Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 55-66, February 2022.

Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 55-66, February 2022.

In this article we focus on how the language of developmental psychology shapes our conceptualisations and understandings of childrearing and of the parent-child relationship. By analysing some examples of contemporary research, policy and popular literature on parenting and parenting support in the UK and Flanders, we explore some of the ways in which normative assumptions about parenthood and upbringing are imported into these areas through the language of developmental psychology. We go on to address the particular attraction of developmental psychology (...) in the field of parenting and upbringing within our current cultural context. Drawing on the work of (among others) Zygmunt Bauman, we will show how developmental psychology, as one of the instruments that contributes to a breaking down of our existential condition into a series of well-defined, and thus apparently manageable, tasks and categories, displaces rather than confronts the possibly limitless depth of the enormity of the reality of ‘being a parent’. (shrink)

The new idea of a 'parenting contract', explicitly taking as its point of reference the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, is meant primarily to protect children's rights, and specifically the right to a proper upbringing. The nature of the parent-child relationship is thus drawn into the discourse of rights and duties. Although there is much to be said for parents explicitly attending to their children's upbringing, something of the uniqueness of the parent-child relationship seems to be (...) occluded by the language of rights and duties as that relationship becomes narrowed down to the confines of a contractual agreement. What comes to be foregrounded in the parent-child relationship is a defence of the various parties'—the parents' and the child's—interests. By drawing on the work of Annette Baier, we argue that this has considerable consequences in terms of trust and distrust, and parental engagement. It is questioned whether the concept of the parenting contract brings about the positive climate of engagement which it is meant to promote. (shrink)

In this article, we explore to what extent parents should be ‘educators’ of their children. In the course of this exploration, we offer some examples of these practices and ways of speaking and thinking, indicate some of the problems and limitations they import into our understanding of the parent–child relationship, and make some tentative suggestions towards an alternative way of thinking about this relationship.

In this paper we explore a new way to deal with social inequality and injustice in an educational way. We do so by offering a particular reading of a scene taken from Minnelli's film The Band Wagon which is often regarded as overly western-centred and racist. We argue, however, that the way in which words and movements in this scene function are expressive of an event that can be read as a new beginning and that it is for this reason (...) in and of itself educational. By drawing on Agamben's and Cavell's insights on childhood and what it means to acquire a language, we argue that in this scene a form of childhood is displayed which denotes a general condition for education to take place in children and grown-ups alike. Hence, education can be understood as a interruption of existing power structures and as a transformation of one's existence. (shrink)

Recently several educational theorists have argued for the incorporation of a scepticism of a postmodern kind into educational theory and into educational research more specifically. Their understanding of postmodernism in terms of scepticism harbours much potential, but to avoid confusion and misunderstanding it is of importance that the ‘scepticism’ associated with postmodernism is distinguished from traditional philosophical scepticism, be it as part of the very process of theoretical scrutiny or as a challenge towards its results. In this paper it will (...) be argued that the interest of postmodernist ‘scepticism’ lies not in a quest for ever more certainty but rather in the way it moves beyond both foundationalism and philosophical scepticism. This will be elaborated from the point of view of a Wittgensteinian understanding of theoretical scrutiny (as found in On Certainty). This opens up the possibility of shedding light on postmodernist ‘scepticism’ in educational theory in terms of an aesthetic distance towards what is reflected upon. (shrink)

In much educational theory there is concern about claims that the concept of truth has no place anymore in educational thinking. These claims are generally identified as ‘postmodernist’ or ‘poststructuralist’. The fear is that when abandoning the quest for truth we enter the domain of mere belief, and in this way leave education without firm grounds. In this article I examine some examples of what is often crudely lumped together as ‘postmodernist’ educational research. What is at stake here, I argue, (...) is not so much a rejection of the quest for truth as rather a shift of focus to a different set of questions and interests: for example, existential questions. Against the contemporary, dominant focus on evidence-based practice, which conceals the person behind the method (textbook, rules, techniques), here the embodied person with her individual investment in education is brought into the light again. (shrink)

