To solve the direct problem of central forces when the trajectory is an ellipse and the force is directed to its centre, Newton made use of the famous Lemma 12 (Principia, I, sect. II) that was later recognized equivalent to proposition 31 of book VII of Apollonius’s Conics. In this paper, in which we look for Newton’s possible sources for Lemma 12, we compare Apollonius’s original proof, as edited by Borelli, with those of other authors, including that given by Newton (...) himself. Moreover, after having retraced its editorial history, we evaluate the dissemination of Borelli's edition of books V-VII of Apollonius’s Conics before the printing of the Principia. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe the genesis of Boscovich’s Sectionum Conicarum Elementa and discuss the motivations which led him to write this work. Moreover, by analysing the structure of this treatise in some depth, we show how he developed the completely new idea of “eccentric circle” and derived the whole theory of conic sections by starting from it. We also comment on the reception of this treatise in Italy, and abroad, especially in England, where—since the late eighteenth century—several authors found (...) inspiration in Boscovich’s work to write their treatises on conic sections. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe the genesis of Boscovich’s Sectionum Conicarum Elementa and discuss the motivations which led him to write this work. Moreover, by analysing the structure of this treatise in some depth, we show how he developed the completely new idea of “eccentric circle” and derived the whole theory of conic sections by starting from it. We also comment on the reception of this treatise in Italy, and abroad, especially in England, where—since the late eighteenth century—several authors found (...) inspiration in Boscovich’s work to write their treatises on conic sections. (shrink)

This paper publishes the correspondence between S. Germain and C.F. Gauss. The mathematical notes enclosed in her letters are published for the first time. These notes, in which she submitted some of her results, proofs and conjectures to Gauss for his evaluation, were inspired by her study of the Disquisitiones Arithmeticae. The interpretation of these mathematical notes not only shows how deeply she went into Gauss’s treatise and mastered it long before any other mathematician, but also, more importantly, shows that (...) she obtained interesting results in the theory of power residues that have never previously been attributed to her. (shrink)

A associação de Rousseau às fontes filosóficas da democracia não constitui algo livre de discussões. O próprio autor preferia a qualificação de “republicano” em vez de “democrata”, e no Contrato Social apontou sérias dificuldades para a existência da democracia como uma forma de governo, ainda que suas teses sobre a soberania popular reverberem princípios tipicamente ligados às constituições democráticas. Diante disso, Kevin Inston questionou que os democratas radicais contemporâneos tenham negligenciado a contribuição do filósofo genebrino, e por isto buscou mostrar (...) o quanto ela continua sendo relevante para enfrentar os desafios políticos da atualidade. Todavia, em que medida se sustentam os esforços de Inston para compatibilizar a teoria política rousseauniana com a democracia contemporânea? Não terá o comentador subestimado ou ignorado elementos cruciais que tornam tal convergência problemática? O objetivo deste artigo é tentar fornecer algumas respostas para tais perguntas. (shrink)

This article is a belated contribution to a Common Knowledge symposium on the “unanticipated conceptual practice” of “anthropological philosophy.” The basic argument is that the groundwork for this emerging approach, associated foremost with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's book Métaphysiques cannibales of 2009, was laid in the 1970s by the controversial French anthropologists Pierre and Hélène Clastres. It is argued that the Clastres took the intellectual practices of Guarani shamans and prophets as analogous to the those of ancient Greek philosophers but (...) also as sharply critical of the principles that underlay early Western metaphysics. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é analisar o conceito de liberdade presente na obra de Rousseau e fornecer argumentos para questionar a imagem do homem natural como um ser livre, de modo a sustentar a tese de que a liberdade somente se torna possível com a saída do estado de natureza descrito no Discurso sobre as origens da desigualdade . Assim, o autor pretende mostrar que o surgimento da consciência e da racionalidade é indispensável para que o homem consiga desenvolver suas (...) faculdades virtuais e seja capaz de criar para si padrões de comportamento diferentes do instinto natural, um processo que ocorre graças à vida em sociedade. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é duplo: primeiramente, tecer alguns comentários sobre o uso feito pelo filósofo da ocorrência de fenômenos da natureza como fatores explicativos para mudanças profundas ocorridas no comportamento humano, um recurso argumentativo presente nas duas narrativas hipotéticas; em seguida, abordar as razões que Rousseau fornece para que esses acontecimentos deixem de ser simples fatos naturais e se tornem verdadeiras catástrofes para o ser humano, as quais podem ser encontradas, por exemplo, na Carta a Voltaire sobre a Providência.

