By a free logic is generally meant a variant of classical first-order logic in which constant terms may, under interpretation, fail to refer to individuals in the domain D over which the bound variables range, either because they do not refer at all or because they refer to individuals outside D. If D is identified with what is assumed by the given interpretation to exist, in accord with Quine’s dictum that “to be is to be the value of a [bound] (...) variable,” then a free variation on classical semantics does not require that all constant terms refer to existents, and in this sense such terms lack existential import. (shrink)

Although preservationists sometimes allege a right of wild areas to remain wild, their arguments do not warrant the ascription of such a right. It is hard to see how any argument to this conclusion could be persuasive, for (1) X having a right to Y requires that depriving X of Y injure X (other things being equal), and (2) the only X we have reason to think can be injured is an X which possesses consciousness. On the other hand, rights (...) are problematic creatures, and the individualistic moral view they presuppose does not accord well with the holistic perspective of many preservationists. While it might be possible to develop this perspective into a moral theory that gives wildemess intrinsic value, there seems a greater need for clarifying the policy implications of accepted moral principles. (shrink)

Although preservationists sometimes allege a right of wild areas to remain wild, their arguments do not warrant the ascription of such a right. It is hard to see how any argument to this conclusion could be persuasive, for X having a right to Y requires that depriving X of Y injure X, and the only X we have reason to think can be injured is an X which possesses consciousness. On the other hand, rights are problematic creatures, and the individualistic (...) moral view they presuppose does not accord well with the holistic perspective of many preservationists. While it might be possible to develop this perspective into a moral theory that gives wildemess intrinsic value, there seems a greater need for clarifying the policy implications of accepted moral principles. (shrink)

This work critically examines the thesis that public lands would be more productive if they were private, or, failing that, managed as if they were private. The author argues that there is no sense of `productivity' for which it is true that greater productivity is both desirable and a likely consequence of privatizing public lands or `marketizing' their management. The discussion is self-contained, with background chapters on federal lands, management agencies, economics, and ethics.