteration of their side residues or backbone and thus implement the tinkering that leads to antifragility. This in-built property of the cell chassis must be taken into account when considering construction of cell factories driven by engineering principles. (shrink)

Tarde make of the art a plan of invention which leaves of a very wide definition - everything human making- to include meanings of the word more specialized. He does not break only so privilege indû of fine art, but accentuates the capacity of the art, fundamental for the, contemporary societies, to socialize very sensations, communicating in a common sensational, the difference of the individuals.

A formalism is introduced to represent the connective organization of an evolving neuronal network and the effects of environment on this organization by stabilization or degeneration of labile synapses associated with functioning. Learning, or the acquisition of an associative property, is related to a characteristic variability of the connective organization: the interaction of the environment with the genetic program is printed as a particular pattern of such organization through neuronal functioning. An application of the theory to the development of the (...) neuromuscular junction is proposed and the basic selective aspect of learning emphasized. (shrink)

Major depression is associated with a decrease of 1st person visual perspective in autobiographical memory, even after full remission. This study aimed to examine visual perspective in healthy never-depressed subjects presenting with either genetic or psychological vulnerability for depression. Sixty healthy participants performed the Autobiographical Memory Test with an assessment of visual perspective. Genetic vulnerability was defined by the presence of at least one S or LG allele of the polymorphism of the serotonin-transporter-linked promoter region . Psychological vulnerability was defined (...) by high scores of harm avoidance measured by the Temperament and Character Inventory. Life stress exposure, depressive mood, rumination, and familial history of depression were assessed through standardized procedures. Visual perspective for positive memories was independently predicted by both harm avoidance and a gene by environment interaction between the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and life stress exposure. Visual perspective and vulnerability for depression may share some biological bases. (shrink)

Que fait la justice numérique à la théorie et à la pratique du droit? Qu’induit-elle pour la vocation de justice de l’institution judiciaire? Comment en bouleverse-t-elle les différents métiers? Jean Lassègue et Antoine Garapon mènent une enquête approfondie pour différencier soigneusement les deux formes symboliques du numérique et du droit. Ils s’efforcent ainsi de ménager ainsi une troisième voie qui sache éviter tout autant la fascination dogmatique des juristes pour la tendance « loi et mathématique » (la tentation de (...) fonder la rationalité juridique sur la formalisation) que l’ambition légale démesurée de l’informatique contemporaine (la prétention actuelle des algorithmes à empiéter sur tous les domaines, y compris le droit). Il doit être possible de résister à l’automatisation pour inventer une justice, certes, assistée par ordinateur, mais sachant rester humaine. Reste à savoir comment. (shrink)

This text reconsiders the philosophizing into the future of mankind and futurology done by molecular biologist Gunther Stent in *The Coming of the Golden Age* in the light of Raymond Ruyer's critical notice published in the aftermath of the publication of Stent's book in French translation. For Ruyer, it is an occasion to revisit his own take on what he called in his last work a "theology of the opposition between the organic and the rational," and to restate in a (...) new light his conclusions concerning Cournot's suggestion as to the becoming of social relationships in a context of management of complexity of association. It is argued here that both Stent and Ruyer share a common thermodynamic, informational, and also surprisingly Nietzschean ascendency in judging of the possible outcomes for the human race. (shrink)

L’ouvrage dirigé par Philippe Régnier regroupe une série de 12 études sur le saint-simonisme, auxquelles sont adjoints deux documents inédits, des photographies de Charles Lambert Bey, Louis Jourdan, Maxime DuCamp et Prosper Enfantin et un brouillon de Dominique Tajan-Rogé, portant un regard critique sur son expérience saint-simonienne. Une bibliographie du saint-simonisme de 1984 à 2001 réalisée par Philippe Régnier prolonge celle qu’il avait établie de 1965 à 1984 dans le dernier travail co..

A collection of essays investigating key historical and scientific questions relating to the concept of natural purpose in Kant's philosophy of biology.