RESUMO:As relações de conflito entre os grupos sociais constituem um tópico relevante para a filosofia política, e as maneiras distintas como elas são interpretadas dependem de uma visão mais ampla sobre as condições apropriadas a um Estado bem-ordenado. Maquiavel, por exemplo, ao refletir sobre o caso da Roma Antiga, procurou refutar aqueles que condenavam os tumultos entre os nobres e a plebe da cidade, como se eles tivessem provocado apenas males à república. Para o autor, tais tumultos estavam entre as (...) principais causas da liberdade romana, visto que a diferença nos “humores” dos grandes e do povo resultou em embates que deram origem às leis favoráveis à liberdade. Rousseau, por sua vez, descreveu a existência de “associações particulares” dentro da sociedade civil como algo potencialmente nocivo à harmonia da república, pois cada uma delas contém um interesse particular passível de se sobrepor ao bem comum, nas deliberações públicas, prejudicando o prevalecimento da vontade geral. Ainda para o genebrino, a ocorrência de longos debates e de tumultos nas assembleias populares poderia ser um sinal de divisões internas capazes de ocasionar a ruína do Estado. Frente a essas duas maneiras de conceber o papel político dos conflitos sociais, o objetivo deste trabalho é realizar uma análise comparativa das ideias de Maquiavel e de Rousseau. ABSTRACT:The conflictual relations between social groups constitute an important topic for political philosophy, and the different ways in which they are interpreted depend on a broader view of the appropriate conditions for a well-ordered state. Machiavelli, for example, by reflecting on the case of Ancient Rome, sought to refute those who condemned the tumultuous conflicts between the nobles and the plebs of the city as if they had only caused harm to the Republic. For this author, these tumults were among the main causes of Roman freedom, since the difference in the “humours” of the great and the people led to clashes that gave birth to laws favorable to freedom. Rousseau, for his part, described the existence of “private associations” within civil society as something potentially harmful to the harmony of the Republic, because each of them had a self-interest that was able to override the common good in public deliberations and jeopardize the prevalence of the general will. For Rousseau, the occurrence of long debates and tumults in the popular assemblies could also be a sign of internal divisions capable of causing the ruin of the state. In the face of these two ways of conceiving the political role of social conflicts, the goal of this article is to make a comparative analysis of Machiavelli’s and Rousseau’s ideas. (shrink)

No debate entre liberais e comunitaristas, colocam-se perspectivas distintas sobre temas políticos cruciais, à medida que se busca definir a relação mais apropriada entre o indivíduo e a coletividade, ora salientando-se o valor da autonomia pessoal, ora enfatizando-se a importância da inserção identitária dos sujeitos no contexto social. Embora os escritos de Rousseau precedam a discussão entre essas correntes de pensamento, eles abrangeram temas sobre os quais as duas se debruçam. O autor toma o indivíduo como base para a construção (...) do Estado, mas também mostra que essa unidade natural precisa ser transformada em uma parte de uma comunidade coesa e dotada de sua própria vontade geral. Assim, pretendo realizar um exercício interpretativo que, a partir de questões postas em relevo por aquele debate, analisará como Rousseau aliou seus princípios do direito político à preocupação com as particularidades de cada povo, o que faz suas teses transitarem entre as fronteiras do que, posteriormente, seriam os campos do liberalismo e do comunitarismo. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the citizenship proposed by Rousseau in light of certain delimitations placed by the philosopher to the exercise of this right, which configure a kind of political participation that would be appropriate to the regime described in the Social Contract. So, I intend to show that popular sovereignty has, for the Genevan writer, a key role in defending the legislation, and that it is up to the Lawgiver and to the magistrates guide citizens (...) in approving the good laws necessary for the State. This thesis is consistent with Rousseau’s republicanism, since it shows that these citizens, members of the social compact, are responsible for protecting and preserving their own freedom throughout the existence of the political body. (shrink)

The Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment series, previously known as SVEC (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century), has published over 500 peer-reviewed scholarly volumes since 1955 as part of the Voltaire Foundation at the University of Oxford. International in focus, Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment volumes cover wide-ranging aspects of the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment, from gender studies to political theory, and from economics to visual arts and music, and are published in English or French.

