It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect”, to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition of (...) an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

Ethical challenges are traditionally described in a negative light, even though moral conflict can express the individual ability to perceive when something is not working and promote change. The true question, therefore, is not to how to silence moral conflict but how to educate it. Although the need for ethical support of health- and social-care professionals in elderly care is clearly perceived, there is no universal method for providing effective interventions. The authors hypothesize that adequate training sessions can help care (...) professionals enhance this skill, once clear goals and specific educational techniques are set. This research tests the hypothesis on twenty care professionals working in acute and residential care settings for the elderly, building on the ethics round method. Mixed methods drawn from literature and the experience of educators were adapted to meet different educational goals. Moral issues can hardly be removed from a context characterized by increasing demand and decreasing resources, but they can be recognized and addressed with common efforts, a critical attitude, and a growth mindset. Enhancing these skills in qualified workers can help them accept the reality of work, release pressure, and identify common team goals. Introducing these skills before graduation can help future workers avoid unreal expectations and reduce frustration and early job quit rates. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect” (1977), to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition (...) of an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

Despite the differences, there is some convergence between Adam Smith's and Immanuel Kant's theories of moral motivation. Both rely on a peculiar feeling, respect, as the proper source of motive in moral matters. An analysis of Smith's and Kant's conception of respect shows that both recognize that it has a specific normative import and plays a decisive role in morality. This convergence offers some support to the idea that Smith's sentimentalism and Kant's rationalism are compatible, at least as far as (...) moral motivation is at issue. (shrink)

This article argues that, to distinguish between “critical” and “uncritical” solidarity, the normative concept of solidarity must be grounded on the principle of respect for persons. I start analyzing the principle of respect for persons from a modified Kantian perspective, arguing that it must be interpreted as a normative relation of power in which each person must recognize the autonomy of the other as a source of power. In this perspective, the principle of respect offers a foundation for an ethical (...) assessment of situations in which ethical solidarity is required. By drawing on the distinction between passive and active respect, I argue that solidarity is grounded on the duty of active respect in the face of danger or oppression and that this foundation allows us to distinguish between critical (i.e. appropriate) and uncritical (i.e. inappropriate) solidarity. (shrink)

Solidarity is often invoked in our times. The challenges posed by a complex juncture in human history seem to impose a rethinking of the concept and of the social practices that respond to the need...

This article examines the normative structure of the concept of health and tries to suggest an account of it in a phenomenological-hermeneutic framework. It is argued that the concept of health has a logical priority to illness, though the latter has an experiential priority. The fundamental feature of the concept of health as discussed in the literature is initially recognized in the notion of ‘norm’, in both the bio-statistical and normative-ideal sense. An analysis of this body of literature reveals some (...) weaknesses in bio-statistical definitions of health as well as in those normative ones which endorse a value-relativity thesis. An approach based on the analogical structure of language is then advanced. In this framework, the notion of biological normativeness proposed by G. Canguilhem is connected with an analysis of the language of health through etymologies. It is argued that health can be characterized as an analogy of ‘plenitude’, which is the common ideal reference of the various health-concepts. The analogical structuring of language allows the recognition of different levels of meaning, and therefore of different kinds of normativeness (biological, mental, social, moral). Some hints of a theory of health deriving from this framework are then given. Keywords: analogy, health, hermeneutics, norm, plenitude CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The varieties of meaning in which we use the terms illness and health requires that we develope a conceptualization allowing us to maintain a unity between the differences. In fact, the experiences of health and illness are complex ones and they need to be understood in their different levels so that the need for help of patients and their desire for health is adequately faced. At its roots, the experience of illness is that of a threat posed to the unreflective (...) credit given to life in good health. This threat has not only a biopsychosocial dimension, but a moral and sybolic one as well, and it is mainly at this level that illness represents a moral challenge. Contemporary culture seems to be at pains in suggesting a shared set of meanings enabling the patient to give an intersubjectively valid sense of illness, since the only kind of answer offered is a technical one. The symbolic dimension of the notions of health and illness call for a deeper cultural enterprise of looking for a credible sense of illness for our times. (shrink)