Farabi et l'école d'Alexandrie, est la première étude consacrée à l'ensemble des thèmes de l'œuvre de celui qui fut l'un des plus grands philosophes arabes.

There are various conceptions of objectivity, a characteristic of the scientific enterprise, the most fundamental being objectivity as faithfulness to facts. A brute fact, which happens independently from us, becomes a scientific fact once we take cognisance of it through the means made available to us by science. Because of the complex, reciprocal relationship between scientific facts and scientific theory, the concept of objectivity as faithfulness to facts does not hold in the strict sense of an aperspectival faithfulness to brute (...) facts. Nevertheless, it holds in the large sense of an underdetermined faithfulness to scientific facts, as long as we keep in mind the complexity of the notion of scientific fact (as theory-laden), and the role of non-factual elements in theory choice (as underdetermined by facts). Science remains our best way to separate our factual beliefs from our other kinds of beliefs. (shrink)

In Richard Bradley’s book, Decision Theory with a Human Face, we have selected two themes for discussion. The first is the Bolker-Jeffrey theory of decision, which the book uses throughout as a tool to reorganize the whole field of decision theory, and in particular to evaluate the extent to which expected utility theories may be normatively too demanding. The second theme is the redefinition strategy that can be used to defend EU theories against the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, a strategy (...) that the book by and large endorses, and even develops in an original way concerning the Ellsberg paradox. We argue that the BJ theory is too specific to fulfil Bradley’s foundational project and that the redefinition strategy fails in both the Allais and Ellsberg cases. Although we share Bradley’s conclusion that EU theories do not state universal rationality requirements, we reach it not by a comparison with BJ theory, but by a comparison with the non-EU theories that the paradoxes have heuristically suggested. (shrink)

Nietzsche once proclaimed himself the 'Buddha of Europe', and throughout his life Buddhism held enormous interest for him. While he followed Buddhist thinking in demolishing what he regarded as the two-headed delusion of Being and Self, he saw himself as advocating a response to the ensuing nihilist crisis that was diametrically opposed to that of his Indian counterpart. In this book Antoine Panaïoti explores the deep and complex relations between Nietzsche's views and Buddhist philosophy. He discusses the psychological models (...) and theories which underlie their supposedly opposing ethics of 'great health' and explodes the apparent dichotomy between Nietzsche's Dionysian life-affirmation and Buddhist life-negation, arguing for a novel, hybrid response to the challenge of formulating a tenable post-nihilist ethics. His book will interest students and scholars of Nietzsche's philosophy, Buddhist thought and the metaphysical, existential and ethical issues that emerge with the demise of theism. (shrink)

2020 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title In this book, Philipp von Wussow argues that the philosophical project of Leo Strauss must be located in the intersection of culture, religion, and the political. Based on archival research on the philosophy of Strauss, von Wussow provides in-depth interpretations of key texts and their larger theoretical contexts. Presenting the necessary background in German-Jewish philosophy of the interwar period, von Wussow then offers detailed accounts and comprehensive interpretations of Strauss's early masterwork, Philosophy and Law, his (...) wartime lecture "German Nihilism," the sources and the scope of Strauss's critique of modern "relativism," and a close commentary on the late text "Jerusalem and Athens." With its rare blend of close reading and larger perspectives, this book is valuable for students of political philosophy, continental thought, and twentieth-century Jewish philosophy alike. It is indispensable as a guide to Strauss's philosophical project, as well as to some of the most intricate details of his writings. (shrink)

