ZusammenfassungEs gibt eine uralte Idee, nach der es – nicht nur, aber vor allem in ethischen Dingen – mit dem, was hier und jetzt geschieht, nicht getan ist. Die Gegenposition macht spätestens dann ihr Recht geltend, wenn sie die wichtige Frage aufwirft, was dieses „Jenseits“ denn mit dem zu tun hat, was hier und heute geschieht. Im Text wird versucht, diese beiden Positionen anhand der Betrachtung einer bekannten Bemerkung aus der Heiligen Schrift miteinander zu vermitteln, also zu zeigen, wie das, (...) was hier und heute geschieht, schon von sich aus auf jenes Andere verweist, und wie dieses wiederum nur verständlich wird vor dem Hintergrund des Hier und Jetzt. (shrink)

Abstract When it comes to sustainability, there is an error we are likely to make. This error takes the form of thinking that we can first discuss ?the concept of economy?, or whatever it is that may be made sustainable, ignoring specific issues of sustainability; then, in a second step we can simply add on to that initial analysis a further discussion of what kind of economies are sustainable and what kind are not. One might then simply go on to (...) generalise this procedure thereby producing parallel treatments of sustainable politics, sustainable nourishment, sustainable partnerships, architecture, education, gardening, sports and so on. However, on my view this is a mistaken way to proceed. This way makes one liable to a serious substantive misunderstanding both of the concepts involved in this discussion and of some of the practical demands we will face if we are to try to engage seriously with the issues our current economic problems pose for us. (shrink)

Frankfurt/M., Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien. Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Lutterfelds, Richard Raatzsch und Andreas Roser. The works of both Goethe and Wittgenstein are a permanent challenge. Goethe's lasting effectiveness is to be found in the alternative nature of his world-view (Weltan-Schauung), which may be characterized as a morphological access to the manifold of phenomena. Lasting in a similar way to the effect of Goethe, one could certainly say today that Wittgenstein's effect has lasted. This is no coincidence. The (...) fact that late Wittgenstein goes together with Goethe in fundamental respects, or even follows him, cannot be overseen. Wittgenstein's lasting legacy has, to a large extent, the same source as that of Goethe's. - This relation is the subject of this book. Contents: Fritz Breithaupt/Richard Raatzsch: Introduction - James C. Klagge: The Puzzle of Goethe's Influence on Wittgenstein - Matthias Kross: Engineering Phenomena: Wittgenstein and Goethe on Scientific Method - Nikos Psarros: "Water is one individual thing - it never changes." Quoting Faraday in the Philosophical Investigations: A Riddle with a Goethean Solution? - Joachim Schulte: Goethe and Wittgenstein on Morphology - Fritz Breithaupt: Non-Referentiality: A Common Strategy in Goethe's Urphanomen and Wittgenstein's Language-Game - Alfred Nordmann: "I have changed his way of seeing" -Goethe, Lichtenberg, and Wittgenstein - Garry Hagberg: The Mind shown. Wittgenstein, Goethe and the Question of Person-Perception - Richard Eldridge: Romantic Subjectivity in Goethe and Wittgenstein - Richard Raatzsch: Goethe's Wahlverwandtschaften - The Ethical Investigations of Late Wittgenstein? (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 67 Heft: 2 Seiten: 174-191.

Name der Zeitschrift: Wittgenstein-Studien Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 27-56.

According to Raymond Geuss, the focus on politician untruthfulness distracts our attention from the political questions that really matter. This tendency is, for Geuss, a sign of our time showing the »persistence of bog-Christian attitudes«. Ancient Greek society, Geuss argues, had a different view on mendacious behavior and political untruthfulness. In this paper, I give a comparative approach to Greek and Christian politics of mendaciousness via the notion of ideology – vindicating to some extend the present-day focus on political untruthfulness.

You can see me doing this or that. And your seeing me doing this or that is the source, or even the form, of your knowing what I am doing. As well as the source, or the form, of my knowing what you are doing might be my seeing you doing this or that. However, it would be strange to say that one is looking for what one is doing in order to know it. Nevertheless, it would also be strange (...) to say that one does not know what one is doing when one is doing this or that. So, what is the source, or even the form, of one's knowledge of what one is doing, given that one knows what one is doing? Or is there something strange about this being an assumption? When, then, do we say that one knows, and then also: that one does not know, what one is doing? (shrink)

