Here, Rhonda Martens offers the first extended study of Kepler's philosophical views and shows how those views helped him construct and justify the new astronomy.

Much of the human enhancement literature focuses on the ethical, social, and political challenges we are likely to face in the future. I will focus instead on whether we can make decisions to modify ourselves that are known to be likely to satisfy our preferences. It seems plausible to suppose that, if a subject is deciding whether to select a reasonably safe and morally unproblematic enhancement, the decision will be an easy one. The subject will simply figure out her preferences (...) and decide accordingly. The problem, however, is that there is substantial evidence that we are not very good at predicting what will satisfy our preferences. This is a general problem that applies to many different types of decisions, but I argue that there are additional complications when it comes to making decisions about enhancing ourselves. These arise not only for people interested in selecting enhancements but also for people who choose to abstain. (shrink)

Copernicus claimed that his system was preferable in part on the grounds of its superior harmony and simplicity, but left very few hints as to what was meant by these terms. Copernicus’s pupil, Rheticus, was more forthcoming. Kepler, influenced by Rheticus, articulated further the nature of the virtues of harmony and simplicity. I argue that these terms are metaphors for the structural features of the Copernican system that make it more able to effectively exploit the available data. So it is (...) a mistake to conclude that early Copernicans could only offer aesthetic or pragmatic arguments; they could and did offer evidential ones as well. Moreover, the evidential arguments they offered parallel current arguments in the philosophical literature.Keywords: Nicolaus Copernicus; Georg Joachim Rheticus; Johannes Kepler; Simplicity; Bayesianism; Hirotsugu Akaike. (shrink)

Studies have shown that using robot pets in dementia care contributes to a reduction in loneliness and anxiety, and other benefits. Studies also show that, even when people know they are dealing with robots, they often treat the robot as though it is a real pet with genuine emotions. This disconnect between beliefs and behavior occurs not just for people living with dementia, but with cognitively healthy adults, including those who are knowledgeable about how robots work. One possible explanation is (...) that robot pets prompt contradictory beliefs, and so the use of robot pets encourages self‐deception. Sparrow argues that this makes the use of robot pets in dementia care morally objectionable. We disagree. We argue that Gendler's concept of alief offers a better explanation of the belief‐behavior disconnect observed when people interact with robot pets. An alief is a mental state composed of an automatic, arational, emotional, and behavioral response to representational input. Aliefs are not beliefs and are not subject to truth norms. Thus, on our view, harms associated with the use of robot pets in dementia care are not likely to include the self‐deceptions that Sparrow suggests. It might seem like philosophical hair‐splitting to claim that deception has not occurred because discordant aliefs rather than false beliefs have been formed, but this distinction matters. We argue that aliefs carry their own risks. These risks are important to consider when using robot pets in dementia care. (shrink)

Kepler, the father of modern physical astronomy, believed that the world is ordered by Archetypes . As quaint as this may seem, I argue that Kepler's archetypes provided methodological and epistemological solutions to problems in physical astronomy acknowledged during his time. ;Kepler used the assumption of a harmony between the archetypal and physical world to argue for the legitimacy of certain methodological innovations. The main difficulty facing astronomers at that time was the availability of observationally equivalent competing astronomical hypotheses. Kepler's (...) solution was to argue that the hypotheses could be distinguished between by proper testing and by bringing in considerations from other disciplines, especially physics. Kepler's account of the proper testing of hypotheses, though modern in appearance, was grounded in his archetypal cosmology. The use of physics in astronomy, also a modern innovation, was not considered to be methodologically sound during Kepler's time unless certain conditions were met. Under Kepler's archetypal cosmology these conditions were met, thereby legitimating the use of physics in astronomy. ;Kepler's archetypes play another role in his physical astronomy. The Aristotelian account of physics still dominant was qualitative in character. The use of mathematical physics was acceptable if it was grounded in qualitative theory, which Kepler was unable to fully provide. I argue that Kepler's archetypal cosmology enabled him to overcome this conceptual barrier. While Kepler agreed with Aristotle that mathematics is unable to reveal anything about physical causes, he believed that the archetypes are not limited in this manner. For Kepler, God's only reason for creating physical powers was to instantiate the archetypes; hence a study of archetypes can provide information about physical causes. When Kepler was unable to attach mathematical models to qualitative physical theory, he attached them to archetypal models, thereby legitimating their use in physics. ;Kepler's archetypes are no longer scientifically significant. At the time, however, they functioned to break down some of the conceptual barriers to his new physical astronomy. As a result, understanding Kepler's archetypes is of paramount importance for understanding his role in the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (shrink)