C'est une vieille évidence qu'il n'est rien sujet à plus de continuelle agitation que les lois. Et en effet, l'ordre juridique est toujours instable. Il traduit un point d'équilibre momentané, qui n'était pas le seul possible, ni le seul prévisible. Le meilleur des Codes n'a jamais pu le fixer. Son contenu évolue sans cesse. Car, à l'image de la vie, le champ du droit est un espace ouvert, où s'affrontent un chaos de forces en perpétuel mouvement. Ni Providence, ni Progrès (...) n'y apparaissent avec certitude, l'esprit souffle apparemment où il veut et nul ne sait où il va. La preuve en est que la meilleure des règles en un temps donné finit toujours par avoir des effets pervers et qu'il est peu de lois vicieuses qui n'aient parfois d'heureux effets. Dans ces conditions, il ne faut pas attendre de l'enseignement du droit qu'il fournisse un catalogue de recettes pratiques, stables et sûres. Son seul but devrait être d'apprendre à poser les bonnes questions, qui sont presque toujours les mêmes, pour parvenir un jour à trouver de bonnes réponses, toujours provisoires. Or, aucune démarche n'est plus propice à la réalisation d'un tel but que la méthode historique. Elle révèle qu'il n'y a jamais de solution bonne et durable et que chaque civilisation, chaque génération doit trouver elle même ses propres réponses, avec une étroite marge de manœuvre. Pour trouver sa voie, explique l'auteur, ni la science, ni la philosophie ne livrent de clé. Si l'une peut l'éclairer et l'autre le guider, le droit n'est ni assimilable à une science, ni réductible à une philosophie. C'est un art subtil, qui nécessite de se plier à une discipline spécifique, mais dont la parfaite maîtrise dépasse celle des règles techniques qui lui sont indispensables. Elle suppose la sagesse d'admettre les pesanteurs, la complexité et la relativité de la vie, ainsi que la sérénité d'accepter ce qui ne peut être changé, le courage de modifier ce qui peut l'être et le désir de chercher à distinguer l'un de l'autre sans parti-pris. Ceci requiert une tournure d'esprit et une culture à laquelle il ne paraît pas concevable d'accéder sans le secours de l'expérience et le recours à l'histoire. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : "Les Lumières sont souvent invoquées dans l'espace public comme un combat contre l'obscurantisme, combat qu'il s'agirait seulement de réactualiser. Des lectures, totalisantes et souvent caricaturales, les associent au culte du Progrès, au libéralisme politique et à un universalisme désincarné. Or, comme le montre ici Antoine Lilti, les Lumières n'ont pas proposé une doctrine philosophique cohérente ou un projet politique commun. En confrontant des auteurs emblématiques et d'autres moins connus, il propose de rendre aux (...) Lumières leur complexité historique et de repenser ce que nous leur devons : un ensemble de questions et de problèmes, bien plus qu'un prêt-à-penser rassurant. Les Lumières apparaissent dès lors comme une réponse collective au surgissement de la modernité, dont les ambivalences forment aujourd'hui encore notre horizon. Partant des interrogations de Voltaire sur le commerce colonial et l'esclavage pour arriver aux dernières réflexions de Michel Foucault, en passant par la critique post-coloniale et les dilemmes du philosophe face au public, L'Héritage des Lumières propose ainsi le tableau profondément renouvelé d'un mouvement qu'il nous faut redécouvrir car il ne cesse de nous parler.". (shrink)

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Deux décennies après les premières vagues de démocratisation en Afrique, le temps n'est-il pas venu d'instruire le " procès " de la démocratie ?

Antoine Pecquet wrote in the eighteenth century during the reign of Louis XV. Although he included Pascal among those he admired, he considered Alexander Pope his true mentor. In Part 1 of "Diverse Thoughts on Man," Pecquet reflects on Man's responsibilities as an individual: in Part 2, on Man's responsibilities as a member of society. Among these responsibilities he includes human and social concerns, such as parental and filial obligations, and the transfer of wealth between generations. In the tradition (...) of Montaigne, Pecquet intended his "Diverse Thoughts on Man" to help his readers learn more about themselves. Although he felt that those who would profit most from his book were readers who had not greatly pondered about themselves, he believed that every reader could find something of value in it. (shrink)

This is the outline: 1. Introduction : organicisme et personnalisme 2. Un effort pour philosopher sur tout 3. La théologie et la question de l’infra-substantiel 3.1 Un schème de pensée qui pose problème 3.2 Le statut de l’immortalité 4. Substance, personne et cosmos.