The varieties of meaning in which we use the terms illness and health requires that we develope a conceptualization allowing us to maintain a unity between the differences. In fact, the experiences of health and illness are complex ones and they need to be understood in their different levels so that the need for help of patients and their desire for health is adequately faced. At its roots, the experience of illness is that of a threat posed to the unreflective (...) credit given to life in good health. This threat has not only a biopsychosocial dimension, but a moral and sybolic one as well, and it is mainly at this level that illness represents a moral challenge. Contemporary culture seems to be at pains in suggesting a shared set of meanings enabling the patient to give an intersubjectively valid sense of illness, since the only kind of answer offered is a technical one. The symbolic dimension of the notions of health and illness call for a deeper cultural enterprise of looking for a credible sense of illness for our times. (shrink)

Enhancing cognition is a complex activity, for the sake of which humanity has developed a rich array of techniques and skills. We can distinguish between three categories: a) cognitive supports and education; b) neural cognitive enhancers: drugs and other ways to improve the functionality of cognitive neural networks; c) technological cognitive enhancers: implants, extended minds and technological supports variously integrated in the neural cognitive networks. Applying a version of the Parity Principle, I argue that there is no morally relevant difference (...) in the three categories. What we want to preserve while using these techniques is not the biological status quo of the mind of persons, but rather personal identities. In this perspective, there can be no general objection to cognitive enhancement. Every technique, even very traditional ones, have their drawbacks, especially when they threaten to reduce the autonomy of agents in moulding their own personal identity. (shrink)

Health is one of those everyday words that only seems self-evident in its meaning. Physiological measurements alone fail to capture the subjective dimension of health. "Health" is an end and a means--it is a foundation for achievement, a first achievement itself, and a precondition for further achievement.

Problems of distributive justice throughout the lifespan are not new. Yet, the increased aging rate of contemporary societies and an array of new life‐extending technologies (LETs) make these problems more and more urgent and complicated. This chapter analyzes the moral and political impact of the LET. There are three kinds of “intergenerational” justice: justice between non‐coexisting generations, justice between partially co‐existing generations, and justice between coexisting generations. The advantage of considering LETs in the light of justice between age groups is (...) that we can assume a complete‐life view. LETs significantly modify the duration and the features of each stage of life. A consideration of the specific needs and features of each stage of life in a lifespan‐enhanced society is needed to regulate policies and offer fair equality of opportunity to each age group. (shrink)

Nella seconda metà del Novecento la conoscenza dell'etica anglosassone in Italia è stata alquanto parziale. Si pensava che il mondo dell'etica di lingua inglese fosse stato dominato nel Novecento dallo scientismo neopositivista o pragmatista che non riusciva a concepire l'etica se non nella forma tecnicizzata dell'analisi del linguaggio o metaetica. In questo modo si è ignorata tutta una ripresa dell'etica normativa, in particolare di Kant e di Aristotele, o la ripresa del diritto naturale che ha tra i suoi principali riferimenti (...) storici il pensiero di Tommaso d'Aquino intorno alla legge. Questo volume presenta un quadro della filosofia pratica anglosassone degli ultimi cinquant'anni. (shrink)

This article tries to point out a source of potential conflict in Charles Taylor’s theoretical perspective. There is an unsolved tension between the historical reconstruction of the genealogy of the modern identity and the theoretical claim that our moral reactions are the basis of an objective assessment of practices. My intention is to analyse this tension at three different levels of discourse: first, Taylor’s position as a liberal non-atomist thinker hinges upon his idea that our moral identity depends on our (...) free determination of our relation to good, which can be pursued only within the experience of a community. Second, this Hegelian trait of his perspective is also present in his meta-ethical theory, in which our moral reactions are said to be both instinctive and culturally mediate. In this case, it is not clear how an individual or a group can transcend this limited perspective, if any appeal to reason is inextricably tied to historical delimitations. Third, the principle that any culture in itself is to be considered equally valuable appears to be disputable in front of the objection that some cultures do violate what seem to be fundamental rights and therefore do not deserve equal consideration and are not to be preserved. (shrink)