Recently several educational theorists have argued for the incorporation of a scepticism of a postmodern kind into educational theory and into educational research more specifically. Their understanding of postmodernism in terms of scepticism harbours much potential, but to avoid confusion and misunderstanding it is of importance that the ‘scepticism’ associated with postmodernism is distinguished from traditional philosophical scepticism, be it as part of the very process of theoretical scrutiny or as a challenge towards its results. In this paper it will (...) be argued that the interest of postmodernist ‘scepticism’ lies not in a quest for ever more certainty but rather in the way it moves beyond both foundationalism and philosophical scepticism. This will be elaborated from the point of view of a Wittgensteinian understanding of theoretical scrutiny (as found in On Certainty). This opens up the possibility of shedding light on postmodernist ‘scepticism’ in educational theory in terms of an aesthetic distance towards what is reflected upon. (shrink)

To understand Nietzsche's view of education requires us to grasp the importance Nietzsche attaches to being embedded in a particular historical and cultural frame. Education is, at least in the early stages, a matter of teaching the child to see and to value particular things or, in Nietzsche's way of putting this, teaching the child to lie. Here I develop an interpretation contrary to those who emphasise Nietzsche's radical individualism and thus view his Overman in subjectivistic terms. I argue that (...) Nietzsche's most important lesson is not that we are to create anything radically new, but rather that we are to take up a serious engagement with respect to what we stand for. (shrink)

In this essay Luc Van den Berge and Stefan Ramaekers take the idea of “scientific parenting” as an example of ambiguities that are typical of our late-modern condition. On the one hand, parenting seems like a natural thing to do, which makes “scientific parenting” sound like an oxymoron; on the other hand, a disengaged stance informed by the latest scientific findings is uncritically demanded of parents, as such an approach is conceived of as a panacea. Instead of taking sides in (...) this discussion, the authors seek a way to make sense of it, drawing upon the work of Charles Taylor, who offers a striking account of our contingent modern condition as well as of our ontological human constitution. They focus particularly on two examples Taylor gives where the contingent self-understanding does not coincide with our timeless human features. This opens a space for what might be considered paradoxes in our late-modern Western culture. This essay thus confronts Taylor's philosophy with the new parenting discourse to reveal how our moral horizons have evolved. Following this approach, the authors both expand on Taylor's thinking about our late modernity and at the same time try to assess the new scientific parenting discourse. (shrink)

Ethics and Education, Volume 6, Issue 2, Page 101-108, July 2011.

ABSTRACT In recent years a tightening of safeguarding legislation and protocols that overlap with anti-terror legislation have given particular shape to discourses and practices of risk management and early intervention, particularly in early childhood education and parenting. Such developments have taken place in a context in which digital technology has become ubiquitous, enabling the role of surveillance in modes of governing to take on new forms. Here as well as giving an overview of literature on the digital in general, we (...) also focus more specifically on the parent-child relationship and the use of digital technology by parents. We then survey recent theorisations of securitisation from other fields, but again focus specifically on its relation to childhood and parenting. We bring digitisation and securitisation together here to consider how the particular form of individualisation produced today is recasting how we think about parents, teachers and children. (shrink)

Educational Theory, Volume 71, Issue 4, Page 435-454, August 2021.

Noddings’s radical choice for a particular stance in life is both what makes Happiness and Education a thought-provoking book and what also leads me to have some reservations. First, I briefly outline some of these reservations and focus on what I think are two important difficulties Happiness and Education faces: firstly, the fact that Noddings’s choice for a particular conception of the good is likely to run into resistance and even incomprehension, and secondly, the observation that Noddings seems to be (...) up against history itself by taking on the hierarchical valuation of intellectual work versus non-intellectual work. Second, I argue that these very difficulties, and the types of reactions they garner, show that this text is at the same time a thoughtprovoking book, for it shows that, drawing on Wittgenstein, we seem to have reached bedrock. Following Stanley Cavell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s remark on the turning of our spade, I try to show that and how Noddings throws us back upon ourselves, confronting us with our own educational present, hence exposing this present. The force of the book lies, I argue, not so much in adducing reasons to persuade its readers, but in originating a slow turning of our educational present, towards a different educational future. (shrink)