This research investigates 3- and 5-year-olds' relative fairness in distributing small collections of even or odd numbers of more or less desirable candies, either with an adult experimenter or between two dolls. The authors compare more than 200 children from around the world, growing up in seven highly contrasted cultural and economic contexts, from rich and poor urban areas, to small-scale traditional and rural communities. Across cultures, young children tend to optimize their own gain, not showing many signs of self-sacrifice (...) or generosity. Already by 3 years of age, self-optimizing in distributive justice is based on perspective taking and rudiments of mind reading. By 5 years, overall, children tend to show more fairness in sharing. What varies across cultures is the magnitude of young children's self-interest. More fairness (less self-interest) in distributive justice is evident by children growing up in small-scale urban and traditional societies thought to promote more collective values. (shrink)

Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific change traditionally emphasize theoretical over technological change. To elaborate on the role of tools in scientific change, I offer an account that shows how scientists use tools in exploratory experiments to form novel concepts. I apply this account to two cases in neuroscience and show how tool development and concept formation are often intertwined in episodes of tool-driven change. I support this view by proposing common normative (...) principles that specify when exploratory concept formation and tool development succeed to initiate scientific change. (shrink)

To what extent do early intuitions about ownership depend on cultural and socio-economic circumstances? We investigated the question by testing reasoning about third party ownership conflicts in various groups of three- and five-year-old children (N = 176), growing up in seven highly contrasted social, economic, and cultural circumstances (urban rich, poor, very poor, rural poor, and traditional) spanning three continents. Each child was presented with a series of scripts involving two identical dolls fighting over an object of possession. The child (...) had to decide who of the two dolls should own the object. Each script enacted various potential reasons for attributing ownership: creation, familiarity, first contact, equity, plus a control/neutral condition with no suggested reasons. Results show that across cultures, children are significantly more consistent and decisive in attributing ownership when one of the protagonists created the object. Development between three and five years is more or less pronounced depending on culture. The propensity to split the object in equal halves whenever possible was generally higher at certain locations (i.e., China) and quasi-inexistent in others (i.e., Vanuatu and street children of Recife). Overall, creation reasons appear to be more primordial and stable across cultures than familiarity, relative wealth or first contact. This trend does not correlate with the passing of false belief theory of mind. (shrink)

The relations between rationality and optimization have been widely discussed in the wake of Herbert Simon's work, with the common conclusion that the rationality concept does not imply the optimization principle. The paper is partly concerned with adding evidence for this view, but its main, more challenging objective is to question the converse implication from optimization to rationality, which is accepted even by bounded rationality theorists. We discuss three topics in succession: (1) rationally defensible cyclical choices, (2) the revealed preference (...) theory of optimization, and (3) the infinite regress of optimization. We conclude that (1) and (2) provide evidence only for the weak thesis that rationality does not imply optimization. But (3) is seen to deliver a significant argument for the strong thesis that optimization does not imply rationality. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that fiction is necessarily incomplete, but some recent work postulates the existence of universal fictions—stories according to which everything is true. Building such a story is supposedly straightforward: authors can either assert that everything is true in their story, define a complement function that does the assertoric work for them, or, most compellingly, write a story combining a contradiction with the principle of explosion. The case for universal fictions thus turns on the intuitive priority we assign (...) to the law of non-contradiction. My goal in this paper is to show that our critical and reflective literary practices set constraints on story-telling which preclude universal fictions. I will raise four stumbling blocks for universal fictionalists: the gap between saying and making true, our actual interpretive reactions to story-level contradictions, the criteria we accept for what counts as a story in our literary practices, and the undesirability of the universal fictionalist’s closure principles. (shrink)