In this special issue, our aim is to analyse the role of emotions with particular attention to shaping political actions in the face of present challenges to justice. The relationship between the widespread rise of collective emotions and the experience of injustice in our societies is a pressing issue, both in our everyday practice of ethical and political discourse and in philosophical reflection and discussion. Some negative emotions—such as fear, resentment, greed, distrust towards institutions, and disrespect for basic human rights—are (...) often manipulated and amplified. Other, more positive, emotions, such as respect, hope, solidarity, and affinity, often seem to be not enough to give rise to alternative policies. This worldwide problem reflects a deep economic, social, and existential crisis. In this framework, philosophical reflection on emotions can be put fruitfully in dialogue with the contemporary philosophical analysis of collective intentionality and collective agency, which aims at investigating the nature of different types of groups and their main features as well as phenomena such as sense of group membership and group agency. Indeed, it is often argued that collective emotions boost the sense of group belonging in individual members and act to reduce uncertainty in joint actions. In normative terms, feelings such as the rejection of cruelty have been proposed as the foundation of moral equality, and even rationalistic approaches tend to focus on respect first of all as a feeling, as Kant maintained. (shrink)

Recent developments in molecular biology and genetic engineering open the possibility of rethinking the meaning of an eugenic project in contemporary society. Whereas the old eugenic movement aimed at an “improvement of the race” and explicitly adopted coercitive means, eugenetics in a liberal society would be the result of the free and equal access of the public to the genetic technologies available. Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler suggest in a recent book that access to genetic therapy and enhancement can be (...) permitted without generatine any discrimination, provided that it is regulated by rules of fairness that guarantee the equality of opportunities. Things are not so simple, anyway, because a normative model of a “perfectly healthy” individual will impose itself in the social perception, and equality of access does not protect against the discrimination of those who depart from such “perfectionist” model. A different approach is also suggested by Habermas in a recent book, where he maintains that the self-normative image of man as free and equal needs to be protected leaving the genome untouched. (shrink)

Dans le développement de l’idée de l’utopie, de la création du terme à sa diffusion et à sa torsion dans de nombreux dérivés (dystopie, hétérotropie, rétrotopie), l’intuition originale et la méthode inaugurée par Sir Thomas More en philosophie politique ont été oubliées et souvent trahies. Il faut restaurer l’esprit humaniste, réaliste et imaginatif de la pensée utopique, en clarifiant ses structures essentielles et le modus operandi de l’expérience de pensée que l’utopie utilise pour déterminer les principes d’une société raisonnablement juste (...) et heureuse. Libérée des malentendus, la pensée utopique est une ressource fondamentale pour tous les temps, mais surtout elle semble inéluctable pour le présent, où l’imagination politique semble être coincée entre des formes mal comprises de réalisme et des tentations nostalgiques. (shrink)

Philippa Foot’s Natural Goodness is a restatement of a naturalistic theory of ethics. It is an interesting book for many reasons, since the author changes her position from a broadly Humean position to a more thoroughly Aristotelian one. Foot criticizes the non-cognitivist stance and various forms of expressivism and utilitarianism. She now declares that there are categorical imperatives, a thesis she used to deny. These imperatives are based on the idea of «patterns of natural normativity» which depend on the forms (...) of life we are talking about. Human life needs practical rationality in order to flourish, and this means to have a rational will, without «volitional defect». Yet, this strategy confines practical rationality to an instrumental value and, more importantly, it can’t stand the objection that, after all, being human or flourishing as human may not be a normative ideal, e.g. from a Nietzschean point of view. Only if the will has an intrinsic side constraint as pure will, the Nietzschean objection can be faced: even a Will of Power cannot will against itself. But it can still will against nature. Naturalism, at least in this version, cannot face such a challenge. (shrink)