Anthony Kenny criticized the Five Ways, by Thomas Aquinas, in a widespread and influential book. About the First Way, among other critiques, Kenny considers that Thomas Aquinas failed to prove that “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another”. As this principle is central for the argument developed by Aquinas on the “first mover, put in movement by no other”, the First Way is insufficient and grounded on a mistake. In this article, Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s works are analysed (...) to expose that their arguments about movement are sound and persuasive. On the contrary, Kenny’s criticism is not consistent and is misled by bad interpretation of texts and concepts. Oderberg and Weisheipl agree with Aquinas and Aristotle, and their papers reinforce the conclusions of this article, favourable to the Medieval philosopher and against Kenny. (shrink)

The article examines Kant's notion of conceptual extension in order to determine a conception of predication that could integrate, in a coherent fashion, basic theoretical commitments of general logic as he conceived it and the central tenets of his transcendental logic. After a brief overview of the several characterizations of thatnotion in the Kantian corpus, I distinguish three interpretative models concerning it in the literature. Such models are criticized and their prospects of integrating Kant's commitments in a fully satisfactory way (...) are rejected. Finally, I sketch an alternative account of Kant's notion of conceptual extension, which respects the criteria of adequacy that guided the examination of the former models. It points, on its turn, to a revaluation of Kant's notion of conceptual content. (shrink)

The Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment series, previously known as SVEC (Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century), has published over 500 peer-reviewed scholarly volumes since 1955 as part of the Voltaire Foundation at the University of Oxford. International in focus, Oxford University Studies in the Enlightenment volumes cover wide-ranging aspects of the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment, from gender studies to political theory, and from economics to visual arts and music, and are published in English or French.

The discussion on ethical issues, it is said, should not be confined to experts but should be extended to patients and local communities, because of the real need to engage stakeholders and non‐stakeholders alike not only in carrying out any biomedical research project, but also in the drafting and legislation of bioethics instruments. Several local and inter‐country consultations have already been conducted in furtherance of this goal, but there is much left to be desired in them. The consultations may have (...) helped in articulating local principles, but not in making the instruments embody these principles. As such, instruments turn incompossible, i.e. the principles and actions they legitimate are not performable. In an ethnographic study conducted in the Philippines, for example, paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Declaration of Helsinki and CIOMS guidelines 8 and 15 are construed as not only contradictory to one another but also to local principles. This problem can be solved by taking deliberate steps to ensure that consultations are grounded in ethnographic data about local principles, which the instruments would embody. A steering committee can be of help in gathering ethnographic data, in conducting consultations at the local level, and in providing a venue for discourse on various bioethical issues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics CommentaryRenato Manaloto, Assistant ProfessorThe key ethical question in this case is whether it is acceptable for Dr. C to disclose information about the 16-year-old patient’s sexual and psychiatric health condition. The answer to the question is yes, if such disclosure serves the patients’ well-being and future interests.The patient, Miss M, may have had her own reasons for asking Dr. C not to inform her parents of her condition (...) — perhaps she was worried about their reaction, or believed that such disclosure was unnecessary, because she could already understand, have an opinion and make decisions for herself. In this respect, Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child provides assurance for “the child, who is capable of forming his or her own views, the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting” him or her. As a 16-year-old, Miss M plausibly senses her capacity for decision-making that is independent of her parents. Various developmental theories, such as those of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, affirm that her decision-making competence might have reached maturity by age 16.1 Seeing her wishes respected, Miss M may be encouraged to open up to Dr. C and receive suitable medical care or services, which may not be there if confidence in her doctor is broken. Her exercise of autonomous decision-making capacity may help in her recovery and restoration.Dependency of children on their parents is, however, arguably unavoidable as they are yet to possess capacities of decision-making equal to those of adults. Children are still, in the words of Aristotle, albeit pejorative, “incomplete adults […] unfinished human beings”, or “becomings” rather than “beings”.2 If [End Page 265] they live under the authority of their parents, they may be subject to “Constrained Parental Paternalism”. Constrained because: “It must be exercised for the good of the child and its exercise lasts only for so long as the child is incapable of making its own choices”.3Following this line of argument, parents may exercise authority over their children in ways that guide their decision-making and thereby promote their best interests. John Locke terms this “guiding the decision-making”, “informing the mind”.4 Immanuel Kant justifies “promoting the best interests of children” as: those who have brought a child into the world “incur an obligation to make the child content with his condition so far as they can”.5 “From this duty,” Kant adds, “there must necessarily arise the right of parents to manage and develop the child.” 6 Thus, parents may have not only an obligation, but also a right to guide the decision-making of their children.As persons who can understand and respond to the needs of their children, parents may be the best judges of the child’s well-being so that they may always be involved in the decision-making especially for significant decisions involving medical care the child. After all, making a medical decision can involve major life decisions. Medical choices may have long-term impact on a child’s well-being that makes parents’ involvement in such decision-making highly desirable. No amount of care by doctors for the child patient can match the invaluable insight and knowledge of the parents.In the case at hand, Miss M’s parents should be informed of her condition as they can provide her with essential support for her recovery and the restoration of her well-being. The mere fact that her parents protested about not being informed of her condition suggests that they wanted — in the sense of taking responsibility and supporting her future interests — to be involved in the medical decision-making. They believe that any harm or injury might have been prevented had they been informed. Miss M is also still under the care and custody of her parents. Not having reached the age of maturity, her parents have an obligation and a right to guide her decision-making.Nevertheless, in some countries, children between 13 and 16 years of age have the right to make medical decisions without parental involvement. In Singapore, parents’ participation in the medical care of... (shrink)

