In this book, I make use of an idea from economics to suggest how noble human tendencies might not only have survived the ruthless pressures of the material world, but actually have been nurtured by them.

How important is luck in economic success? No question more reliably divides conservatives from liberals. As conservatives correctly observe, people who amass great fortunes are almost always talented and hardworking. But liberals are also correct to note that countless others have those same qualities yet never earn much. In recent years, social scientists have discovered that chance plays a much larger role in important life outcomes than most people imagine. In Success and Luck, bestselling author and New York Times economics (...) columnist Robert Frank explores the surprising implications of those findings to show why the rich underestimate the importance of luck in success--and why that hurts everyone, even the wealthy. Frank describes how, in a world increasingly dominated by winner-take-all markets, chance opportunities and trivial initial advantages often translate into much larger ones--and enormous income differences--over time; how false beliefs about luck persist, despite compelling evidence against them; and how myths about personal success and luck shape individual and political choices in harmful ways. But, Frank argues, we could decrease the inequality driven by sheer luck by adopting simple, unintrusive policies that would free up trillions of dollars each year--more than enough to fix our crumbling infrastructure, expand healthcare coverage, fight global warming, and reduce poverty, all without requiring painful sacrifices from anyone. If this sounds implausible, you'll be surprised to discover that the solution requires only a few, uncontroversial steps. Compellingly readable, Success and Luck shows how a more accurate understanding of the role of chance in life could lead to better, richer, and fairer economies and societies. (shrink)

Sympathy and other moral emotions described by David Hume (1740/1978) and Adam Smith (1759/1966) motivate people to incur a host of costs they could easily avoid. Such emotions pose a challenge to evolutionary biologists, who have long stressed the primacy of narrow self-interest in Darwinian selection. In earlier work, I argued (Frank, 1987, 1988) that natural selection might have favored moral sentiments because of their capacity to facilitate solutions to one-shot social dilemmas. Here, I present a capsule summary of the (...) basic argument. (shrink)

Theories of natural language syntax often characterize grammatical knowledge as a form of abstract computation. This paper argues that such a characterization is correct, and that fundamental properties of grammar can and should be understood in terms of restrictions on the complexity of possible grammatical computation, when defined in terms of generative capacity. More specifically, the paper demonstrates that the computational restrictiveness imposed by Tree Adjoining Grammar provides important insights into the nature of human grammatical knowledge.

In earlier work, I proposed the ‘adaptive standard of rationality’, according to which narrow self-interest models can be broadened by positing additional tastes, but only upon a plausible showing that those tastes do not hamper resource acquisition in competitive environments. This proposal is related to the green beard hypothesis from biology, according to which altruism might be adaptive if its presence could be reliably signaled by some observable feature, such as a green beard. In their contribution to this issue Ernst (...) Fehr and Urs Fischbacher offer theoretical arguments and describe laboratory experiments whose results they interpret as refuting my version of the green beard hypothesis. In this response, I argue that their theoretical arguments and experimental evidence pose no threat to the green beard hypothesis. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a resurgence of contractarian thinking about the nature and origins of the state. Scholars in this tradition ask what constraints rational, self-interested actors might deliberately impose upon themselves. In response, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, and other early contractarians answered that laws of property were an attractive alternative to “the war of all against all.” More recently, James Buchanan, Russell Hardin, Mancur Olson, Gordon Tullock, and others have used contractarian principles to justify laws that solve a variety of (...) Prisoner's Dilemmas and other collective-action problems. And in the distributional realm, John Rawls and others have applied contractarian analysis to investigate how material wealth ought to be allocated among people. (shrink)

Rachlin's attack on the internal commitment model rests on the demonstrably false claim that self-punishment does not exist. He is correct that habits are an effective device for solving self-control problems, but his additional claim that they are the only such device makes it hard to explain how good habits develop in the first place. Someone with a self-control problem would always choose the spuriously attractive reward, which, over time, would create bad habits.

Ces dernières années, les historiens français de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ont beaucoup investi de leurs compétences sur l'histoire de Vichy, ce qui était tout à fait légitime du fait des enjeux de la mémoire. Après quelques décennies d'occultation de certaines réalités qui font mal à la conscience française - la collaboration d'État, l'antisémitisme du régime du maréchal Pétain, sa complicité avec les basses œuvres du génocide -, il était normal et souhaitable que les chercheurs fiss...

Ces dernières années, les historiens français de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ont beaucoup investi de leurs compétences sur l'histoire de Vichy, ce qui était tout à fait légitime du fait des enjeux de la mémoire. Après quelques décennies d'occultation de certaines réalités qui font mal à la conscience française - la collaboration d'État, l'antisémitisme du régime du maréchal Pétain, sa complicité avec les basses œuvres du génocide -, il était normal et souhaitable que les chercheurs fiss...

A major objective of cognitive science is to understand the nature of the abstract representations and computational processes responsible for our ability to reason, speak, perceive, and interact with the world. In addition, a commitment to a materialist resolution of the mind–body problem requires that we search for the manner in which these representations and processes are neurally instantiated in the brain. Given this dual aim, one might proceed in one of two ways: (1) from the bottom up, commencing with (...) the study of how low‐level information and computations are encoded in the neuroanatomy of the brain, in the hope of working upwards toward an understanding of the properties of higher‐level cognitive processes; (2) from the top down, using behavioral data from a variety of sources to provide an abstract characterization of cognitive processes and then utilizing these results to guide our search for the neural mechanisms of cognition. At present, our understanding of the neural basis of higher‐level cognition is virtually negligible. Thus, it is probably fair to say that a contemporary study of any of the domains discussed in part II of this volume may be carried out only in a top‐down fashion. (shrink)