It is not uncommon to hear parents say in discussions they have with their children 'Look at it this way'. And called upon for their advice, counsellors too say something to adults with the significance of 'Try to see it like this'. The change of someone's perspective in the context of child rearing is the focus of this paper. Our interest in this lies not so much in giving an answer to the practical problems that are at stake, but at (...) disentangling the issues on a conceptual level. Within the so-called second part of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein deals with shared practices and with concepts such as 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. What he says there is in terms of content linked with his earlier Tractatus position concerning ethics, a matter which will first be dealt with. After that, the relevant sections of his later work are discussed. Following Cavell, it is concluded that to try to get someone to see what one sees, necessarily presupposes giving it out of one's hands. The passivity this points at highlights what Erziehung in the end comes down to. (shrink)

This article is a discussion of a dominant (and mostly taken-for-granted) discourse of multicultural education (the phrase 'intercultural education' is sometimes used). My aim is, simply, to highlight two issues which, I think, are insufficiently dealt with in relation to multicultural education: the observation that differences can be irreconcilable and the idea of change. In the first part of this article, I try to sketch this discourse by giving some examples in which some characteristic markers of this discourse are illustrated (...) (such as the idea of initiation in a variety of perspectives, of inclusion of a diversity of viewpoints, hearing multiple voices, of enrichment of our own way of looking at the world, etc.). In the second part of this article, I will rehearse some familiar concepts regarding what it means to be initiated into socio-historical and cultural practices, drawing mainly on Cavell. The point here is to bring out a sense of a human being's embeddedness in a form of life that at the same time cuts very deep (i.e. affectively, even physically, anchored) and is incomplete (i.e. there is an irreducible, though unidentifiable lack), for the purpose of addressing the two issues mentioned (irreconcilable differences and change). Here the theme of voice (and what is involved in owning a voice) will be briefly developed, again by drawing on Cavell. In the final part of this article, I will try to draw some implications for multicultural education. (shrink)

In ‘Problematising Critique in Pedagogy’ Jörg Ruhloff develops a concept of critique that is motivated by a deep concern for the state of humanity. This is a thought-provoking development of critique, but I find myself disagreeing over, or rather simply unconvinced by, his understanding of the human condition, and, connected to this, of criticism. Referring to Nietzsche, I start by illustrating one way in which a concept of critique such as Ruhloff's may in some sense be implied in educational praxis, (...) focusing mainly on his concern that critique is not domesticated by political, economic, or other forces. In the second section I draw on Stanley Cavell to discuss some contentious aspects of Ruhloff's construal of criticism. Here I focus on Ruhloff's claim to universality, as contained in his appeal to what he calls the condition of human rationality and to a procedure of critical-transcendental-sceptical deliberation over the presuppositions of different standpoints. Ruhloff's understanding of criticism exemplifies an attitude that presents itself as a hostility to the ordinary. Connected to this, I sketch a conception of scepticism that is different—viz. more dynamic—than his understanding of it as a kind of methodological tool in the service of exposing presuppositions. Scepticism needs to be acknowledged in existential terms, as inherent to the human condition: a condition of life with language. With further reference to Cavell, the importance of expression, of revealing oneself as an exemplar, can then be emphasised. I conclude, in the third section, by indicating in what sense I find that a commitment to substantial judgements is lacking in Ruhloff's conception of critique and criticality. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to recent critical work on the current parenting culture. It does so by a critical reading of the individual words/parts of the sentence ?Parents need to become independent problem solvers? ? a characteristic phrase of ?Triple P?, a parenting programme that has recently been implemented as a form of parenting support in a number of countries. The paper aims (1) to bring out and expose some of the worrying features of the current parenting culture, (2) (...) criticise its narrow conceptions of what a parent is and what childrearing is, (3) by doing so give a sense of the oddness of implementing Triple P as a form of parenting support and, finally, (4) tentatively suggest alternative routes of thinking for and about childrearing as well as ?grafting points? to start reconstructing parenting support practices. (shrink)

To understand Nietzsche's view of education requires us to grasp the importance Nietzsche attaches to being embedded in a particular historical and cultural frame. Education is, at least in the early stages, a matter of teaching the child to see and to value particular things or, in Nietzsche's way of putting this, teaching the child to lie. Here I develop an interpretation contrary to those who emphasise Nietzsche's radical individualism and thus view his Overman in subjectivistic terms. I argue that (...) Nietzsche's most important lesson is not that we are to create anything radically new, but rather that we are to take up a serious engagement with respect to what we stand for. (shrink)