How much can and should be said about the beginning of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI) on the basis of its very first section alone? Is the only thing worth mentioning that it is designed to introduce the topic for the rest of the book - may this be a "pre-philosophical", "pre-theoretical", "Augustinian" picture of Ianguage (Baker/Hacker, Kenny, Katz, Canfield et al.) or a mentalistic picture of the use of language (Savigny)? These ways of interpreting leave too many aspects of the (...) text untouched. Some of these are: Why does Wittgenstein quote just from the Confessions if his only interest was to get a picture of language? How about Wittgenstein's different ways of dealing with the quotation from Augustine? Trying to answer these questions means to develop a new, more complicated picture o f the beginning of the PI. (shrink)

How much can and should be said about the beginning of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PI) on the basis of its very first section alone? Is the only thing worth mentioning that it is designed to introduce the topic for the rest of the book - may this be a "pre-philosophical", "pre-theoretical", "Augustinian" picture of Ianguage (Baker/Hacker, Kenny, Katz, Canfield et al.) or a mentalistic picture of the use of language (Savigny)? These ways of interpreting leave too many aspects of the (...) text untouched. Some of these are: Why does Wittgenstein quote just from the Confessions if his only interest was to get a picture of language? How about Wittgenstein's different ways of dealing with the quotation from Augustine? Trying to answer these questions means to develop a new, more complicated picture o f the beginning of the PI. (shrink)

Reality and Appearance. At the beginning of On Certainty, as its second entry, Wittgenstein makes a remark according to which the fact that something appears to me, or to all of us, to be so and so does not entail the fact that it is so and so. This looks like a straightforward philosophical claim made by Wittgenstein. This claim fits into a family of views on the nature of the relation between appearance and reality which in turn is related (...) to a family of views concerning the nature of belief, knowledge and certainty. However, it is common experience with Wittgenstein’s remarks that what appears to be a straightforward philosophical claim is actually no such thing. The essay follows that experience to a point where it becomes unclear what the remark about appearance and reality could possibly be if not a philosophical claim. (shrink)

This book is a concise philosophical meditation on Iago and the nature of evil, through the exploration of the enduring puzzle found in Shakespeare's Othello. What drives Iago to orchestrate Othello's downfall? Instead of treating Iago's lack of motive as the play's greatest weakness, The Apologetics of Evil shows how this absence of motive is the play's greatest strength. Richard Raatzsch determines that Iago does not seek a particular end or revenge for a discrete wrong; instead, Iago is governed by (...) a passion for intriguing in itself. Raatzsch explains that this passion is a pathological version of ordinary human behavior and that Iago lacks the ability to acknowledge others; what matters most to him is the difference between himself and the rest of the world. The book opens with a portrait of Iago, and considers the nature and moral significance of the evil that he represents. Raatzsch addresses the boundaries dividing normality and pathology, conceptualizing evil as a pathological form of the good or ordinary. Seen this way, evil is conceptually dependent on the ordinary, and Iago, as a form of moral monster, is a kind of nonbeing. Therefore, his actions might be understood and defended, even if they cannot be justified. In a brief epilogue, Raatzsch argues that literature's presentation of what is monstrous or virtuous can constitute an understanding of these concepts, not merely illustrate them. (shrink)

Abstract“If it passes, then it was not true love.” On two Remarks by Wittgenstein about Love. Wittgenstein’s Nachlass does not contain many philosophical remarks on love. Yet, the ones it does contain can be made fruitful for the long-lasting philosophical debate on love’s nature. This text, however, focuses on just two of these remarks, preparing their discussion extensively by sketching part of the philosophical background against which their points become visible.

Im Paragraphen 206 seiner Philosophischen Untersuchungen sagt Ludwig Wittgenstein, daß „die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise das Bezugssystem (ist), mittels dessen wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten". Unter,,gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise" wurde in der Literatur ein Bündel an Gattungsmerkmalen des Menschen verstanden (Baker/Hacker; Haller). Diese Interpretation ist exegetisch nicht überzeugend. Auch die Lesart (v. Savigny), wonach es lediglich um Gemeinsamkeiten der Sprechergemeinschaft geht, ist nicht zwingend. Am plausibelsten ist die Interpretation (Schulte) im Sinne einer Sprecher- und Beobachtergemeinschaft gemeinsamen Handlungsweise.

Im Paragraphen 206 seiner Philosophischen Untersuchungen sagt Ludwig Wittgenstein, daß „die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise das Bezugssystem (ist), mittels dessen wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten". Unter,,gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise" wurde in der Literatur ein Bündel an Gattungsmerkmalen des Menschen verstanden (Baker/Hacker; Haller). Diese Interpretation ist exegetisch nicht überzeugend. Auch die Lesart (v. Savigny), wonach es lediglich um Gemeinsamkeiten der Sprechergemeinschaft geht, ist nicht zwingend. Am plausibelsten ist die Interpretation (Schulte) im Sinne einer Sprecher- und Beobachtergemeinschaft gemeinsamen Handlungsweise.