The premise that every work belongs to an art-kind has recently inspired a kind-centred approach to theories of art. Kind-centred analyses posit that we should abandon the project of giving a general theory of art and focus instead on giving theories of the arts. The main difficulty, however, is to explain what makes a given kind an art-kind in the first place. Kind-centred theorists have passed this buck on to appreciative practices, but this move proves unsatisfactory. I argue that the (...) root of this dissatisfaction stems not from the act of kicking the can down the road, but from not kicking it far enough. The missing ingredient, I argue, is a notion of convention which does the work of marking the difference between art and non-art for a given physical medium. (shrink)

Judgment aggregation theory, or rather, as we conceive of it here, logical aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of merely preference judgments. It derives from Kornhauser and Sager’s doctrinal paradox and List and Pettit’s discursive dilemma, two problems that we distinguish emphatically here. The current theory has developed from the discursive dilemma, rather than the doctrinal paradox, and the final objective of the paper is to give the latter (...) its own theoretical development along the line of recent work by Dietrich and Mongin. However, the paper also aims at reviewing logical aggregation theory as such, and it covers impossibility theorems by Dietrich, Dietrich and List, Dokow and Holzman, List and Pettit, Mongin, Nehring and Puppe, Pauly and van Hees, providing a uniform logical framework in which they can be compared with each other. The review goes through three historical stages: the initial paradox and dilemma, the scattered early results on the independence axiom, and the so-called canonical theorem, a collective achievement that provided the theory with its specific method of analysis. The paper goes some way towards philosophical logic, first by briefly connecting the aggregative framework of judgment with the modern philosophy of judgment, and second by thoroughly discussing and axiomatizing the ‘general logic’ built in this framework. (shrink)

We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim forms of the (...) Pareto principle. After characterizing the ex ante and ex post criteria, we present a first solution to their conflict that extends the former as much possible in the direction of the latter. Then, we present a second solution, which goes in the opposite direction, and is also maximally assertive. Both solutions translate the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive utility representations, and both attribute to the individuals common probability values on the objective source of uncertainty, and different probability values on the subjective source. We discuss these solutions in terms of two conceptual arguments, i.e., the by now classic spurious unanimity argument and a novel informational argument labelled complementary ignorance. The paper complies with the standard economic methodology of basing probability and utility representations on preference axioms, but for the sake of completeness, also considers a construal of objective uncertainty based on the assumption of an exogeneously given probability measure. JEL classification: D70; D81. (shrink)

A epistemologia histórico-racionalista de Canguilhem, seu gosto pelo concreto, as áreas a que se refere - a medicina, o estudo da patologia, a fisiologia, a biologia - parecem longe dos grandes estudos metafísicos do "primeiro" Deleuze e de seu interesse pela sistematização conceitual abstrata. Mas nos situaremos aqui num outro nível: o dos problemas e projetos filosóficos. Sobre esse plano, apresentamos o entrecruzamento das leituras do Essai e de Nietzsche et la philosophie, para ver como é esclarecedor: enquanto um Canguilhem (...) menos exclusivamente racionalista aí aparece, vemos na pesquisa filosofia efetivada por Deleuze algo distinto de um gesto que eleva a reflexão a um grau suplementar de abstração. Mais profundamente, tal aproximação coloca sob novas perspectivas a tripla significação da refundação do criticismo kantiano como uma filosofia de valores, de sua relação com uma "filosofia de vida" e de seu ponto culminante na problematização da imagem do pensamento.  . (shrink)

Following a long-standing philosophical tradition, impartiality is a distinctive and determining feature of moral judgments, especially in matters of distributive justice. This broad ethical tradition was revived in welfare economics by Vickrey, and above all, Harsanyi, under the form of the so-called Impartial Observer Theorem. The paper offers an analytical reconstruction of this argument and a step-wise philosophical critique of its premisses. It eventually provides a new formal version of the theorem based on subjective probability.