Resumo: Percepção sensorial: até hoje um grande mistério filosófico. O presente trabalho divide-se em duas partes. A primeira sintetiza a crítica ao modelo representacionista intracerebral predominante, e enuncia um argumento que prepara o terreno para a segunda parte do trabalho. Nesta, a teoria pragmatista da percepção é equiparada à de Aristóteles, em De Anima. Eis, grosso modo, o argumento: percepção resulta de fatores causais da natureza inerentes à transação organismo ambiente; tais fatores não podem ser encontrados entre os elementos ontológicos (...) revelados na própria percepção; logo a estrutura ontológica revelada na percepção não reflete a total complexidade da transação real organismo ambiente. Esta conclusão é crucial para entender a teoria pragmatista-aristotélica da percepção; passagem da fase sujeito-no-mundo para a fase mundo-no-sujeito, via recepção imaterial de formas - estabelecimento de campo anteceptivo consciente de potencialidades de ação subentendidas em tais formas. Pragmatismo como naturalismo esclarecido: a percepção é a versão histórico-natural mais evoluída do mesmo mecanismo chave-e-fechadura próprio da detecção de formas inerente a interações ontológicas elementares - biológicas e mesmo físico-químicas. Mas em vez de detecção-na-ação nomológica/biológico automática: detecção consciente, em aberto, de possibilidades de ação livre inscritas no ambiente do precipiente.: Even today, sensorial perception is a great philosophic mystery. This work is divided in two parts: The first synthesizes and criticizes the prevailing cerebral representationism model and enunciates an argument that prepares the field to second one. In this second part the pragmatism perceptions theory is compared to Aristotle's De Anima. Here is, in a general way, the argument: perception is the result of nature's cause factors intrinsic to organism environment transaction; these factors cannot be encountered among revealed ontological elements of this same perception; therefore the ontological structure reveled by perception doesn't reflect the totality of the organism-environment's transaction complexity. This conclusion is vital to understand the Aristotelian-pragmatic perception theory: the subject-on-world's transposition to world-on-subject phase, via "immaterial reception of forms"- establishment of the anteceptive field conscious of the action potentialities in such way. Pragmatism naturalism cleared up: the perception is a natural-historic evolved version of this same key-and-locker mechanism proper to form detection intrinsic of elementary ontological, biologic and even physical-chemical interaction. But instead of detection in the automatic nomological/biological action: conscious detection, opened, of free actions possibilities inserted in the percipient environment. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the predominant, representational-neurophysicalist conception of sensory perception. It introduces the notion of "experience-field" to give a tentative ontological account of the phenomenological data of experience. The general idea is that visual experience, for instance, would be ontologically something like an experience-field extending over and between the central nervous sistem of the subject of the experience and the distal object of vision. I call this position phenomenological macrorealism, in contrast to scientific microrealism. Phenomenal qualities are not subjectively inside (...) the brain, but objectively inside perceptual extraencephalic experience-fields, or, as we say, out there in the world. Some specific consequences of phenomenological macrorealism are presented.Este artigo critica a concepção predominante, representacionista-neurofisicalista sobre a percepção sensorial. Introduz a noção de "campo-experiência" na tentativa de tratamento ontológico dos dados fenomenológicos da experiência. A idéia geral é que a experiência visual, por exemplo, seria ontologicamente algo assim como um campo-experiência de intencionalidade visual, que se estende por sobre e entre o sistema nervoso central do sujeito da experiência e o objeto distai da visão. Chamo esta posição de macrorrealismo fenomenológico, em contraste com o microrrealismo científico. Qualidades da fenomenalidade não estão subjetivamente dentro do cérebro, mas objetivamente dentro de campos-experiência perceptuais extra-encefálicos, ou, como dizemos, lá fora no mundo. Algumas conseqüências específicas do macrorrealismo fenomenológico são apresentadas. (shrink)