The distinction between internalism and externalism can be interpreted in different ways, which must be kept clearly distinct. The distinction between internal and external reasons for action, proposed by Bernard Williams , can be interpreted as expressing a form of internalism. If we assume that internalism seems preferable to externalism and Williams’s "internal reason theorist" as an internalist, we have an example of an anti-rationalistic form of internalism. I will suggest that Williams’s arguments do not justify his distinction and the (...) consequences he draws, basically because of the unjustified exclusion of rational elements from the "subjective motivational set". Moreover, Williams’s position seems exposed to a subjectivistic outcome which he himself probably would wish to avoid. Therefore, I argue that the distinction between internal and external reasons should be abandoned. Some considerations in favour of a rationalistic interpretation of internalism and of the normativity of moral reasons are then suggested. (shrink)

According to the intuitionist picture of moral normativity, prima facie duties are features of the overall nature of an act, which together make them overall right or wrong. W.D. Ross says that prima facie duties are «not a duty», but something which has a special relation to duty. These fea-tures are «apprehended» by way of an intellectual act , which implies that they are the object of a theoretical cognitive act. This image creates serious problems for both the theory of (...) moral normativity and the theory of motivation. The problem is how to explain the practical nature of duties and their connection with the will: the intuitionist picture sketches a rather passive role for the will, both in determining the obligatoriness of an action and the possible motivation for it. This rather intellectualistic picture fails to explain the authority and motivational power of moral reasons. Furthermore, the outcome of this position is to lead back to a form of naturalism and to a problematic externalist explanation of moral motivation. In the end it is suggested that a more thoroughly Kantian theory of normativity shows a more promising picture for this problem. (shrink)

The interpretation of experimental data in neuroscientific research concerning moral decisions is controversial. One of the leading experimenters in the field, Joshua Greene, holds that the data show that deontological theories of morality are the expression of a confabulation which tries to give a rational justification for emotional responses. His arguments are criticized on the basis of a different interpretation of deontology. On the other hand, Marc Hauser, John Mikhail and others have proposed a research project in moral psychology called (...) Universal Moral Grammar. This perspective is more promising as far as the normative dimension of moral judgment is concerned. Yet, it is suggested that rather than looking for the universal moral principles we should look for the formal principles of morality, in a more thoroughly Kantian perspective. (shrink)

Our reproductive imaginaries have changed considerably in the XX century. This cultural change can be described as a transition from Utopia to Dystopia. Plato imagined that in his perfect State women and children were in common, and that adequately matched couples would yield a perfect breed. On the contrary, Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) is based on a modern liberal view of the family, where divorce is allowed and relationships are free. Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1602) understands relationships (...) exactly in terms of a eugenic policy. Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis (1626) also conceives of generation as a public good. Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1934) creates a vision of reproduction as a total nightmare. The whole process of reproduction has been taken into control by an ideology. We must distinguish liberal utopias from totalitarian ones, which evolve into dystopias. (shrink)

Recent proposals to think about philosophy as conceptual design (Floridi, 2019) fail to understand the scope and method of philosophical thinking. The goal of philosophy is truth, but truth has a double direction: towards theory and towards practice. The design is in the middle and it lacks the criteria in order to evaluate itself, since its truth depends on the theory on which it is based and on the practical use of its functions. Furthermore, design lacks critical ability, since only (...) the horizon of existence, in social and political terms, offers the possibility to judge about the validity of a project. (shrink)

The concept of character has a long history in moral philosophy. Three fundamental versions can be identified: the Aristotelian, the Humean, and the Kantian. The Aristotelian concept of character is based on the model of the wise person, who shapes her feeling according to reason. The Humean character is based exclusively on feelings, having as a criterion the feeling of approval for virtue and disapproval for vice. The Kantian character is based on freedom as autonomy and on the feeling of (...) respect. I argue that the Kantian concept avoids the risk of depending on metaphysics (as the Aristotelian model does) and of lacking universal value (as the Humean model does). (shrink)