In order to understand how the logic of public management can enrich humanistic management’s practices, the current paper will analyze the managerial practices adopted by public administrations within a situation of emergency, a condition where the specific features of the public management can emerge more clearly. Specifically, it will focus on the ways in which the municipality of Bergamo (one of the hardest-hit cities) have reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic, outlining interesting managerial practices especially from the point of view of (...) Humanistic Management’s theory. Such interest resides also in the fact that although the Humanistic Management’s field of research has dealt with a wide range of topics (including human development, emancipation and progress), so far, however, it has not yet considered public administrations, whose role is by definition oriented towards human development through the creation of public value. The analysis of public management through the lens of Humanistic Management can be useful in various respects. Above all, the difference between public administrations and private enterprises can also lead to a very much different process of value creation, based on collaborative forms of production as well as relational and reflexive forms of management. In accordance with the Humanistic Management framework, also business organizations must generate social wellbeing. From this point of view, the lesson of public administrations can be extremely useful for business organization and management alike. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é o de evidenciar de que forma a afirmação de ser ser-para-a-morte de Heidegger pode ser entendido como condição de possibilidade para a responsabilização do desejo conforme formulado pela psicanálise lacaniana. Primeiro, descreve-se a estrutura do Dasein heideggeriano, bem como seus existenciais. Em seguida, analisa-se o uso e o sentido da noção de desejo em Lacan. Tanto numa existência autêntica, quanto num final de análise, onde o sujeito sabe lidar com suas perdas, diante da angústia, ele (...) assume um papel de protagonista de sua existência e consegue se responsabilizar pelo seu desejo. A análise, nesse sentido, serve como uma ferramenta que possibilita o sujeito lidar com este sofrimento decorrente da falta, deste nada que falou Heidegger. Evidentemente que a análise não objetiva eliminar esta falta ontológica, mas tão somente desconstruir os fantasmas que o sujeito construiu para afastar o que lhe é mais próprio, constitutivo de sua estrutura ontológica, qual seja, sua finitude. Portanto, tanto para Heidegger, por meio da afirmação da angústia frente à morte, quanto para Lacan, onde o sujeito assumiu a tragédia de sua existência – no final de análise –, é a afirmação da finitude que possibilita a responsabilização do desejo, de ser autêntico ou, se preferir, sujeito. (shrink)

Uma concepção de cosmopolitismo, de base eurocêntrica, é questionada por pensadores como K. A. Appiah, Walter Mignolo, Silviano Santiago entre outros, para buscar possíveis ressemantizações do termo no contexto contemporâneo, marcado pela globalização, pelo multiculturalismo e pela expansão das novas tecnologias de comunicação. Considerando esse confronto de noções de cosmopolitismo, indaga-se como se deu a interpretação do Brasil no início do século XX, quando recrudesceram as tensões entre cosmopolitismo e nacionalismo. Busca-se, por outro lado, confrontar tais interpretações com as que (...) surgem no início do século XXI, quando a nação vai deixando de ser o centro de um sistema de significação, em tempo heterogêneo e de globalização, em que se pode falar em “cosmopolitismo do pobre” (cosmopolitismo do subalterno), como formulou Silviano Santiago. (shrink)